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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a case study of a cross-border network of labor unions at the 
Brazilian steel company, Gerdau. In the thesis I trace the ten-year development of this 
union network from its informal origins to a to a more comprehensive model of global 
unionism. Finally, I identify four key functions of cross-border networks: coalitions, 
campaigns, capacity building, and contracts. I hypothesize that each of these functions 
addresses a specific challenge to building and expanding bargaining power at 
multinational corporations (MNCs). The thesis concludes that unions will need to 
make long-term commitments to deepening cross-border activity in each of these four 
areas in order to build bargaining power.  
The Gerdau network began with a series of informal exchanges between North 
American and Brazilian trade unionists between 1998 and 2003. These exchanges 
began a process of information sharing and trust building between unions setting the 
foundation for more comprehensive cross-border activity as the network expanded.  
In 2005, Gerdau Ameristeel locked out 270 United Steelworkers (USW) members in 
Beaumont, Texas. Between 2005-2007, the USW worked with allies in North 
America, South America, and Europe to build a broad comprehensive global campaign 
to end the lockout and ensure that all its North American union locations were under 
contracts. In 2006 eleven unions representing workers at Gerdau globally formed the 
Gerdau Workers‟ World Council (GWWC). The GWWC was designed to be a more 
formal body for information sharing, coordinated activity and decision-making 
amongst Gerdau unions. These unions have made a long-term commitment to further 
cross-border collaboration with the goal of signing an International Framework 
Agreement (IFA) with Gerdau management.  
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Introduction 
On November 16, 2006 seventy trade unionists from nine countries met in a 
hotel conference room in Porto Alegre, Brazil. These trade unionists, from Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, the United States, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, and Spain, had 
come to Porto Alegre to discuss, plan and vote on the formation and agenda of the 
Gerdau Workers‟ World Council (GWWC), a cross-border union network 
representing workers globally at the Brazilian steel company, Gerdau. The Porto 
Alegre meeting included not just trade unionists but representatives from the 
International Metalworkers Federation (IMF), the Canadian Steelworker Humanity 
Fund, and the Brazilian union research institute DIEESE. Workers gave reports on 
their respective relationships with Gerdau management in their home countries; 
researchers gave presentations on the differences in legal and organizational structures 
between countries and on the state of the global steel industry; participants debated 
strategies for building towards an International Framework Agreement (IFA) with 
Gerdau management.  
For Gerdau workers the November 2006 meeting was a critical moment in 
itself: the establishment of a formal global union network in order to maintain 
communication between Gerdau workers globally, share information, formulate 
strategy, and build towards an IFA. This level of international coordination and 
cooperation between multiple unions is rare enough in itself, but the Porto Alegre 
meeting was notable not just for what went on inside the conference room, but for how 
it came about and the context in which it was occurring.  
This meeting, while the official founding of the GWWC, was actually the third 
international meeting of Gerdau workers. Workers from Brazil, Canada and Chile, 
with coordination from the Canadian Steelworker Humanity Fund, met for the first 
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time in 1998. In 2003 Gerdau workers from around the world met again, this time with 
representatives from Argentina, Uruguay, the United States and the IMF present. 
These international meetings had evolved out of a national network of Gerdau workers 
in Brazil begun in the 1980s.  
The 2006 GWWC meeting was attended by a delegation of workers from 
Canadian, US, Argentine, Brazilian, Uruguayan and Colombian Gerdau locals. Led by 
Judith Marshall of the Canadian Steelworker Humanity Fund, these workers had spent 
two weeks touring Gerdau facilities in Colombia and Brazil, meeting face to face with 
other rank and file Gerdau workers and comparing notes on their respective legal and 
union frameworks. This study group was unique because it integrated a face-to-face, 
pedagogical, worker education component to the cross-border strategies at Gerdau. 
Workers were encouraged to understand and question how their local and national 
unions were structured (existence of a grievance procedure, multiple unions in a 
workplace, presence of shop stewards etc), how this structure was similar to or 
different from that of other unions, and how workers could build from these 
similarities and differences. Rank and file workers were forming personal 
relationships across-borders with other Gerdau workers. To coordinate cross-border 
activity, unions in the North would need to understand the legal and structural contexts  
in which unions in the Global South operated. Perhaps most importantly, workers 
needed to see the communities their fellow workers lived in, eat with them in their 
union halls and meet their families to make personal bonds which would outlast a 
week-long trip.  
November 2006 also commemorated the eighteen-month anniversary of the 
lockout of 270 US steelworkers at a Gerdau facility in Beaumont, Texas. The 
members of United Steelworkers (USW) Local 8586 had been locked out by Gerdau 
Ameristeel (Gerdau‟s North American subsidiary) in May 2005 shortly after being 
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acquired, along with three other USW locals, from North Star/Cargill. Soon after the 
lockout, the USW launched a global campaign to end the lockout and had already 
achieved a partial victory when Gerdau ended the lockout in December 2005. But the 
campaign continued as more North American USW Gerdau contracts expired without 
collective bargaining agreements.  
By the November 2006 GWWC meetings, the USW campaign had gone 
beyond the traditional confines of the bargaining table to incorporate global allies 
across North America, Latin America and Western Europe, environmental and 
regulatory agencies, shareholders, and political allies in both the US and Brazil. There 
was not one single “magic bullet” strategy to bring Gerdau back to the table. The 
USW carefully mapped Gerdau‟s operations, profit centers, key actors and followed 
the flows of power to build an effective comprehensive campaign. Understanding 
how, where and through whom power circulated was a key component in formulating 
a campaign strategy.  Leverage from traditional bargaining table tactics would not be 
enough to take on a powerful multinational firm. The USW expanded its network of 
leverage from the bargaining table to the surrounding community, national unions, 
regulatory agencies and ultimately, integrated the broad network of union allies in 
North America, Latin America and Western Europe to build a campaign to bring 
Gerdau Ameristeel management back to the table. The Gerdau union network 
provided critical infrastructure for the USW‟s cross-border campaign. 
The seventy trade unionists in the Porto Alegre hotel room were there to 
officially establish the GWWC, but this step was more than just a formality. 
Establishing the GWWC was just one way of articulating the legacy of other activities 
that had preceded it. The workers at the Porto Alegre meeting, and many others who 
couldn‟t make it, had been activists and internationalists for years before. While the 
2006 GWWC meeting was an achievement in itself, it was not an extraordinary stretch 
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of the imagination for these workers. Rather, the meeting was the logical next step 
given the diverse cross-border activities Gerdau workers had been engaged in for the 
past eight years: study groups, solidarity campaigns, information exchange, strategic 
research, and face to face interactions through barbeques and social gatherings.  
 
Thesis Context and Theoretical Issues 
This thesis is a case study of how the Gerdau union network evolved from its 
informal origins to a more formal and comprehensive form of cross-border 
organization. Why has the Gerdau network lasted for more than ten years while others 
have foundered or developed unevenly? What processes and activities have given the 
Gerdau network sufficient vitality and flexibility to balance the needs of multiple 
members with different interests? What explains both continuity of organization and 
depth of activity at Gerdau? What lessons does the Gerdau case offer for other unions‟ 
attempts to develop cross-border strategies? 
To answer these questions I posit four key processes of cross-border union 
activity: coalitions, campaigns, capacity building, and contracts. Over the last thirty 
years unions in various countries have used these strategies to build bargaining power 
and promote solidarity between workers; none of them are new or “innovative” 
strategies in themselves. But, more often than not, these strategies have been used 
individually, opportunistically, and unevenly, rather than as part of a more 
comprehensive approach to building cross-border unionism.  
Surprisingly, a theoretical framework for analyzing these processes in their 
interaction with each other has never been formulated. Instead of seeing one 
campaign, or the signing of an IFA as the sole litmus test for successful cross-border 
union strategy, researchers need a more comprehensive framework through which to 
analyze cross-border unionism. A solidarity campaign, the signing of an IFA, or the 
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establishment of the GWWC in the Gerdau case, is often the result of immense efforts 
over many years by unions, usually in the face of corporate opposition, and should not 
be underestimated as an important indicator of success, but in themselves these 
achievements are rarely able to encompass the full range of activities needed to build 
both continuity over time and depth of activity.  
I argue that what is needed is not just a grab bag or laundry list of tactics and 
strategies for unions to use, but a strategic framework for building long-term cross-
border unionism. Many unions have tried various individual international strategies, 
but these strategies have usually been piecemeal and defensive with little follow-up 
(Nissen 1999). Activities such as cross-border campaigns or worker-to-worker 
exchanges have not been integrated into other cross-border processes such as research 
or shared decision-making. When these processes are disconnected from other 
important union functions they will remain isolated and produce isolated gains. 
Isolated gains in collective bargaining, organizing and political support are more 
easily rolled back by the efforts of multinationals (through coercion or co-opting of 
these gains) leading unions to constantly engage in rearguard, defensive actions 
(Hickey 2004). Many authors have touted the need for international activity by unions 
to combat the growth of multinationals (Banks and Russo 1999; Gordon and Turner 
2000; Stevis and Boswell 2008), but what is needed is not just an increase in the 
frequency of activity, but a qualitative deepening of cross-border activities in a way 
that reinforces other core activities.  
This thesis was inspired by the hypothesis that cross-border campaigns by 
themselves are not enough to build lasting bargaining power at multinational firms. 
Campaigns are an important piece of labor‟s international strategies, but in order for 
the gains made during these campaigns to be long lasting, campaigns must be 
combined with other international strategies to ensure both organizational continuity 
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and durable collective bargaining gains. As Bronfenbrenner (2007) explains, “Finally, 
unions can no longer afford to limit their cross-border activity to defensive actions. 
Strategies such as strategic corporate research, worker-to-worker exchanges, global 
coalition building, and comprehensive campaigns need to become a constant in the 
organizing and bargaining relationship with these large transnational firms” (2007:14).  
While there has been increasing an amount of research on comprehensive 
campaigns as a tool for union revitalization (Banks and Russo, 1999, Greven and 
Russo 2003), it is important for unions to recognize that campaigns alone will not 
produce lasting gains at most corporations. Hickey (2004) notes in his analysis of the 
1996-2001 Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Union (PACE)  campaign at 
Crown Petroleum  
 
The third lesson of the Crown dispute is that sustained revitalization of the US 
labor movement requires more than the effective application of comprehensive 
campaign tactics. While PACE succeeded in rebuilding bargaining power by 
reaching out to other stakeholders and expanding network of leverage against 
Crown, the strategy is reserved for disputes where the existence of the union is 
at stake. (2004: 139) 
Likewise, unions will need not just internal organizational change within their own 
unions, as Hickey argues, but new structures for representing workers across-borders, 
especially at multinational corporations (MNCs). Cross-border comprehensive 
campaigns are a critical component of transnational union strategy, but when used 
only in defensive crisis situations, in isolation from other activities such as organizing, 
collective bargaining and coalition building, or without proper financial or institutional 
support, the gains made by these campaigns are likely to be short-lived. More 
importantly, without direct worker participation in cross-border activity, the process of 
sowing internationalism at the rank and file level, will be thinly rooted and unlikely to 
fulfill the project of renewal at the grass roots (Marshall and Garcia-Orgales 2006).  
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While I argue this case is a story of success where others have failed, it is 
always a precarious success story. Since there is no scientific model for building 
cross-border unions, the Gerdau network must evolve and adapt to new and unique 
situations. The Gerdau case is not the story of an ideal form of cross-border 
organization. Like any organization, the Gerdau case has its faults and weaknesses, 
discussed below, but thus far it has rooted itself in a solid foundation of trust and 
mutual respect, rank and file participation, an aggressive approach to defending 
workers rights, and a shared commitment to future organization. Through both its 
strengths and its weaknesses, the Gerdau network has articulated a range of key 
components for cross-border union activity. It is this articulation of key processes, 
rather than their absolute success or failure that makes the Gerdau case an important 
model for a case study.  
In order to understand this process of building cross-border unionism I trace 
the history of the Gerdau network from its early stages of informal exchange to the 
more formalized structure of the GWWC. I begin by setting out a theoretical 
framework through which to examine the cross-border unions. The next chapter is a 
review of existing literature on cross-border unionism. This is followed by a history of 
cross-border strategies at the USW and CUT in order to provide context for the 
understanding the formation and development of the Gerdau network and relevant 
cross-border strategies.  
The case study begins in 1998 with the First Inter-American Meeting of 
Gerdau Workers and documents the early exchanges between unions at Gerdau. The 
chapter on the USW‟s 2005-2007 North American comprehensive campaign 
highlights the role of cross-border strategies in the campaign as well as the Gerdau 
network‟s role in these strategies. A short chapter on the foundation of the GWWC in 
2006 concludes the case study section. Finally, in the conclusion I will discuss four 
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characteristics of the Gerdau network through the original theoretical framework and 
discuss other relevant, contextual influences such as the role of national networks, 
Global Union Federations (GUFs), and bridgebuilders. I conclude by addressing some 
challenges to the theoretical model and Gerdau case and offering some prospects for 
future research.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
In recent years cross-border networks, especially cross-border union networks, 
have become an important subject for activists and scholars (Keck and Sikkink 1998; 
Evans 2000; Anner 2004; Seidman 2007). Keck and Sikkink define networks as 
“forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns 
of communication and exchange…it stresses fluid and open relations among 
committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialized issue areas” (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998: 8). In the trade union context I define networks as linkages created 
between unions represented by a common multinational employer, unions linked to a 
multinational through commodity chains, and employees linked through outsourcing 
or indirect ownership. These networks are “counter-hegemonic” (Evans 2000), and 
expand the scope of core union activity, bargaining, organizing, and political activity, 
to a broader set of organizations in order to reflect the cross-border and often cross-
industry organization of multinational firms.   
 This thesis argues that in order for unions to build strategic, long-term 
bargaining power at multinational firms, unions will need to engage in four key 
processes: coalitions, campaigns, capacity building, and contracts. These activities 
should be done in a way that reinforces and strengthens other key activities: 
campaigns to achieve or enforce basic rights for all workers, grassroots, rank and file 
coalitions to build stronger representation at the international level etc. Engaging in 
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these activities on their own, without reinforcing mechanisms, may lead to victories 
but these will tend to be fleeting and difficult to sustain over the long term (Hickey 
2004). 
 International solidarity needs to be developed and worked on, not taken for 
granted. Unions need to develop systematic programs for developing cross-border 
networks rather than relying on ad hoc or defensive coalitions created after a crisis has 
broken out. Each network will be organizationally unique depending on industrial and 
commodity chain context, degrees of union internationalism, mix of union/NGO 
participation and level of activity but each of these networks provide important 
resources for unions on the local or national level. To explain my framework I present 
cross-border union networks as a set of four processes which constitute network 
activity. Each of these processes responds to a specific challenge labor unions are 
faced with when building and expanding multinational bargaining power.  
 
Challenge #1: Competition from other workers. 
Coalitions  
First, networks build union-to-union coalitions and member-to-member 
relationships. To define coalition work I borrow Tarrow‟s (2005) term “socialization 
through collective action.” Describing transnational protest events Tarrow writes, “But 
participation in such events can be transformative for those who participate in them. 
The experience of marching side by side with others from different countries and areas 
of interest can help create broader identities and issue definitions” (2005:178). Worker 
exchanges, study groups, and cross-border meetings build a foundation for other, more 
developed forms of cross-border union work by first creating a psychic and physical 
transformation in how workers view their counterparts in other countries. Seeing other 
workers as allies, not as competition, is the first, and most fundamental, step in 
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building long-term cross-border networks. Coalition building is the organizational 
principle upon which other network activities are based. 
It is helpful here to note Johns‟ (1998) distinction between “accomodationist” 
and “transformatory” solidarity to emphasize that simply engaging in global 
exchanges is not transformatory in itself. For Johns “accomodationist” solidarity 
“seeks not to transform social relations, but to accommodate them while reasserting 
the dominance of a particular group of workers within capitalism‟s spatial structures” 
(1998:256). By contrast,  
 
In a transformatory solidarity organization, universal class interests dominate 
over interests that are spatially derived and rooted. Campaigns are designed to 
unite workers across space in order to fundamentally transform social relations 
of production into something more humane, by preventing capital‟s wanton 
production of space, its creation and perpetuation of uneven development. In 
this case, solidarity programs seek to equalize both social conditions and 
investment for job creation. Such efforts do not prioritize one set of workers 
over another. (Johns 1998: 256) 
 
Coalition work must qualitatively encourage solidarity by overcoming national, 
gendered, racial and geographical boundaries.  
Two components of Johns‟ work are important in order to assess the 
effectiveness of coalition building. First, “specialized agenda” as “an understanding of 
the critical importance of the spatial division between workers, particularly at the 
international scale, in preventing the empowerment of the international working 
class.” (Johns 1998: 257). How do workers, and by extension the organizations and 
union officials who represent them, understand spatial versus class differences vis a 
vis capital? Are workers and their union‟s interests aligned with the interests of 
national capital, or do workers see themselves as members of an international working 
class without allegiance to a national ideology? The second category for assessing the 
effectiveness of coalition building is the relationship between “self-interest and shared 
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interests.” Johns writes, “Solidarity level is also shaped by a group‟s definition of its 
own self-interest in relation to what it perceives as the interests of workers in other 
countries” (Johns 1998: 257). While Johns notes that no organization can function out 
of complete altruism, the degree to which workers define their own self-interest as 
equal to those in other countries is a measure of international solidarity. Are workers‟ 
interests the same irrespective of national origin, or do they see themselves as 
competing with other workers for the same jobs? 
Exchanges, study groups and social events reinforcing “transformatory” 
solidarity are important to union networks because they involve rank and file workers 
directly interacting with other rank and file workers from other countries. This has 
multiple effects. First, as one union official described, it “makes members 
internationalists.” Worker exchanges may provide opportunities to expand 
geographical frames of reference (and possibility for action) and create a positive view 
of other workers, not simply as competition or “Other.”  
Second, exchanges plant the seed of internationalism as a possible instrument 
for local union activity. Seemingly local or plant level issues may be better resolved 
through international strategies. It is uncommon for workers on the local level to put 
forward global solutions to local problems unless these workers have some direct 
connection to cross-border structures or representation. Exchanges and participation in 
cross-border structures such as union networks open the door to employ global tactics 
in local contexts.  
All of these are possible, and more effective, when workers are able to meet 
their brothers and sisters, discuss issues in common, and share social events. “This 
transnational education effort is intended to give participants an experience of 
„globalization on the ground.‟ The idea is that the visceral experience of meeting 
counterparts, in their homes and communities, combined with a framework on 
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globalization can contribute to building support within the union for its international 
agenda…” (Shaiken et al. 2002:351).  These shared personal bonds between workers 
become bonds of solidarity and provide the fiber of more extensive global 
organization.  
HYPOTHESIS #1: Labor transnationalism which views foreign workers as 
competition for similar jobs and/or views foreign workers’ interests as different or 
unequal to domestic workers will produce pressures to divide workers in the same 
firm. This produces uneven development of bargaining power and reduces the 
likelihood of worker activity based on solidarity. In order to challenge this trend 
workers and their unions will need to engage in transnational activities encouraging 
“shared interests.” 
 
Challenge #2: Building and Expanding Bargaining Power 
Campaigns 
 Campaign work may be done to support organizing, collective bargaining or 
union recognition. Bronfenbrenner and Juravich discuss the central role of campaigns: 
“Collective bargaining and contract campaigns matter because they are the focal point 
for the power and voice that workers can achieve only through unionization. 
Collective-bargaining campaigns are also the forum in which unions and union 
members most connect with customers, clients, and the broader public. When 
successful, these campaigns result in a significant expansion of union organizing 
opportunities, bargaining leverage, political clout, and a concomitant shift of public 
support towards unions. When they fail…they undermine labor‟s efforts for years to 
come” (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 2001: 212). 
Bronfebrenner and Hickey (2003) outline ten elements of a “comprehensive 
organizing model”: adequate staff and financial resources, strategic targeting and 
13 
 
research, active and representative rank and file committees, participation of volunteer 
organizers, person to person contact inside and outside the workplace, benchmarks to 
assess goals, issues which resonate in the community at large, escalating pressure 
tactics involving members internally in the workplace and externally in the 
community, and building for a first contract before the election. Their survey of 
organizing campaigns found that “across all industrial sectors, percent win rates are 
much higher in elections where unions use a comprehensive organizing strategy 
incorporating more than five comprehensive tactics, compared to campaigns where 
they used five or fewer tactics.” (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2003: 24).  
Campaigns have developed from early forms of “corporate campaigns” (Jarley 
and Maranto 1990) to more sophisticated and “comprehensive” campaigns using 
strategic research to find vulnerabilities in company‟s corporate structure and growth 
plan (Juravich 2007). Successful campaigns expand local and national union bases, 
build member density, produce new opportunities for union activity and send the 
message of solidarity to management. Networks may be used as an infrastructure of 
communication and solidarity support during campaigns (Banks and Russo 1999; 
Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 2003). Some global campaigns such as the 
Bridgestone/Firestone and Continental Tire campaigns have been responses to 
situations “where the existence of the union is at stake,” (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 
2003; Greven and Russo 2003; Hickey 2004) while others have been designed as more 
proactive and strategic campaign components (Witt and Wilson 1999; Frundt 2002; 
Garver et al 2007). Campaigns such as the Justice @ Quebecor campaign used 
volunteer organizers from foreign countries on house calls (Tate 2006). In both 
offensive and defensive campaigns, cross-border solidarity networks have proved to 
be crucial components to the campaign outcomes.  
14 
 
HYPOTHESIS #2: Unions who use comprehensive organizing and bargaining 
strategies to organize the unorganized and bargain collective agreements will produce 
longer lasting and deeper gains in bargaining power. 
 
Challenge #3: Continuity of organization and internal voice 
Capacity Building 
Capacity building is the means by which networks become both 
institutionalized and democratized in order to build long-term continuity and 
organizational structure. While networks are celebrated for their flexibility and 
horizontal organization, Tarrow notes “In contrast to the excitement and spontaneity 
of decentralized international events, institutionalization can seem like a tired 
bureaucratic solution…some degree of institutionalization is needed to transform these 
encounters into enduring coalitions” (2005: 177).  Cross-border campaigns, solidarity 
activity, and other “event coalitions” (Tarrow 2005) tend to produce short-term, but 
high-involvement alliances focused on one common goal. These coalitions are less 
likely to endure once the original issue has been resolved. In order for long-term 
organization to be sustained, some form of institutionalization and structure needs to 
be set up.  
Shared decision-making, regular meetings, and commitment to a common set 
of goals build the long-term capacity of unions to maintain cross-border organization. 
“For coalitions to survive there must be mechanisms for resolving tensions. Rules and 
institutional arrangements are necessary to reinforce trust relations in new and high-
risk situations and substitute for them when they do not exist…There must also be 
procedures put in place that permit all representatives to express their voices in ways 
that could influence the outcome.” (Levi and Murphy 2006: 658). Capacity work 
builds the power of the network as a formal institution at the local, national and global 
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levels. The credible threat of a cross-border network is enhanced when that network 
can speak with a unified and long-term voice. 
 In the context of campaigns, capacity building is important because it means 
that unions do not need to “reinvent the wheel” by assembling a new coalition of 
actors and allies in preparation for, or after, a conflict has erupted and solidarity is 
needed. In order to do this, unions must have a space to communicate with each other, 
resolve differences, and make strategic decisions about future activity.  
Unions will also need to commit resources to developing these relationships 
over a long period of time. At times, this may mean making difficult decisions when 
balancing local needs with ideals of global solidarity (Johns 1998; Tattersall 2007). 
Networks, in their various levels of formalization and forms of organization, provide 
the opportunity for continuity of organization, but members will need to make some 
long-term commitment to shared goals and provide some space for shared decision-
making.  
HYPOTHESIS #3: For long-term, transnational organization to be sustained, some 
form of institutionalization and structure will need to be agreed upon and established 
by participating unions. This structure will need to provide space for resolving 
differing interests.  
 
Challenge #4: Enforcement of transnational labor rights and bipartite structure 
Contracts 
The fourth function of cross-border networks is achieving “contracts,” 
especially “contracts” at the global level. The term “contract” is a slight misnomer, 
especially in reference to IFAs, because most IFAs tend to be non-binding agreements. 
Effectiveness of IFAs is usually limited by the power of signatory unions to enforce 
the IFA. But it important to include IFAs and “contracts” in this framework for 
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multiple reasons. First, on the union side, IFAs presuppose a high level of self-
organization. On the company side, IFAs force firms to acknowledge some level of 
recognition, on a global level, for basic rights for all employees including those of 
subcontractors and suppliers. These basic rights include ILO Core Labor Standards 
such as prohibitions on the use of child labor, forced labor, policies against racial and 
gendered discrimination as well as the right to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining (Stevis and Boswell 2008).  
The recognition of basic rights is especially important where national labor 
laws may be weak or unenforced allowing multinationals to ignore or skirt collective 
bargaining agreements (Frundt 2007). An IFA is not a panacea, but may be an 
important tool in cross-border campaigns to “bargain for space,” engage in dialogue, 
and secure some access to the home MNC (Wills 2002).  
IFAs and international contracts may exist mainly as an ideal for most cross-
border networks, yet they still provide a crucial role in the collective imagination of 
cross-border networks by providing a long-term organizing goal and building a 
common frame for activity. They are concrete goals and achievement and represent a 
level of global organization most workers do not have. An IFA is not an impossible 
goal, but it is one that will require long term and sustained commitment to 
organization and activity on multiple geographical scales. 
HYPOTHESIS #4: Because multinational firms are subject to uneven levels of 
national regulation and these uneven regulations privilege some workers’ interests 
over others, and because of the lack of effective transnational regulatory frameworks, 
unions will need to build some form of regulatory and enforcement structure with the 
firm. This regulatory structure will tend to be weak because of the underdeveloped 
state of transnational regulation and the limits of national regulatory frameworks. 
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Methods 
For this thesis I combine a comprehensive literature review of global union 
strategies with a qualitative case study of the Gerdau global network. The literature 
review explores the theories, tactics, and strategies used by unions to develop cross-
border organization. This literature review also helps frame the theoretical 
contribution of this thesis.  
For the case study I rely upon extensive document and media research and 
open ended, unstructured interviews. Media research included newspapers, industry 
journals, union publications and internet links. I was given access to campaign files, 
flyers, inter and intra-union correspondence and meeting notes from US, Brazilian, 
and Canadian union officials. The interviews were conducted with rank and file union 
members (USW locals involved in the campaign), local and national union 
representatives (USW in the US, CUT and Força Sindical in Brazil) and international 
trade union officials (AFL-CIO Solidarity Center, International Metalworkers 
Federation). These interviews have been conducted face to face, via telephone and 
internet connection (Skype), usually lasting about an hour each with follow up email 
exchanges when necessary.  
I attended a Gerdau Workers‟ World Council meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay 
in May 2007, the Congresso Nacional dos Metalúrgicos of the CNM/CUT in São 
Paulo, Brazil in June 2007 and observed a worker exchange of US Gerdau employees 
between the USW and CNM/CUT and Força Sindical in São Paulo, Brazil in June 
2007.  
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I. Labor Internationalisms 
Introduction 
Much has been written in recent years on the possibilities, successes and 
failures of international unionism. International unionism is not a new phenomenon in 
itself. Marx‟s exhortation for workers of the world to unite dates back to 1848 (Marx 
1972) and attempts to coordinate bargaining and organizing efforts date at least back 
to the 1860s (Lorwin 1929). What is new are global economic changes which have 
impelled unions, now more than ever, to organize internationally. The rise of 
multinational corporations has shifted the playing field of industrial relations and 
ushered in an era of largely unchecked corporate hegemony. Deregulation and 
privatization of previously protected national industries (often heavily unionized as 
well) have opened new spaces for investment capital (Klein 2007). New forms of 
technology have linked geographically disparate areas into networks of production, 
circulation and consumption, challenging traditional models of economic organization 
(Gereffi 1994).  
Largely unprepared and ill-equipped for this global reorganization of capital, 
labor unions have had to create new and innovative organizational strategies and 
models to keep pace with the shifts in global capitalism. Some unions have opted for a 
more conciliatory, social partnership approach, cutting deals to save jobs and maintain 
traditional influence in the short run (Anner 2004). Other unions have struck a more 
confrontational approach, challenging capital on a global scale and attempting to 
create international linkages to strengthen local bargaining power (Bronfenbrenner 
2007). In both cases, and in the various permutations in between these two poles, the 
internationalization of capital has precipitated a change in labor union structures and 
repertoires of action. The reorganization of global capital has meant new opportunities 
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for strengthening labor, not just an unending series of defeats and concessions (Moody 
1997). 
  
Historical Labor Internationalisms 
The earliest trade union internationalisms began around 1859 when British 
employers in the construction industries, faced with demands for increased wages and 
reduced working hours, threatened to import cheaper, unskilled workers from the 
Continent to undercut potential strikes. British unions along with French, Belgian and 
German allies engaged in isolated sympathy strikes and calls for stronger international 
cooperation (Lorwin, 1929). Trade unions and radical political organizations 
(especially those coming out of the revolutions of 1848) began to forge international 
alliances culminating in the formation of the International Working Men‟s 
Association, The First International, in October 1864. Member unions were rooted in 
national labor struggles and were bound together mostly on voluntarist principles, but 
advocated a more unified international political agenda. This initial attempt to build an 
international organization for labor unions was fraught with sectarian battles between 
communists, anarchists, syndicalists and social democrats which would plague 
attempts at international cooperation for the next century (van Holthoon and van der 
Linden 1988).  
Attempts at creating and sustaining international organization were scattershot 
and largely ineffective throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
This trend could be attributed primarily to the growth of national labor parties and 
“nationalization” of trade union demands (Stevis and Boswell 2008). Early legislative 
successes such as the establishment of minimum wage standards and child labor 
statutes, early union demands going back to the mid nineteenth century, led European 
trade unions to focus on domestic politics through labor-based parties. These mass-
20 
 
based political parties rose to prominence in the advanced industrial nations of 
Western Europe and were successful in channeling the demands of labor unions into 
broader social legislation. But the redirection of trade union goals within the 
machinery of the nation state also meant a realignment of workers‟ goals with the 
goals of their state and national capital and reduced the incentives for labor unions to 
look for international solutions to “national” problems (Stevis and Boswell 2008: 53).  
This reorientation of workers‟ interests as “national” interests also produced 
divisions within labor union policies toward cross-border strategies. Trade unions 
were hardly immune from imperialist sympathies, often colluding with national 
industrialists in supporting legislation to restrict trade or migration from the colonies 
under the auspices of protection of “standards of living” or “cultural heritage.” 
Racism, nationalism, and imperialism colluded to inhibit cooperation between 
European unions and workers in the colonies but exceptions did exist, especially for 
those unions aligned with Communist Internationals and the successive World 
Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in the early twentieth century (Stevis and 
Boswell 2008; Sukthankar and Kolben 2007).  
Sukthankar and Kolben (2007) highlight the ways in which British colonial 
labor legislation and trade policies were designed to divide the interests of British and 
Indian workers in order to inhibit cross-border solidarity activities. The British Factory 
Acts of the 1880s were designed as protective labor legislation to regulate the hours 
and working conditions of women and children in British textile and heavy industries 
while at the same time excluding coverage of workers in sites which produced the raw 
materials for these British industries (2007). By the 1927 the British Trade Disputes 
Act was passed to demarcate “acceptable” (those “designed to advocate workers‟ own 
interests”) and “unacceptable” (those “taken for the interest of other workers or other 
movements through general strikes and sympathy strikes”) actions workers were 
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legally allowed to undertake (2007: 65). Legislation was designed to keep workers‟ 
interests geographically isolated from others,‟ squarely within the boundaries of 
national borders and away from any form of organized cross-border collaboration 
through general strikes or sympathy strikes.  
The culmination of this nationalization of trade unions‟ demands was the rise 
of national industrial relations systems (Dunlop 1958). These tripartite systems were 
designed to integrate labor and capital into national arrangements for resolving 
conflicts. This relationship would be regulated by the state and enforced by juridical 
statutes to ensure a productive and stable relationship that would promote both the 
material capabilities of national industrial growth as well as social welfare provisions 
and a voice for labor in governance. Kerr et al. (1960) claimed that competition 
between competing ideologies was declining due to the age of total industrialization 
leading to a decline in worker protest. For Kerr et al. the only questions left for labor 
and capital to sort out were technical problems of how to administer new technologies 
and fairly distribute national goods. 
Yet, despite the optimism of national industrial relations theorists about the 
possibilities of industrial harmony, conflict between organized labor and capital was 
not diminished by the nationalization of demands. Instead, it was the institutions by 
which conflicts were resolved and the issues over which conflicts arose which were 
redefined within the boundaries of the nation state. The internationalization of capital 
and push for export-based growth had led trade unions, especially in the most globally 
integrated auto, rubber and chemicals sectors, to explore new ways to build bargaining 
power globally. Capital had organized itself on an international scale while unions 
were still organized on at the national level. This disparity of organization gave 
multinational firms the ability to exploit national differences in labor and to whipsaw 
on an international level. By the mid-1960s new attempts to build international labor 
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representation had arisen in the form of World Company Councils (WCCs) and 
Multinational Collective Bargaining (MNCB). By 1974 more than 30 WCCs had been 
formed, though only a handful ever developed beyond initial high-level meetings.  
Charles Levinson, Secretary of the International Chemical and General 
Workers Union (ICF) theorized that the objective economic and political conditions 
for multinational unionism had arrived, though the subjective conditions of the unions 
themselves were still immature. Unions would be unable to build the structures 
necessary to match multinational firms at the bargaining table. “The objective 
conditions for such a program exist. They are in fact more advanced than the 
subjective ones…The difficulties lie largely with the unions themselves, in their 
ability to really turn from purely national commitments and concerns to the more 
international ones” (Levinson 1972:141). Through research and the formation of firm-
based company councils, Levinson concluded unions would be able to exchange ideas, 
build common agendas and eventually exert sufficient international pressure on 
multinational firms to equalize conditions across all plants in the firm through full 
multinational collective bargaining. The internationalization of capital would form a 
natural structural foundation for international solidarity to develop.  
 These optimistic calls for building international structures were progressive 
for their time and many of Levinson‟s conclusions were ultimately proved right, but in 
the mid 1970s unions were for the most part unable to build the organizational 
capacity to engage in truly multinational bargaining. In the case of the auto industry 
economic conditions were rapidly changing and Southern nations such as Brazil, 
Japan and Korea, where growth was occurring most rapidly, were not included in the 
early models of multinational collective bargaining. The WCC‟s focus on wage parity 
was an ambitious (and problematic) first step on which to build international 
organization, setting the bar too high for meeting these initial demands. Baldry et al. 
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(1983) remind international organizers that “Labour, in contrast, relies on identity, 
consciousness, solidarity and determination, which is generated essentially in the work 
community; thus multinational and even inter-plant solidarity is in certain key respects 
almost an alien thing…In our view there is no „natural‟ tendency for such solidarity to 
evolve…” (Baldry et al. 1983). There would be no short cuts or “natural evolution” to 
building effective international worker solidarity without building strong rank and file 
solidarity at the local and plant levels.  
Other critics of the era were more pessimistic about workers‟ abilities to build 
lasting international solidarity structures. Olle and Schoeller (1977) believed that 
Levinson‟s (1972) exclusive focus on the firm as the organizing principle for 
international solidarity would only exacerbate protectionist tendencies and reproduce 
uneven national development. Ulman (1975) agreed with Levinson (1972) that 
multinational corporations‟ transnational organization gave them vast advantages over 
a more locally based labor force, but ultimately the inducements to engage with 
national industrial relations structures would be too attractive for unions to trudge 
through the difficulties of forming international collective bargaining structures. 
Thomson and Larson (1978) emphasized that while unions had raised hopes for 
international solidarity to new heights, much of previous international trade union 
work was, in reality, implicated in Cold War factionalism which opposed independent 
workers‟ movements in the Global South.  
 
From Corporate Campaigns to Comprehensive Campaigns 
With the breakdown of New Deal labor relations system in the 1980s (Kochan, 
Katz and McKersie 1986), labor unions have increasingly looked to alternative 
strategies to gain ground in a hostile economic and political environment. Faced with 
declining membership, global competition, shifts in corporate structure and an 
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increasingly anti-union bias in state and federal government, unions have had to 
fashion new strategies to respond to these changes. Early literature on labor union 
strategies examined the use of “corporate,” and later “comprehensive,” campaigns to 
counter the power corporations hold by using research to identify weaknesses, 
devising strategic interventions according to the findings of this research and building 
new constellations of allies outside of the traditional union-government axis (Perry 
1987; Jarley and Maranto 1990; Hickey 2004). Unions have integrated a wide array of 
methods, strategies and new allies to fight corporate power: community coalition 
building and new union allies, consumer boycotts and public awareness, pressure on 
lenders and creditors and using courts and regulatory agencies (IUD 1985; 
Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2003).   
 By the 1970s corporate structure had shifted from vertical and horizontal 
integration along industrial lines to a “core/ring” structure with production 
decentralized among contractors, subcontractors, and outsourced labor. Corporations 
had become “dis-integrated” (Brecher and Costello 1998). Unions had been 
accustomed to making demands and winning gains at the bargaining table, especially 
through pattern bargaining in core industries such as auto, steel, rubber and 
meatpacking. But as corporate power dis-integrated and a recession hit the US in the 
early 1980s corporations seized the opportunity to go on the offensive against the long 
established pattern agreements unions had built in the post-New Deal era. 
Management pushed for concessions, give-backs, work rule changes, wage freezes, 
and layoffs. The balance of power between unions and companies had shifted through 
both objective (recession and shifting corporate power structures) and subjective 
conditions (bureaucratization and paralysis by union leaders who didn‟t realize the 
fundamental rules governing industrial relations had changed) (Fantasia and Voss 
2004). 
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High-profile strike defeats in both the public sector at PATCO in 1981, and 
private sector at Phelps-Dodge in 1983 illustrated the decreased effectiveness of 
strikes and traditional repertoires of action to affect bargaining outcomes. Historically 
the most important weapon labor could wield, strikes had not only become ineffective 
in the industrial relations climate of the 1980s, but were now being used as strategy by 
management to break unions outright (Moody 1988). The combination of corporate 
restructuring, a more aggressive management zeitgeist using concessions as a labor 
relations strategy, and the willingness to use permanent replacements to break strikes 
(and break unions) had left unions bewildered and looking for new tactics. 
One strategy used by unions to combat this reappropriation of strikes by 
management was in-plant strategies (Balanoff 1985; Metzgar 1985). Updated from 
1930s direct action tactics in industrial organizing campaigns, in-plant strategies used 
strategic work-to-rule actions inside the workplace to disrupt the work process. This 
strategy was successful in some workplaces, but required a long-term commitment to 
organization and discipline that was difficult to sustain over long periods of time and 
still did not get to the fundamental restructuring corporate power. Local militancy was 
not enough to beat global capital. 
Organizer Ray Rogers is credited with coining the term “corporate campaign” 
during the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU) 1976 
organizing drive at J.P. Stevens. This victory promulgated certain tactical innovations, 
particularly the use of the consumer boycott, pressure on Stevens‟s board of directors, 
and an emphasis on understanding how key internal and external relationships affected 
corporate structure. “What Rogers brought to the union‟s battle with J.P. Stevens was 
a lunge at the company‟s financial throat. He targeted the insurance firms and 
financial backers the company relied on. He put public pressure on J.P. Stevens board 
members. He engineered efforts to elect dissident directors for the company” (Franklin 
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2001: 31). Rogers‟ focus on key relationships, both internal and external to the firm, 
meant unions would have to revise and invent new tactics for pressuring management. 
The site of leverage was no longer centered at the bargaining table, but rather extended 
out in a network of stakeholders: boards of directors, prominent personalities, 
investors, retailers, customers and suppliers. Rogers used these relationships as public 
leverage chips, often shaming individuals related to the company in dispute or 
publicizing compromising pieces of information about the individual or firm. Yet 
despite high profile victories such as J.P. Stevens and Campbell‟s Soup, Rogers‟ 
corporate campaign strategy failed to be the panacea it was hailed as by some critics.  
The AFL-CIO‟s Industrial Union Department (IUD) published “Developing 
New Tactics: Winning With Coordinated Campaigns” (1985) as an early handbook for 
corporate campaign strategies outlining initial steps in planning and implementing a 
campaign. Tactics included legislative initiatives, regulatory and oversight complaints, 
consumer actions and boycotts, pressuring lenders, pension funds and stockholders 
and in-plant strategies to build an extensive and escalating campaign against the firm.  
Perry‟s (1987) analysis of ten early corporate campaigns found that the most 
successful campaigns took place at firms with “a high degree of sensitivity to adverse 
publicity” (1987: 123). These successful campaigns were able to translate a local labor 
struggle into a public campaign that elicited sympathy from the general public. Issues 
of patient care (Beverly Nursing Homes) and child labor (Campbell Soup) brought 
public sympathy with workers and painted the firm as a “corporate outlaw” that was 
dangerous to society as a whole, not just to the workers in dispute.  
Subsequent campaigns in the 1980s showed that no two campaigns were alike 
and there were no cookie cutter tactics that could simply be applied during the next 
campaign. Defeats at Phelps-Dodge (1983), Hormel P-9 (1986) and International 
Paper (1988) integrated various corporate campaign tactics, but campaigns tended to 
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be defensive and undertaken while unions were already on strike and under immense 
pressure. While these campaigns were built on militant memberships, utilized hard-
nosed tactics at the bargaining table, and involved active local communities, 
traditional tactics could not overcome vast imbalances in power faced by these local 
unions. This echoed Jarley and Maranto‟s findings that strike support campaigns were 
the least successful due to last minute planning, a lack of a unified response by unions 
(i.e. uneven allocation of resources between local and national union bodies) and the 
continued lack of preparedness by unions against the new corporate offensive. 
 
Labor‟s experience in the mid-1980s showed that no individual technique, not 
corporate campaigns nor inside tactics, was the panacea for an embattled union 
movement. Unions found that even with the full community support and a 
united workforce, many employers were impervious to community-based 
campaigns. Too often in the global economy, decisions affecting workers lives 
were being made by financiers and dealmakers thousands of miles away. The 
consensus began to develop by the late 1980s that none of these strategies 
alone was sufficient to win. Clearly, successful campaigns…depended on 
running a multi-faceted campaign that put escalating pressure on the employer 
in the workplace, in the community, in the corporate boardroom and around 
the world. Hence the term “corporate campaign” was replaced by “coordinated 
campaign” or “strategic campaign.” (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999: 71-
72) 
 
 Campaigns needed to be more comprehensive than the scattershot attempts to tarnish 
the public image of the company and needed the support and resources of the 
international union, not just the local under attack. 
What was needed to increase union effectiveness were not just innovative 
individual tactics, public escalation or local militancy, but a systematic approach to 
understanding how a corporation was structured, the industry in which it operated, 
how power operated within the firm and ultimately, the vulnerabilities of the firm to 
organized worker power. This systematic approach, “strategic corporate research” 
(Juravich 2007), would be used in bargaining and organizing campaigns before the 
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campaigns were initiated to build an effective strategy and would be updated 
throughout the campaign in order to choose the most effective tactics to exploit the 
weaknesses identified. Unions would need to identify how power was structured both 
inside and outside the firm. Different strategies would be needed for internal and 
external actors. Unions would also need to distinguish between different functions 
within the corporate web. Command and control, operational and outside stakeholders 
all occupy important, albeit differing, roles in the firm as a whole. The location of 
profit centers, the firms growth plan, key decision makers and relationships all need to 
be identified in order to transform strategic research into a comprehensive strategic 
campaign.  
Strategic corporate research went beyond early models of corporate campaigns 
which focused on public actions and shaming but ignored the fact that power was not 
always held by the most visible members of the corporation. A board of directors 
would be able to withstand shaming or attacks on their image if the bottom line was 
not affected. As the USW realized through careful research at Ravenswood, boards of 
directors and CEO‟s may not even hold the ultimate control over the corporation in 
dispute. Direct corporate ownership was becoming less common as corporations were 
increasingly just one of many entities owned by multinational conglomerates (Juravich 
and Bronfenbrenner 1999). Strategic research meant not just knowing what a 
corporation looked like, but required understanding how power flowed within the 
corporation and building a plan to exploit those intersections of power.  
Successful campaigns at BASF (1984-1990), Bayou Steel (1993-1996) and 
Crown Petroleum (1996-2000) all integrated environmental and community allies into 
campaign repertoires (Minchin 2003, Seroka 2005, Hickey 2004). The UMWA‟s 
victory at Pittston Coal in 1989 integrated sit-in‟s and occupations of corporate 
headquarters and job sites, tactics used in the 1930s but which had remained dormant 
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since then, into more traditional repertoires of action such as pickets and 
demonstrations (Beckwith 2000). Victories at Bridgestone/Firestone (1996) and UPS 
(1997) showed how strategic campaigns could use rank and file participation in 
consumer campaigns and global alliances to take on multinational corporations 
(Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 2003; O‟Malley 1999).  
The Teamsters‟ 1997 strike at UPS stressed the importance of internal 
strategies to plan and execute a strategic campaign (Witt and Wilson 1999; O‟Malley 
1999). Hickey (2004), in a case study of the PACE‟s campaign at Crown Petroleum, 
emphasized the need for organizational transformations within unions in order to 
produce sustained and comprehensive union revitalization. “Coordinating collective 
bargaining strategies with organizing and political action is one important step in 
transforming comprehensive campaigns for survival into strategies for revival. 
Integrating such a comprehensive approach into the union‟s core activities would 
translate the lessons of episodic struggles like Crown‟s into lasting strategic 
innovations.” (Hickey 2004:18). Unions had begun to use strategic research methods 
and campaign tactics in individual campaigns, but in order for the success of these 
campaigns to be sustained they would need to be fully integrated into other areas of 
the union‟s activities such as organizing and political action. Strategic campaigns used 
in isolated individual bargaining or organizing campaigns could not be expected to 
bring the labor movement back from the doldrums of the past thirty years, instead the 
methodology of strategic campaigns would need to be an integrated modus operandi 
for labor in the twenty-first century. 
Comprehensive campaign strategies have by no means been limited to 
Northern unions. Many of the central components of comprehensive campaigns such 
as community support, rank and file involvement and escalating tactics, have been 
central to Southern unions since the 1970s (Seidman 1994). More recent examples 
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include the 2004-2006 Argentine rubber workers‟ (SUTNA) organizing campaign at 
Neumáticos de Avanzada (Wells 2006) and the Taiwanese Chughwa Telephone 
Workers Union campaign (Chunghwa 2009). The Neumáticos campaign included 
protests outside the owner‟s vacation house, leafleting at car races and marches 
through the heart of the Buenos Aires business district (Wells 2006).     
In each of these campaigns unions were forced to build unique strategies to 
take on their employer, rather than imitating and replicating the strategies of earlier 
campaigns. Only by using strategic corporate research as a methodology guiding 
coordinated campaigns, rather than conceiving of campaigns as a checklist of tactics to 
be replicated, would unions be able to have the flexibility to take on global 
corporations. Writing about the USW‟s strategic campaigns in the 1990s, 
Bronfenbrenner and Juravich (2001) describe strategic campaigns thus: “This 
evolution has not, however, reflected steady progress in a single direction, forging a 
unitary model for strategic campaigns. It has not been the evolution of a single, more-
developed species. Instead it might best be characterized by the evolutionary concept 
of generalized adaptation by which a less-specialized organism can survive in many 
different environments, in part because it is neither as vulnerable nor as inflexible as a 
more highly developed form.” (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 2001: 234).  
 Strategic campaigns also had unique challenges. Management filed a federal 
RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) suit against the USW during 
the Bayou Steel campaign, forcing the union to spend large amounts of resources and 
money on lawyers and court fees (Seroka 2005). The suit at Bayou Steel was 
ultimately dropped after the strike was settled. RICO suits, while rarely successful, are 
costly to fight and divert important resources away from the campaign and are still a 
potential leverage point for companies trying to defend themselves against strategic 
campaigns. Northrup (1997) criticizes unions for “manipulating” governmental 
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regulatory agencies such as OSHA, the EPA and the SEC as tools in corporate 
campaigns. 
 
Global Campaign Forms 
 Cross-border union campaigns have taken many different forms. Industry, 
company and union structure, political climate, ideology, levels of bargaining power, 
and differing sets of goals are all important variables in how cross-border labor 
organization will be structured. While it is impossible to point to one particular form 
of organization as an ideal that all others should be modeled off, it is important to 
identify different processes and strategies that labor has used and why they were used. 
Cross-border bargaining and organizing campaigns will look different for a Thai 
garment worker than for a Canadian steelworker. To navigate the various forms of 
cross-border labor organization, we need a framework to identify underlying the 
processes unions have used to build cross-border activity.    
The 1986 Shell Oil boycott was one of the earliest truly global comprehensive 
campaigns. While using one of the most venerable campaign tactics, the consumer 
boycott, the Shell campaign linked anti-apartheid activists, trade unionists, civil rights 
activists, politicians, church activists and consumers in a global divestment campaign 
unlike anything that had preceded it (Bronfenbrenner 2007). The anti-apartheid 
movement had used a wide array of tactics to build international pressure and enforce 
the UN embargo on importing oil to South Africa, but it was the central involvement 
of labor unions that transformed the Shell boycott from humanitarian work into a 
comprehensive campaign based on strategic research.  
 South African mineworkers at Reitspruit Opencast Services coal mine had 
gone on strike after a fellow mineworker was killed in an accident. Reitspruit 
management responded with violence, firing eighty-six workers and forcing the other 
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mineworkers back to work at gunpoint (Walker 1986). Reitspruit, a South African 
firm which exported its coal globally, was also 50 percent held by Royal Dutch Shell. 
The United Mineworkers (UMW) had responded to solidarity requests, not simply on 
altruistic grounds, but because they too had recently gone through a 15-month strike at 
A.T. Massey, Shell‟s U.S. subsidiary. Rank and file mineworkers in South Africa and 
Kentucky, though geographically dispersed, were connected through a common 
employer with a shared experience of union busting and corporate lawbreaking. 
Earlier “solidarity campaigns” were not uncommon, but would have focused on letter 
writing between union leaders, not militant rank and file tactics linked to broad 
political and social movements intended to inflict economic damage on one of the 
most profitable global firms. 
The Shell boycott linked these workers and their local struggles to a 
coordinated global boycott against one of the most powerful multinationals in the 
world, but most corporate campaigns had yet to use international strategies to go 
beyond more traditional solidarity actions towards more comprehensive worker 
mobilization. The OCAW used international solidarity with German unions in its 
environmental critique of BASF (Minchin 2003). At Ravenswood, the USW had 
followed billionaire financier Mark Rich across the globe, mounting pressure on his 
global holdings, using the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF) and 
International Chemical Workers (ICEM) to coordinate solidarity actions in over a 
dozen nations from Venezuela to Israel (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999). These 
campaigns used international solidarity as a key campaign tactic in a broader 
campaign, but these campaigns revolved around individual union locals with hundreds 
of workers, not entire multinational firms with thousands of workers working jointly.  
By the 1995-96 campaign at tire giant Bridgestone/Firestone, the USW was 
able to use global mobilization as a comprehensive strategy to not only win an 
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individual campaign, but to build lasting power at a MNC (Bronfenbrenner and 
Juravich 2001). With over 4,000 workers across North America on strike at 
Bridgestone/Firestone, the USW (recently merged with the United Rubber Workers) 
had a more formidable challenge of winning a campaign against a multinational 
lacking in one salient vulnerability (as at BASF with its connection to cancer rates and 
environmental damage) on which to focus the campaign. Instead, strategy would have 
to be applied on multiple fronts over a much longer period of time.  
 Picketing in the US alone would not produce sufficient leverage to bring the 
company to the table; unions from across the company would have to be partners in 
planning and executing strategy, not just pieces of a North American centered 
campaign. Unions in Japan, initially hesitant at the confrontational tactics used by the 
USW, eventually participated in the campaign. In Belgium, Italy, and the US, regional 
headquarters were picketed. South American workers at Goodyear, Pirelli and 
Michelin held solidarity strikes and rallies. Workers and their families traveled from 
country to country for rallies, protests, and consumer actions to present a united front 
and paint a human face on the campaign. A Bridgestone/Firestone company council, 
designed to create sustained links between unions globally, was formed. This council 
provided a link from the campaign activity of the 1995-96 lockout towards a more 
permanent model of union solidarity and coordinated action building power at a 
multinational firm. The Bridgestone/Firestone council was central in a recent 
campaign for union recognition of Liberian rubber plantation workers (USW 2007). 
Sustained international coordination, targeted at strategic points in 
Bridgestone/Firestone‟s corporate structure, not just piecemeal solidarity actions, 
produced a winning global campaign. The USW‟s subsequent campaign at Continental 
Tire (Greven and Russo 2003) would reaffirm many of the lessons about international 
coordination learned at Bridgestone/Firestone.  
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Similarly, the Banks and Russo (1999) case study focuses on the formation of 
a the Teamsters World Council at UPS (using the International Transport Workers 
Federation (ITF), as an international intermediary) in preparation for their 1997 
bargaining campaign. Unlike the world council established in the 1995 
Teamsters/Royal Ahold case (Russo 1999), which was a defensive maneuver, the UPS 
World Council was set up over a year before the strike started and was integrated into 
a comprehensive membership mobilization strategy intended to bring pressure on the 
global logistics firm from as many points as possible (O‟Malley 1999). Management‟s 
plans to shift work from full time employees to part-time employees struck a nerve 
with workers across UPS and created a common issue linking workers globally and 
facilitating the formation of the world council.  
The example of the UPS World Council is also problematic because it was 
formed and mobilized at the behest of North American Teamsters rather than as a 
long-term project based on building power across UPS‟s global network. It is this type 
of one-sided cross-border activity which may reinforce uneven power dynamics 
between unions. While some authors, such as Banks and Russo (1999) and O‟Malley 
(1999), may view the 1997 mobilization as a complete success, this conclusion is only 
tenable if the striking North American workers are the central subjects of the analysis. 
These critics need to take a broader analysis of how the aftermath of 1997 campaign 
was experienced by workers in Europe, Asia and Latin America, not just by North 
American Teamsters. Has the UPS council continued its work after the 1997 
campaign? Has this level of solidarity been reciprocated by North American workers 
for unions in the South? And perhaps more fundamentally, has this model of 
internationalism been used as a short-term tool to win a North American strike, or as a 
model for long-term power building across UPS.  
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Internal leadership changes within the Teamsters from its Teamsters for a 
Democratic Union (TDU) to more conservative leadership, less committed to 
internationalism as a long-term union-building strategy, has complicated the union‟s 
international mobilization strategies. The TDU‟s emphasis on rank and file 
mobilization and building international links offered an opportunity to build broader 
networks of power at multinationals in the logistics, distribution and transportation 
industries. While current leadership does devote some resources to cross-border 
activity, it unclear how deep or horizontal these links to unions and social movements 
are. More research is needed to see how the UPS World Council has operated since 
the 1997 strike. 
The Graphic Communication International Union (GCIU) (now merged with 
the Teamsters in the US and the Communications, Energy and Paper Workers in 
Canada) integrated similar comprehensive strategies in its 2002 organizing campaign 
at Quebecor (Tate 2006). Combining innovative organizing strategies (house calling, 
in plant committees, and mobilization in unionized and non-union facilities), volunteer 
organizers from existing unionized Quebecor plants and public actions at Quebecor 
customers (Victoria‟s Secret and IKEA), the GCIU built a multifaceted comprehensive 
campaign with multiple pieces of leverage while pushing for neutrality at all North 
American facilities. Quebecor, a multinational commercial printing company, has 
facilities in more than a dozen countries. The GCIU used Quebecor‟s global reach in 
both production and distribution to its advantage in building a global solidarity 
campaign by engaging unionized employees and consumers across Quebecor.  
In 2001 the GCIU had begun working with Union Network International (Uni, 
the Global Union Federation for workers in the commercial sector) and Quebecor 
unions globally to create a global labor standards agreement that would secure 
freedom of association rights and health and safety standards across the company. The 
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allies in this campaign for company-wide labor standards had created a foundation of 
trust that would be integrated into the North American campaign. The 2003 “Global 
Quebecor Solidarity Conference” brought both campaigns together launching a 
worldwide “Justice @ Quebecor” campaign (Tate 2006). Delegates accompanied 
organizers on house calls and hand billed outside headquarters. Coordinated global 
solidarity days sent the message that workers all around the world were supporting not 
just North American workers organizing but workers in the UK and Sweden who were 
threatened with layoffs as well (ORIT-ICFTU 2005). Quebecor showed that 
comprehensive strategies in an organizing campaign combining inside and outside 
strategies, union and non-union member mobilization, strategic customer outreach, 
and global solidarity could lead to a victory at a powerful multinational firm bent on 
resisting an organizing drive.  
As in the case of Quebecor, UNITE‟s organizing drive at the Brylane 
distribution center in Indianapolis integrated comprehensive membership mobilization 
tactics, global solidarity and customer outreach to build a multifaceted campaign at a 
multinational clothing company (Hannah 2006). While the Teamsters at Quebecor 
were able to run a customer campaign at public retailers such as Victoria‟s Secret and 
IKEA, Brylane was a mail-order retailer with no outlets to handbill or run a public 
campaign. Instead, UNITE had discovered, through thorough strategic research, that 
Brylane‟s parent company, the French conglomerate PPR, was actually the owner of 
haute couture brand Gucci. Brylane, one part of a multi-sector firm, was not the main 
profit center that Gucci was. UNITE shifted its international campaign to integrate 
consumer actions at Gucci retail stores in high profile locations such as New York, 
Paris and London. Unionized French PPR workers traveled to Indianapolis to show 
their support. 
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Rather than limiting the campaign to the US and Western Europe, UNITE 
connected with NGOs who monitored sweatshops in Asia to connect the clothes sold 
in Brylane‟s catalogs to grim conditions in the sweatshops which produced the clothes. 
UNITE made links with the Clean Clothes Campaign, a coalition of trade unions, 
NGOs and human rights organizations that fights to improve working conditions in 
sweatshops, in order to publicize the working conditions of Gucci and Brylane 
suppliers (Hannah 2006). Student-labor activists on college campuses were brought in 
through United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS). Innovative actions such as 
“sweatshop fashion shows” and a “sweatshop holiday catalog” were creative ways to 
inform the public of the global ties to deplorable working conditions in both Asia and 
Indianapolis and bring pressure on a diversified multinational clothing vendor. 
Previous cases of North American comprehensive campaigns had focused on lock-
outs, strikes and bargaining support but successful campaigns at Quebecor and 
Brylane showed that comprehensive global campaigns could be successful in 
organizing campaigns as well.   
But similar to the victory at UPS, campaigns at Quebecor and Brylane raise 
questions about unions‟ models of long-term solidarity. Can models of cross-border 
solidarity supporting Northern workers be considered victories without developing 
structures to extend gains to all workers at Quebecor and Brylane? Have the unions 
which initiated the campaigns shown similar commitment to allies in their struggles or 
developed structures for power sharing between unions and power building across the 
company? Integrating cross-border tactics into organizing campaigns is an important 
strategic innovations, but does not necessarily lead to long-term, horizontal relations 
between unions. If Northern unions are hesitant or unwilling to show similar levels of 
solidarity as other unions have shown for them, whether through strikes, member 
mobilization, resource allocation and/or power sharing structures, then categories of 
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success and innovation need to be reconsidered to include this.  This is especially 
critical in cases such as Brylane involving North-South union relationships. Scholars 
will also need to consider how these campaigns reinforce or transform power relations 
between unions when evaluating the “success” of such case studies.  
Turnbull (2007) examines the role of the International Transport Federation 
(ITF), in a sometime uneasy alliance with the regional European Transport Workers 
Federation (ETF), in coordinating EU-wide mobilizations against the restructuring of 
European port ownership. Complicating the work of mobilizing workers in a dozen 
nations was the need to shift the basis of dockworker unions‟ repertoires of action 
from bureaucratic engagement  (“logic of influence”) to rank and file mobilization 
(“logic of membership”), shifting the scale of mobilization from the national to the 
international (in this case EU-wide). ITF organizers needed to “reframe” issues that 
had previously been dealt with by local or national unions in order to “[C]reate a 
stronger European identity among rank-and-file dockworkers and to develop a new 
unconventional repertoire of collective action.” (Turnbull 2007: 130). Local networks 
of dockers connected with the ITF, which in turn connected to other local networks, in 
effect creating an EU-wide network of dockworkers based on local mobilization. With 
a EU-wide network based on member mobilization, dockworkers were able to put 
forward flexible responses as circumstances changed.  
The case of Coca-Cola shows the potential for conflict in cross-border 
campaigns and building long-term networks, especially North-South networks. In July 
2001 the USW and the International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF) filed a lawsuit under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act on behalf of the Colombian Food and Beverage Workers 
Union (SINALTRAINAL), the Colombian trade union representing the majority of 
Colombian Coca-Cola workers, accusing Coca-Cola of complicity in the killing of 
Colombian trade unionist Isidro Segundo Gil. Two years later, in July 2003, 
39 
 
SINALTRAINAL, working with the international coalition Campaign to Stop Killer 
Coke, announced a global boycott of Coca-Cola products (Chomsky 2008). This 
boycott has received the support of multiple unions, student activists, and community 
organizations, but has been actively opposed by the International Union of 
Foodworkers (IUF), the GUF representing foodworkers, and its union affiliates 
(SINALTRAINAL is not an IUF affiliate) going so far as to “strongly condemn the 
boycott” (Chomsky 2008: 253). The IUF has claimed that it “should be the ones to 
make a decision about the boycott” (Chomsky 2008:254).  
The IUF for its part has dedicated large amounts of resources to organizing 
Coca-Cola workers internationally and coordinating meetings between Coca-Cola 
workers in various countries. The IUF was at the forefront of the global boycott of 
Coca-Cola products during the 1970s (Garver et al. 2007). The boycott in support of 
Guatemalan Coca-Cola trade unionists facing assassination and intimidation led to 
recognition of the union at the Guatemala City plant in 1980.  Since then the IUF‟s 
strategy has attempted to use existing sites of bargaining power at organized Coca-
Cola facilities coupled with transnational coordination to support new organizing 
campaigns in countries such as Russia and Pakistan (Garver et al. 2007). The IUF has 
also continued to seek dialogue with Coca-Cola in drafting an agreement on human 
rights and trade union rights for Coca-Cola workers globally, including Colombia. 
The Coca-Cola case illustrates the difficulties of building effective cross-
border union networks. Political and ideological divisions between the IUF and 
SINALTRAINAL have not just impeded closer collaboration between campaigns, but 
led to sharp attacks in public against one another. Unions in the Global North such as 
the Teamsters have simultaneously supported the campaign to end the assassination in 
Coca-Cola workers in Colombia by pushing for disinvestment from banks 
underwriting Coca-Cola while at the same time expressing concern about the effect of 
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a global boycott on unionized facilities in North America (Correa 2004). Other 
federations such as the Canadian Labor Congress (CLC) have made public statements 
in support of SINALTRAINAL and the lawsuit against Coca-Cola, but adhered to the 
IUF‟s position against the boycott (Chomsky 2008). The problematic question for 
SINTRAINAL and other independent unions remains one of how to build sufficient 
leverage at global corporations such as Coca-Cola without the support of GUFs and 
their union affiliates when these affiliates represent critical leverage in Coca-Cola 
global operations. The issues are especially salient when the lives of workers are in 
immediate danger of assassination and kidnapping.  
 
Sweatshop Solidarity Campaigns 
 Sweatshops, long the universal symbol of deplorable, unsafe and low wage 
working conditions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, have become a 
central site of transnational union organizing campaigns in recent years. Early 
campaigns against child labor and forced labor became public reform movements after 
high profile catastrophes such as the 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Fire. By the 1970s 
sweatshops as a form of garment production reappeared in Latin America, the 
Caribbean Basin, Southeast Asia and Southern California. Nations reeling from debt 
crises and structural adjustment programs had turned to export processing zones 
(EPZs) for growth industries. EPZs were tax-free industrial havens for multinational 
firms to assemble low value products such as garments, textiles, electronics and toys 
employing a low wage, mainly female workforce. Aided by free trade agreements and 
a system of subcontracting and global production, sweatshops became the symbol of 
both high fashion apparel lines in the Global North and the face of a race to the bottom 
for the economies of the Global South.  
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 Anti-sweatshop campaigns solidified themselves in the public consciousness 
after UNITE‟s 1996 campaign to organize Los Angeles Guess? garment workers 
(Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). After Guess? announced it would close its 
production facilities in LA and move them across the border to Mexico, organizers 
were quick to highlight the willingness of business to offshore production at the whiff 
of labor organizing. Unions, NGOs and the US Department of Labor attempted to 
mount public pressure on Guess? by highlighting sweatshop conditions in Mexico, but 
a relaxing of regulation on investment after NAFTA gave North American 
manufacturers free reign to either move production at will or, more likely to threaten 
to move production in order to scare workers who dared to organize. The situation was 
similar in other parts of the world. In Latin America, the Caribbean, and East Asia, 
sweatshops became the preferred engine of growth for countries at the bottom of the 
global pyramid. Public cases of child labor (Kathy Lee Gifford and her Wal-Mart line) 
and suburban sweatshop slavery (El Monte, California) brought the global reach of the 
garment industry into Middle America‟s homes, proving that a small, well-organized 
North American NGO could occupy a strategic position between workers in the 
Global South and consumers and activists in the North. 
 Workers, mainly young women, organizing in places like Guatemala, Thailand 
and Haiti began global solidarity campaigns, as much out of structural necessity as out 
of tactical innovation, to win improvements in individual garments factory organizing 
campaigns as well as to increase pressure for industry and retailer-wide codes of 
conduct. Workers on the ground, independent national labor unions, transnational 
NGOs, Northern labor unions, consumer activists and North American university 
students formed a multi-layered “Transnational Advocacy Network” of on-site 
organizing, transnational communication, and advocacy at the site of consumption, 
forming a “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Anner 2004). These networks 
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used pressure at the sites of production combined with publicity campaigns on big 
name brands such as Nike, Reebok and Liz Claiborne as well as popular retailers such 
The Gap and Wal-Mart. 
 Frundt (2002) posits four models of cross-border maquila organizing:  
“coalitional,” “federation to federation,” “international campaign organizing,” and 
“clandestine targeting.” Federation to federation organizing involves community and 
NGO support for local organizing, but established union federations play a central role 
in initiating and fostering organizing projects. This type is typified by the UE-FAT 
partnership (Alexander and Gilmore 1999). International campaign organizing uses 
the power of transnational NGOs and transnational advocacy networks to bring 
highlight local sweatshop conditions and build consumer pressure in Northern 
countries (Anner 2000). Clandestine targeting involves building a militant cadre of 
activists on the ground to expand into other factories in the sector or region 
(Armbruster-Sandoval 2005).  
 The model of “coalitional” organizing is based on “the construction of 
alliances on the basis of preexisting networks” (Frundt 2002: 49) and exemplified by 
the Coalition for Justice in the Maquilas (CJM). Formed in the late 1980s by religious, 
labor and community groups (including the AFL-CIO and the Canadian Labor 
Congress), the CJM coordinated a broad network of organization in maquila 
communities. Because of its own roots as a coalition, not a labor union, the CJM was 
primarily devoted to education, advocacy and support. Member groups such as the 
Comite Fronterizo de Orbreras (CFO) used worker centers as safe meeting places to 
discuss workplace issues (necessary in an environment of management repression and 
company unions). Educational programs were run for workers concerning labor law, 
overtime rules and maternity leave rights (Frundt 2002: 49). But the CJM‟s role as a 
coalition was important because it played a mediating role between local rank-and-file 
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organizations and transnational NGOs and Northern labor unions. Frundt notes that 
while high levels of collaboration between coalition members increased the likelihood 
of organizing victories (Williams 1999), it is rarely enough without strong labor union 
support  (Frundt 2002:51).  
 Frundt emphasizes the need for bidirectional relations in order to build 
sustained coalitions. He faults most maquila organizing attempts as “one-way 
processes” focusing on the Latin American side of campaigns. For longer-term 
successes, workers on both sides of the border need to be involved in organizing 
campaigns and go beyond vague solidarity for distant workers to a “principled self-
interest” (Alexander and Gilmore 1999: 258). The UE-FAT Strategic Organizing 
Alliance is one of the most mature and well-known attempts at long-term cooperation. 
Both are independent unions with deep commitments to rank and file democracy. 
Founded in 1992 after the federations had collaborated on anti-NAFTA campaigns, 
the alliance targeted transnational corporations operating in Mexico that had a 
bargaining relationship with the UE in the US (Alexander and Gilmore 1999: 258). 
The ultimate goal of the alliance would be organizing new members and attaining 
tangible benefits for members on both sides of the border. Both unions realizing that 
circumstances were unfavorable to quick campaign victories, have committed 
resources to the long-term cooperation through bidirectional education, worker-to-
worker exchanges and campaign cooperation. Rank and file members of both unions 
needed to become internationalists in order to commit their resources and dues to 
workers thousands of miles away.  
Anner (2000) compares three cases of transnational solidarity campaigns in 
Guatemala and Haiti to “[S]uggest that campaigns with a weak or nonexistent 
international component will fail or meet with limited success. However, these cases 
also suggest that international support can never replace sustained organizing efforts 
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by local actors at the point of production.” (Anner 2000: 248). Each case featured a 
local subcontractor bent on fighting an organizing drive, the presence of international 
allies (NGOs and unions) and a vulnerable retailer or brand name. For campaigns to 
succeed a combination of local and national union support along with committed and 
adroit Northern allies would be needed.  
 Armbruster-Sandoval (2005) expands on Anner‟s (2000) work with more in-
depth case studies focusing on the mixed outcomes in Central American sweatshop 
solidarity campaigns. Successful high profile campaigns that had been run at 
PhillipsVan Heusen and The Gap were mixed victories, with initial successes in 
gaining either pay raises or improved working conditions, but over time, these 
victories proved ephemeral. Where Anner (2000) had focused on the strength of the 
local union campaign and the effectiveness of transnational network advocacy, 
Armbruster-Sandoval (2005) sees the degree of corporate vulnerability as an important 
factor in transnational sweatshop campaigns. Strong local unions and dense 
transnational networks were not “necessary and sufficient” conditions for success 
(Armbruster-Sandoval 2005: 144). Likewise, as in the case of The Gap in El Salvador, 
a retailer with a well-known image to protect may be vulnerable solely on its image, 
even without strong local campaign roots or a dense transnational network. “The most 
optimal scenario for raising wages and improving working conditions involves 
moderate/high corporate vulnerability, high local union strength and moderate/high 
TAN unity” (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005: 146).  
Robertson and Plaiyoowong‟s (2004) case study of the transnational solidarity 
campaign at the Gina Bra Form company in Thailand reiterates Armbruster-
Sandoval‟s (2005) findings that a well-organized combination of local activism, 
transnational allies and corporate vulnerability are keys to success adding that national 
union support and resources, not just local militancy, were important in sustaining 
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local victories. The authors also stress the need for “midfielders,” activists who can 
“‟see the entire field‟ and works to ensure that local union views (conveyed in the 
local language) are placed at the centre of international strategy discussions” 
(Robertson and Plaiyoowong 2004: 5). The role of the “midfielder” as a person who 
links various groups, often coming from unfamiliar repertoires of action, during an 
activist campaign is echoed later by the role of “bridgebuilders” (Tattersall 2007) and 
“brokers” (Tarrow 2005).  
 All of the authors are realistic about the possibilities of sustained, long-term 
victories at individual garment factories without raising industry-wide standards. The 
overwhelming power of capital to move production (or make credible threats to move 
production), corporate intransigence, and weak independent labor unions in the 
garment industries of these nations all create precarious foundations for long term 
sweatshop organizing (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005). Transnational campaigns have 
created high-profile successes in Latin America and Asia, but broader industry- or 
company-wide regulatory structures, political victories in national governments, and 
systemic global justice campaigns will be needed in order to make more far-reaching 
gains for workers at the bottom of the global production chain (Armbruster-Sandoval 
2005; Bronfenbrenner 2007).  
 Special attention must be paid in global campaigns involving low wage 
Southern workers and more privileged Northern organizations so not to reproduce 
gender and class inequalities in the relationships of solidarity. Some authors have 
pointed to the US labor movement‟s history of manipulation and outright imperialism 
in its international endeavors (Thomson and Larson 1978; Johns 1998; Herod 2001). 
Others have pointed at the tensions between Northern NGOs and Southern campaign 
activists to show how Southern activists have asserted their positions as equal partners 
in global campaigns (Hertel 2006). Some authors have tried to find solutions to the 
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unequal relationships in sweatshop advocacy campaigns.  Anner and Evans (2004) 
suggest that the changing nature of the North American workforce, specifically 
unions‟ new efforts to organize women and immigrant workers may be affecting how 
the terms of engagement with Southern activists are renegotiated. Broader issues of 
global governance, i.e. the global justice movement, may also affect Northern 
coalition building. Compa (2004) reminds unions and NGOs that each has more 
commonalities than differences and identifies codes of conduct as valuable points of 
common involvement.  
 The renegotiation of power through union campaigns is not just a feature of 
workers in the Global South. Campaigns such as the Justice for Janitors (JfJ) 
campaigns in Denver, Los Angeles, Houston and Miami, and the Los Angeles 
drywallers campaign may be seen as “global” campaigns because of the prominent 
role immigrant workers have played. These “global” workers are central actors in the 
remaking of power dynamics not simply because they are mostly (female) immigrants 
from Central and South America (many bringing traditions of labor and community 
organizing with them) in a traditionally white (and male) union structure, but because 
of the way in which these workers have remade local unions and challenged existing 
leaderships (Milkman 2006; Albright 2008). Community-based strategies such as the 
JfJ and drywallers campaigns have remade cities such as Los Angeles, reasserting the 
voice of labor both in City Hall (through the election of pro-labor councilmembers and 
Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa) as well as in the barrio (through the Latino-ization of 
new regions of the city)  (Davis 2001).  
 
Community Responses 
Globally linked, low wage industries such as textiles, apparel manufacturing 
and electronics assembly tend to be located in developing nations with majority 
47 
 
female workforces. These industries are dependent upon strong state-capital alliances 
to maintain a disciplined workforce and promote a friendly investment climate for 
MNCs. Attempts to organize unions may be met by overt repression through physical 
violence, threats and firings or by legal restrictions of worker activity through bans on 
strikes, demonstrations and meetings. Work in Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and 
maquiladoras is often atomized to ensure minimal worker to worker contact on the job 
and shop floor discipline is enforced through local management control (McKay 
2006). This type of control regime provides little space for worker resistance on the 
shop floor and moves the site of organization and resistance into the community where 
these workers live. Workplace issues such as wages, hours, forced overtime and 
unsafe working conditions remain central to organizing efforts, but become mixed 
with issues of gender inequality, child services, domestic violence and housing and 
land rights.  
A different model of cross-border campaigns that relies more heavily on local 
organizing and community-based support may be emerging from unions in these 
industries. This model of labor organization mixes local, community-based structures 
with links to transnational labor groups, NGOs and Northern labor unions. Local labor 
organizing is embedded in community support structures such as housing and water 
defense groups, women‟s centers, and progressive church organizations rather than 
being strictly based around in-shop collective bargaining. Many of these community 
organizations have been involved in pro-democracy movements or struggles around 
housing and land tenure and provide a wide network of allies and repertoires of 
actions that have been successful in a specific community (Seidman 1994).  
In many of these nations official unions either have monopolies on 
representation or are unresponsive to organizing in low wage industries (either 
because of patriarchal ideologies or because existing unions may rely on state-capital 
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alliances) making independent union organizing extremely difficult. Unions in these 
marginalized sectors cannot rely on traditional collective bargaining models for 
workplace representation and instead build power locally through links with 
community allies and globally through transnational labor networks. This intimidating 
context of management opposition and indifference of established trade unions 
towards organizing often makes joining a trade union an option of last resort. 
Community groups, which focus on issues of gender and housing, provide a more 
receptive setting for bringing workers (especially women workers) together and 
talking about how to change their workplace (Gunawardana 2007). 
But the local support of these organizations alone is rarely sufficient to defend 
workers against the threats of highly mobile industries such as apparel manufacturing 
and electronics assembly. To augment the local support provided by community 
organizations, workers have connected with international labor rights organizations 
which are able to link workers in the Global South to unions, students and NGOs in 
the Global North. GUF‟s, labor rights NGOs such as National Labor Committee 
(NLC), Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) and the Transnationals International 
Exchange (TIE) and direct union-to-union networks integrate workers into global 
solidarity networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  
In response to these conditions, workers have attempted new strategies for 
building power at the most vulnerable node in the global production chain. In 
Gunawardana‟s (2007) article on union organizing in Sri Lanka‟s EPZs, workers at a 
garment factory, Jaqalanka Ltd, were forced to bypass official industrial relations 
channels such as the labor ministry and official unions (who had not been interested in 
organizing women in EPZs) in order to achieve representation and win their annual 
holiday bonus. The workers, almost all female, collaborated with the local women‟s 
center for training, leadership, material support and a safe space to meet and plan 
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union activities. The women‟s center had provided support for other EPZ workers in 
the region who had previously attempted to organize independent unions and were 
able link the workers at Jaqalanka to labor NGOs in the region and North America. 
Through these links with NGOs and trade unions, workers at Jaqalanka aired their 
case to consumers of their products in the US and Western Europe and investors in 
Jaqalanka‟s parent company, VF Workware (which owned denim brands such as Lee 
and Wrangler). Although initial attempts to organize a union through government 
ministries and seek representation through existing trade unions were cut off, 
Jaqalanka workers instead linked with community organizations that had broad 
international ties. These international ties brought a new axis of leverage to the local 
fight in the EPZ. The combination international ties with deep local roots in women‟s 
and community groups built a strong base for rank and file organization, keeping 
pressure on the company in the community (and building a foundation for future 
collective activity) while at the same time building an international network of allies to 
reach consumers and investors in the Global North.   
 Much like Gunawardana‟s (2007) example of Sri Lankan EPZ workers 
organizing around issues gender and community, women workers in the Latin 
American banana industry (Frank 2005) have combined local and international 
strategies to organize for better conditions both on the job and in their communities 
and homes. Unions in the Latin American banana industry have existed since the 
1950s (originally as US-promoted, anti-communist bulwarks against more militant 
union organizing efforts) providing a foundation for current organizing. Through a 
cross pollination with feminist and national liberation struggles in the 1970s and 
1980s, women workers have established structures within these unions such as 
women‟s caucuses and education programs and women have been elected to 
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(traditionally male) positions of power as well as having added contract language for 
maternity leave, equal pay and rules against sexual harassment.   
 In 1993 trade union leaders from Nicaragua, Guatemala, Panama, Honduras, 
Colombia and Costa Rica met to establish COLSIBA, the Central American network 
of banana workers (Ecuadorian unions joined in 2000). By providing a regional 
network for employees in the banana industry women from these seven nations were 
able to meet regularly, communicate and share local experiences and build a more 
powerful women‟s organization throughout the sector. Their struggles in the banana 
plantations connected them to more regional campaigns against free trade agreements 
such as Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and Plan Puebla Panama (PPP).  
COLSIBA was institutionalized as a collective bargaining agent through the 
IFA signed in 2001 at Chiquita. The IFA covered all Chiquita workers in these seven 
nations and provided contract language supporting collective bargaining rights. The 
IFA was supported by the International Union of Foodworkers (IUF) providing the 
unions in COLSIBA with financial and logistical support. Other NGOs, solidarity 
organizations and labor unions such as US Labor Education in the Americas 
(US/LEAP), the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center and European NGOs Banafair and 
Banana Link all provide crucial links for international solidarity outreach to the 
nations where bananas are exported and consumed. These links to Northern unions 
and NGOs also provide important financial and logistical support for international 
travel and conferences to meet other banana workers globally and coordination for 
transnational campaigns to end local labor disputes.  
One of the most advanced examples of this multiscalar approach to union 
organizing is the UE-FAT partnership (Hathaway 2000). The UE-FAT alliance, which 
has focused organizing and education efforts in the maquila sector of the US-Mexico 
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border, has opened a joint-run workers‟ center in Ciudad Juarez to “[E]ducate workers 
about their rights, provide legal assistance designed to promote the development of 
workers‟ organizations, and consistently put forward a different vision of how unions 
should and could operate” (Alexander and Gilmore: 260). The UE-FAT alliance is 
built along ideological, industrial and geographical lines and sustained by developing 
structures that involve workers from both sides of the border in the alliance. 
The examples in Gunawardana (2007), Frank (2005), McKay (2006) and 
Hathaway (2000) illustrate attempts at building multi-scale labor organization 
combining deep roots in workers‟ local communities with links to international allies. 
Highly repressive factory regimes, unresponsive established trade unions and 
vulnerable positions in global production chains create a unique set of challenges for 
workers trying to organize unions in these industries. By incorporating local struggles 
around community, housing and gender into labor organizing, these workers have 
been able to build a broader discursive and material foundation for pressuring 
employers on a local scale. When this foundation in local organizing is linked to 
international allies in the Global North, a transnational network is formed connecting 
shop floor labor disputes to global solidarity networks. Rather than relying upon 
Northern allies to intervene and “save the day” for Southern workers, local 
organization ensures that potential power imbalances between local workers and 
international allies can be offset. Global campaigns to end abuses in EPZs and 
maquiladoras must have strong roots in the lives of the workers involved, not rely 
solely on international media campaigns run by Northern allies.  
 
Strategic Alliances and World Councils 
Meyer (2001) analyzes the history of international bargaining attempts at 
General Electric (GE) over the past 45 years. As GE is truly global and committed to 
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its own mobility, refusing to be tied to one location or workforce, unions must deal 
with a fragmented workforce spread across geographical space as well as diversified 
industrial lines. This poses serious organizational and operational challenges to any 
organization trying to formulate a cohesive agenda and mobilize transnationally. The 
GE Coordinated Bargaining Committee (CBC) began as an attempt to pressure GE to 
bargain collectively with national unions (US and Canadian) across the various 
industries and crafts represented at GE (disparate unions such as the American Flint 
Glass Workers and the American Federation of Technical Engineers alongside 
machinists, electricians and sheet metal workers) (Meyer 2001: 66-67). Before there 
was international competition there was the threat of union whipsawing on a national 
level and a need for unions to go beyond traditional bargaining forms and formulate a 
labor agenda at the table. From this success at forcing GE to bargain nationally, the 
International Metalworkers Federation (IMF) worked with the CBC to begin initial 
forays into the possibilities of international bargaining and coordination. International 
CBC meetings have occurred sporadically since 1967 and evolved from intermittent 
high-level meetings between national union leaders into a more strategic and cohesive 
model emphasizing international cooperation at multiple levels of union organization.  
 Tattersall (2007) examines the recent work done by SEIU to create 
“Global Union Alliances.” Arising out of the need to build leverage in local 
bargaining and organizing fights and the desire to move beyond individual requests for 
solidarity on a campaign by campaign basis, SEIU‟s alliances have been made with 
other union federations (specifically the UK‟s Transport and General Workers 
(T&G)). Longer-term partnerships are designed around three goals. First, the 
coordination of specific campaigns, especially new organizing campaigns. SEIU has 
done this most prominently in its “Driving Up Standards” 2004-2005 campaign to 
organize school bus drivers at private contractor FirstStudent (a subsidiary of UK‟s 
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FirstGroup). Second, global alliances are designed to build capacity for all unions 
involved, not just SEIU. This echoes Frundt‟s (2002) need for “bidirectionality” in 
cross-border organizing campaigns. In the case of the FirstStudent campaign, this has 
involved SEIU sending organizers to the UK to train T&G organizers in SEIU‟s 
organizing model. SEIU has done similar exchanges with the Australian Liquor, 
Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union in Australia in its “Clean Start” 
campaign to organize building service workers in Australia and New Zealand 
(Tattersall 2007: 162-163). Third, SEIU‟s global alliances have worked closely with 
GUFs to strengthen their organizing capacity. Because unions are primarily organized 
around the national level, the role of GUFs as the international interlocutor is 
important for long-term stability and continuity.  
 Other unions have criticized SEIU‟s methods in building global alliances 
claiming the “[L]earning process between SEIU and the T&G is less than mutual” and 
“[E]ngagement is sometimes seen as a one-way street where SEIU is the teacher and 
the UK unions are the students” (Tattersall 2007: 170). There have been difficulties 
translating SEIU‟s confrontational style to unions that have cultivated and depend on 
long standing relationships with firms. SEIU has less to lose by using more 
antagonistic tactics as an outsider than do the indigenous unions who will have to deal 
with companies after SEIU leaves. Tattersall remains optimistic that these differences 
can be overcome through experience, patience and negotiation (Tattersall 2007). 
Within SEIU, there are concerns that the global alliances may have more breadth than 
depth (2007: 172) 
 Cohen and Early (2000) use three case studies in the telecommunication 
industry to showcase the various alliances the Communication Workers (CWA) have 
built with allies. Faced with a combination of privatization and deregulation, telecom 
unions have lost the local control previously used as leverage over firms. 
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Transnational giants such as British Telecom, Nortel and Sprint have diversified their 
holdings beyond their national origins, leaving local unions with less bargaining 
power over firms. As a means to combat this, the CWA has built alliances with 
Canadian, British, Mexican and Taiwanese union federations assisting in organizing 
campaigns, strike solidarity and worker exchanges. In order to build coordinated 
power at telecom multinationals these alliances will need to be combined with 
innovative cross-border organizing and bargaining tactics and take advantage of the 
strategic position of telecommunications in global information networks. Actions such 
as the “virtual strike” by unions in the IBM global network have exploited the 
strategic position to build leverage (Uni Union Network 2007). The cross-border 
campaign by the Chunghwa Telecom Workers Union integrated international 
solidarity (with the CWA, telecom unions and the GUF, Uni) with local militance to 
halt the privatization of the state-owned Chunghwa Telecom (CWA News 2006; 
CTWU 2009).  
 Other global networks have gone beyond union-union alliances and included 
other social movements to challenge the multiple logics of capital accumulation. The 
Rio Tinto network links unions, GUFs, environmental advocacy, indigenous rights 
organizations and human rights groups in what Goodman (2004) calls “cross national 
social movement unionism” (2004: 106). Beginning in 1996 with an international 
corporate campaign designed to “politicize Rio Tinto, defining it as a global pariah” 
(2004: 113), the network is made up of overlapping levels of activity. A trade union 
network coordinates unions representing Rio Tinto workers globally. A public 
campaign, including films, a cyber campaign, and an information database are 
designed to educate the public and counter the influence Rio Tinto has over media 
with an unfiltered message. Third, community and environmental groups build local 
pressure in communities affected by the effects of Rio Tinto‟s mining operations, 
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especially indigenous communities dealing with displacement. A fourth track, building 
a shareholder campaign, was inaugurated in 1998 (2004:114-115). This broad based 
approach to confronting Rio Tinto has taken advantage of the multiple logics MNCs, 
especially in the extractive industries, depend on to produce profits. More research is 
needed to see how the Rio Tinto network has incorporated other unions in industries 
associated with the products extracted by the firm. Networks in the extractive 
industries would seem especially suited to organizing vertically along commodity 
chains as well as horizontally with other social movements. 
 
International Framework Agreements (IFAs) 
 Over the past decade attention has turned to Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) as alternative mechanism for unions and consumer groups to regulate the power 
of corporations on an international level (Crane et al 2008). The need to ensure equal 
standards across firms has increased due to both the internationalization of 
corporations to stretch across geographical boundaries as well as corporate campaign 
tactics unions and other consumer groups have used to highlight disparities between a 
corporation‟s public image and actual behavior. While CSR, especially in the form of 
“codes of conduct,” has been held up by some as an effective mechanism to ensure 
fair treatment, these codes of conduct are non-binding statements more often used to 
promote a company‟s positive self image to the public rather than binding agreements 
with labor, environmental and human rights organizations. Codes of conduct are also 
unilateral, written and signed solely by the corporation without input from external 
groups affected by the corporation‟s policies or enforcement procedures to ensure 
compliance with the code.  
 As an alternative, many unions have promoted International Framework 
Agreements (IFA) as more effective and participatory structures. IFAs are multilateral 
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agreements, signed between the corporation and a union, usually one of the GUF‟s, at 
a global level in order to ensure equal standards across a firm. Stevis and Boswell 
(2007) identify three goals of IFAs. First, they must guarantee Core Labor Standards 
(CLS) such as abolition of child labor, non-discrimination and freedom of association. 
Second, they should cover all employees, including workers who are subcontracted or 
employed by subsidiaries and suppliers of the firm. And, third, IFAs should be 
designed to establish an institutionalized relationship with the firm at (at the very 
least) a corporate level and ensure some form of “arrangements for interactions, 
monitoring and implementation” (2007: 181). IFAs have been signed at fifty-five 
firms (2007: 174), varying in sector and size, though all but two are European (US-
based Chiquita and the South African mining firm, AngloGold) and provide for 
varying levels of participation and representation from unions throughout the firm.  
 Ultimately IFAs provide a foundation from which to approach regulating 
transnational capital, not an end in itself. IFAs are not international collective 
bargaining agreements, i.e. there is no international body to enforce these agreements, 
and in the end IFA‟s are only as strong as the unions that sign on to them.  Stevis and 
Boswell (2007) conclude that while IFAs may help initiate vertical links to corporate 
offices and horizontal links to other unions representing workers at the same firm, in 
order for them to work they must be connected to broader comprehensive global 
campaigns. If IFAs are treated as an end to be attained for themselves rather than as a 
tool in the repertoires of comprehensive campaigns, they will end up more like 
watered down codes of conduct than enforceable collective bargaining agreements.  
 Unions have used IFAs as tools in organizing campaigns with varying degrees 
of success. Wills (2001) surveys the effects of the IUF-Accor IFA in different 
countries. In the US, Canada and Indonesia is has been used as leverage in organizing 
hotel workers. In Australia it helped build horizontal links between hospitality workers 
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and building trades unions seeking representation at new hotel sites. In Africa the IUF 
was able to bring together the first conference of Accor affiliate unions to exchange 
information and strategies. While the IFA has not guaranteed neutrality in organizing 
campaigns or guaranteed access to worksites, it has given unions an extra tool to use 
strategically in building both vertical and horizontal links. Or, as the IUF Executive 
committee wrote in 2000 “IUF agreements are in essence about organizing and 
bargaining for „space‟. The work of the IUF in this area is best seen as international 
bargaining aimed at protecting and enlarging the space in which IUF affiliates 
organize and bargain” (quoted in Wills 2001: 685). IFAs cannot substitute for well-
disciplined organizing and bargaining tactics, but may add another tool in unions‟ 
repertoires of comprehensive campaigns.  
 The cross-border and community work of unions in the Latin American banana 
industry has already been discussed (Frank 2005). Frundt (2007) examines the 
numerous strategies banana unions have employed to fit circumstances. Having signed 
a historic IFA with Chiquita in 2001 (the first in an agricultural and non-European 
MNC), COLSIBA has used the IFA to combat rounds of layoffs and facilitate 
organizing Chiquita suppliers, though results have been mixed. In some regions local 
unions have seen an improvement in labor relations, while in other places management 
has continued with anti-union activities. Other major Latin American banana 
producers, DelMonte and Dole, have refused to sign IFAs.  
 
Challenges to Building Global Networks 
 Not all attempts at building lasting cross-border networks have been as 
successful as the previous examples. Industries such as the hotel and auto parts 
industries have been plagued by internecine fighting, mistrust and national 
chauvinisms that have inhibited the formation of long-term union coalitions and cross-
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border campaigns. Unions at the Starwood hotel chain in North America have been 
successful at building regional and national organizing and bargaining strategies. 
Starwood Hotels in Europe have been able to coordinate through the structure of 
European Works Councils, but lacking such an institutional framework in North 
America, unions have been stymied in attempts to engage in cross-border campaigns 
(Brenner 2007). The IUF‟s work with unions in the Accor chain have shown that 
cross-border coordination can occur in the hotel industry, but only with the long-term 
commitment of unions involved (Wills 2002). 
 Models of cross-border networks in the auto and auto parts industries have 
been well-documented (Alexander 1999; Hathaway 2000; Anner 2004), but not all of 
these attempts have been successful. Babson and Juarez (2007) document the 
“International Research Network on Autowork in the Americas” (IRNAA) which 
began as an academic research network and grew to become an important coordinating 
body for US, Canadian and Mexican unions. Continental integration through trade 
agreements such as NAFTA, lean production methods and integrated production 
chains have integrated unions in these three nations into regional markets of 
production while at the same time have produced only halting attempts at cross-border 
coordination. While Alexander (1999) and Hathaway (2000) have described the cross-
border work the UE has done with the FAT but the UAW, the largest auto union in the 
US, has been reluctant to commit resources and money towards long-term cross-
border activity.  
 The industrial relations system of Mexico with its corporatist origins and the 
embedded position of labor unions in the ruling PRI (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional) party‟s system of political patronage have hindered coordination 
amongst unions within Mexico. This has left Mexican auto unions wishing to engage 
in cross-border work to do so independently, without the resources or bargaining 
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power needed to build broad-based networks within multinational firms (Babson and 
Juarez 2007). Corporatism, union competition, a lack of trust amongst unions, tepid 
support from the UAW and the weak institutional position of the IRNAA network 
itself have all hindered the growth of a North American network in the auto industry 
(Babson and Juarez 2007: 37-39).  
  
II. USW and CUT Internationalisms 
USW Internationalisms 
Arising out of the upsurge in industrial union organizing following the passage 
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935, the USW (known as the 
Steelworker Organizing Committee (SWOC) between 1936-1942) was formed in 
1942. The USW‟s collective bargaining activities remained primarily focused on 
pattern bargaining agreements at domestic steel and manufacturing firms such as US 
Steel and Kaiser Steel, which dominated the North American market (Clark et al. 
1987). Pattern bargaining provided a solid foundation for USW gains at the bargaining 
table from the 1960s until the 1980s when concessions and the aggressive use of 
permanent replacement workers during strikes set unions on the defensive (Rosenblum 
1995).  By the 1990-1992 campaign at Ravenswood and 1995-1996 campaign at 
Bridgestone/Firestone, the USW turned towards more aggressive, and international, 
strategies of its own to contend with management‟s continued pressure for 
concessions. The USW used international solidarity, company and industry councils, 
and strategic partnerships with other unions around the world to increase its 
bargaining position with firms. At the same time, the USW has offered solidarity to 
unions such at the Mexican Sindicato Nacional  de Trabajadores Mineros, 
Metalúrgicos y Similares, known as Los Mineros, the Brazilian CUT and the Mexican 
FAT in their campaigns (USW@Work 2006a).  
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Organizational change has come rapidly since the mid 1990s with mergers to 
United Rubber Workers in 1995, Industrial Woodworkers and Allied Union in 2004, 
and PACE (themselves a 1998 merger of the OCAW and UPIU) in 2005. The USW 
signed an agreement with the UK/Irish Unite the Union in July 2008 to form the first 
global union, Workers Uniting. It has been at the forefront of developing new 
strategies for global trade unionism (Needleman 2008). The USW‟s international 
strategies have developed over nearly 20 years through comprehensive campaigns, 
worker exchanges and education, political advocacy and involvement in global union 
federations (GUFs). 
The current USW is the product of multiple mergers of industrial unions in the 
rubber, chemicals, paper, steel and nuclear industries. It reflects the diverse histories, 
organizational cultures and memberships of industries most acutely affected by the 
shifts in the manufacturing sector over the past twenty-five years. Some industries, 
such as oil refining, steel and aluminum production are directly linked to extractive 
industries and mining. These global industries connect North American workers to 
counterparts in Africa, South America or Australia through commodity and production 
chains. Offshoring, plant closings and the threat of international whipsawing have 
focused the USW on issues of trade and the decline of the North American 
manufacturing sector. Mergers and the internationalization of corporate ownership 
into complex webs of subsidiaries, joint ventures and holding companies have 
impelled the USW to use more sophisticated research methods to understand the 
ultimate sources of corporate power. Environmental activism and worker health and 
safety concerns have built links with environmental and community organizations. 
Globally integrated industries such as steel, mining, aluminum, oil and paper have 
brought recognition of the struggles of workers in other nations and the power 
international solidarity has for workers at home and abroad. Newer, more innovative 
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campaign tactics were needed to build bargaining power in increasingly global 
industries such as steel, oil and mining.  
 
Campaigns 
The USW‟s initial forays into cross-border activity began as pragmatic 
comprehensive campaign strategies. The OCAW‟s campaign to end the five-year 
lockout of workers at a Louisiana BASF facility taught early lessons about the need 
for local solidarity, community outreach, and the need to broaden the union‟s base of 
allies (civil rights groups, German Green Party) in order to take on a powerful MNC 
like BASF. It also taught the OCAW the difficulties of building international 
solidarity: language barriers, lack of established relationships with unions overseas 
and working with unions (IG Chemie) who did not share the same ideological 
commitment to comprehensive campaigns (Minchin 2003).  
The USW‟s campaign at Ravenswood (1990-1992) took locked out workers 
from West Virginia to Zug, Switzerland, chasing billionaire financier Marc Rich to his 
safe haven and gathering support from local Swiss politicians. Rather than simply 
focusing on the figurehead of Ravenswood‟s global chain, the USW followed Rich‟s 
money trail to banks in the Netherlands, aluminum smelters in Venezuela, luxury 
hotels in Romania and oil trading in Finland; namely anywhere where Rich had 
financial investments (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999). The USW would make 
allies with local and national unions in order to build escalating pressure on Rich‟s 
financial empire. This willingness to use international solidarity as a campaign 
strategy, while initially pragmatic, would become established within the USW‟s 
organizational makeup over subsequent comprehensive campaigns.  
The OCAW and later PACE would be involved in solidarity campaigns to 
support jailed union leaders in Nigeria (OCAW Reporter 1995), passing resolutions at 
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the convention in 1994, hosting speaking tours of Nigerian unionists and organizing 
protests outside the Nigerian embassy (OCAW Reporter 1998). The OCAW was 
involved in the campaign to boycott the Burmese junta because of human rights 
abuses by the military dictatorship there. The OCAW used its leverage at oil 
companies such as Unocal, Texaco and ARCO to push for divestment (OCAW 
Reporter 1997; 1998).  
During the Bridgestone/Firestone global campaign (1994-1996), the USW used 
global outreach coordinating work stoppages, protests and international days of action 
in over a dozen countries (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 2003). The First World 
Conference on Bridgestone, a gathering of unions involved in the solidarity campaign, 
would evolve over the next ten years, through the support of the ICEM,  into a 
worldwide network of Bridgestone/Firestone unions across the world able to 
coordinate information and strategy exchanges (ICEM 2008).  
Likewise, the 1999 campaign at Continental Tire (Greven and Russo 2003) 
would involve bringing striking workers from North Carolina to Germany, Slovakia, 
France, Turkey and Scotland to meet fellow trade unionists face to face and sustain 
pressure on the German MNC (Steelabor 1999a). These exchanges during the global 
campaign would build the foundation for future USW solidarity with striking Mexican 
Continental Tire workers (Steelabor 2001). During the 1998-2002 global campaign at 
Titan Tire the Uruguayan Rubber Workers Union (FUNSA) would play a strategic 
role in bringing about a settlement (Steelabor 1999b; 1999c; 2002b). PACE‟s 
campaign at Continental Carbon was successful in part due to hunger strikes and the 
support of Taiwanese petroleum unions (PaceSetter 2002).  
 As in the campaign at Gerdau, the USW would use the comprehensive 
campaign both as a pragmatic tactic in building in winning the conflict at hand as well 
as a springboard for building long-term relationships with other unions globally. 
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Comprehensive campaigns such as Bridgestone/Firestone, Continental Tire, Titan Tire 
and Continental Carbon built trust through struggle and established common 
repertoires of action that may be used in future campaigns. Solidarity campaigns to 
end human rights abuses against trade union leaders struggling against military 
dictatorships broadened the union‟s scope of engagement from bread and butter issues 
to issues of human rights.  
 
NAFTA 
Opposition to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between 
1992-1993 led the USW to build relationships with independent labor unions in 
Mexico. Most notably this has meant an early alliance with the FAT (Hathaway 2000). 
FAT had built solidarity networks with the United Electrical, Radio and Machine 
Workers of America (UE) at the same time, proceeding to pursue cross-border 
organizing strategies as well as lobbying against NAFTA.  
Supporters of NAFTA who claimed it would bring jobs to Mexico accused US 
and Canadian labor unions of being either shortsighted (as NAFTA was touted to be 
an export boom for US manufacturers) or as selfish protectionists who only cared 
about their own jobs and not those of Mexican workers‟ (MacArthur 2000). Unlike 
official labor unions linked to the Institutional Ruling Party (PRI) which supported the 
free trade agreement, the FAT opposed NAFTA on the grounds that negotiations 
which excluded labor unions and social movements would not reflect the interests of 
the majority of workers. Mexican unions and social movements founded the Mexican 
Action Network Confronting Free Trade (RMALC) (Hathaway 2000). FAT leaders 
came to Pittsburgh in 1993 to present their opposition to NAFTA to the USW 
Executive Board (Steelabor 1993).  
64 
 
 The collaboration with the FAT during the campaign against NAFTA would 
build a foundation a broader alliance to develop cross-border organizing strategies. In 
1997 the FAT, Teamsters, UE, UPIU, CAW, UNITE (Union of Needletrades, 
Industrial and Textile Employees) and the USW would form the Echlin Workers 
Alliance. This alliance was formed to organize workers across Canada, the US and 
Mexico at Echlin, an auto parts company later bought by Dana Corp (The 
Paperworker 1998; Hathaway 2000). 
 
Steelworker Humanity Fund 
 After the passage of NAFTA in 1993, North American unions began to feel the 
repercussions of capital mobility through plant closures and, more often, the threat of 
plant closures. This led the USW to look at where jobs were moving, the quality of 
conditions of these jobs and who would be working in these jobs. Union members in 
North America wanted a way to meet the workers who would be working these jobs in 
order to get a better understanding of the processes of globalization and its effects on 
workers throughout the global production chain. Out of this need to link with workers 
in other parts of the world came initiatives of the Canadian Steelworker Humanity 
Fund (Marshall and Garcia-Orgales 2006). 
 Originally created in 1985 as a way to raise funds for victims of famines in 
Africa, the Humanity Fund‟s mission has expanded to other areas. First, the Fund 
assists building long-term labor-community development projects with Southern 
activists. These projects reflect local needs of trade unionists, ranging from building 
physical infrastructure, providing credit for agricultural development, and helping 
HIV/AIDS education among trade union members. Second, the Fund promotes 
education of union members about corporate globalization in both Canada and the 
Global South. These education projects develop worker-based alternatives to corporate 
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globalization focusing on how privatization, capital mobility, and multinational 
corporations have affected local communities. Third, the Fund spends much of its 
resources facilitating worker-to-worker exchanges with Southern unionists as a way to 
put a face on workers thousands of miles apart but linked through processes of 
corporate globalization. These exchanges have been the foundation for building global 
networks like the one at Gerdau. Finally, the Humanity Fund lobbies opposition to free 
trade policy initiatives such as NAFTA and the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA). This lobbying also includes organizing local worker mobilization at 
demonstrations in Canada through gatherings such as the People‟s Summit of the 
Americas in 2001 (Steelworker Humanity Fund, 2004; Marshall and Garcia-Orgales 
2006). The Fund is bargained into individual union contracts and funded by member 
contributions of a penny per hour worked. 
 
Global Union Federations (GUFs) and Global Networks 
 Global Union Federations are “organizations bringing together national trade 
unions on an international level” (ICFTU 2004). GUFs work to build solidarity among 
member unions worldwide through financial assistance, and coordination of action 
against corporations or governments. They also do research and facilitate information 
sharing among members, engage in public awareness campaigns and work with NGOs 
such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) to develop worker-based trade and 
labor standards and lobby national governments (ICFTU 2004). In recent years GUFs 
have taken the lead in promoting IFAs between member unions and multinational 
employers. IFAs “aim to establish certain rules that regulate the corporation‟s labor 
practices at the global level…” (Stevis and Boswell 2007: 175). While the USW has 
supported IFAs in principle, it has not been signatory to any IFAs (2007:187).  
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 The USW belongs to four GUFs, the International Union of Food Workers 
(IUF), the International Federation of Chemical, Energy and Mine Workers (ICEM), 
the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF) and the International Federation of 
Building and Wood Workers (IFBWW). Through these GUFs the USW is able to 
maintain relationships with other unions in similar industries, discuss issues of 
globalization and develop solidarity strategies. Within these GUFs the USW has 
participated in both industry councils such as the Aluminum and Steel councils in the 
IMF and the Latin American United Tire and Rubber Workers Council (FUTINAL) in 
the ICEM, providing the USW with more specific industry-wide research, trends and 
projections (Steelabor 2001; Steelabor 2003).  
More recently the USW (and PACE before it) has helped establish company 
networks at MNCs such as Bridgestone/Firestone (1996), Goodyear (1999), Smurfit-
Stone (2000), International Paper (2002), Exxon Mobil (2004), and Kimberly-Clark 
(2007). These networks include unions from across the world representing workers at 
a common employer. They facilitate information exchange about company strategies 
in different countries and build a strategic understanding of how company may be 
using geographic disparities in treatment to undercut workers in other parts of the 
world. Company networks bring unions together to build common agendas around 
issues such as health and safety, outsourcing and other ILO core labor standards. 
These networks have been integral in USW comprehensive campaigns at 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Continental Tire and Gerdau as a means to coordinate 
escalating global pressure strategies in multiple places. Events such as international 
solidarity days (buttons or stickers), coordinated rallies, and solidarity strikes have all 
been coordinated through these company-wide networks.  
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Strategic Alliances 
 Strategic alliances have been used as a way of deepening relationships between 
individual unions since the mid 1990s. The OCAW began exploring a long-term 
relationship with the Dutch union FNV Bodgenoten after management at a DSM 
Polymer facility in Virginia started an anti-union campaign during a 1996 organizing 
drive (OCAW Reporter 1998). DSM, a large Dutch chemical company, refused to 
recognize the union‟s NLRB victory. The OCAW reached out to the FNV for support 
in the Netherlands. FNV leaders came to Virginia, met with workers on housecalls and 
tried to meet with American management. After returning to the Netherlands, the FNV 
was able to help broker a deal to end the impasse and certify the OCAW in Virginia. 
Worker exchanges continued with the Dutch even after the Virginia campaign ended 
(PaceSetter, 1999; 2002). Similar worker to worker exchanges took place with the 
Finnish paper worker union (PaceSetter 2001) and with Brazilian unions at 
International Paper and BASF (Pacesetter 2001).  
 The USW has built strategic alliances with six major unions: IG Metall 
(Germany), CNM/CUT (Brazil), SNTMM-SRM, or Los Mineros (Mexico), Australian 
Workers Union, AWU and the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
(Australia) and signed a merger agreement in 2008 with the UK/Irish Unite the Union 
to form the first transatlantic labor union. These alliances are the building blocks for 
long-term partnership with unions who share common values, tactics. They are usually 
located in countries or regions strategic to production and extractive industries. “The 
ideal partners have industrial sectors similar to those where our members work. The 
USW additionally sought allies showing militancy, sophistication in research and 
bargaining and an understanding of the global economy with no direct ties to their 
governments.” (USW@Work 2006a: 24-25).  
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Steel Tariffs 
 In March of 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush announced the 
implementation of tariffs of up to 30 percent on foreign finished steel. This 
protectionist measure was adopted after strong lobbying from the USW and other U.S. 
industrial unions in response to heavy job losses in the steel industry and steel 
dumping from developing nations such as China, India and Brazil. The effect of this 
protectionist measure was initially cause for some concern among international union 
allies but after discussions among union leaders, a common policy on tariffs was 
agreed upon (Grana and Navarro 2002). Rather than adopt a more free market 
approach to the tariff issue, the CNM/CUT and USW were able to agree that existing 
free market approaches to lower tariffs had actually hurt both Brazilian and US 
workers.  
After privatizations, technological improvements and corporate restructuring in 
the mid-1990s Brazil had become the fifth largest exporter of steel (Grana and 
Navarro 2002). But at the same time Brazil had become a major exporter of steel, 
Brazilian steelworkers felt the effects of this turn towards an export-oriented growth 
strategy. The competitiveness of Brazilian steel on the world market was directly 
linked to increased productivity, a “crushing of wages” and a 23% reduction in overall 
levels of employment (Grana and Navarro 2002, paragraph seven). Export-oriented 
growth had also come at the expense of domestic infrastructure and Brazilian 
standards of living (Steelabor 2002a).  
The CNM/CUT met with the AFL-CIO in Brazil in March 2002 and with 
USW leadership in April 2002 (also in Brazil) (Grana and Navarro 2002). The 
CNM/CUT also met with Brazilian politicians to push for higher domestic tariffs to 
match the ones adopted by the US and European Union. In June, the CNM/CUT and 
USW began a series of worker exchanges to deepen mutual understanding of the 
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situations faced by union members in each country (Steelabor 2002a). Due to a history 
of trust and solidarity work, USW and CNM/CUT leaders were able to take a 
potentially divisive issue such as tariffs and transform it into a platform for 
cooperation and deeper hemispheric involvement. 
 
Brazilian Labor Internationalisms 
 Internationalism in the Brazilian labor movement emerged from the “Novo 
Sindicalismo,” or “New Unionism” movement in the late 1970s and 1980s. This 
movement was centered in the auto sector in the industrial region surrounding São 
Paulo known as the ABC.
1
 New Unionism in the late 1970s and 1980s was rooted in 
rank and file mobilization, autonomy from State control over union affairs and direct 
negotiations with employers. Unions used in-plant factory committees, mass strikes 
and links with community and social movements to build a broad, class-based 
movement of industrial workers. These early roots in rank and file mobilization, direct 
negotiations and oppositionist ideology would influence more recent international 
strategies.  
This movement was shaped by the uniquely Brazilian code of labor laws, a 
repressive military dictatorship and a global reorganization of industrial production 
turning regions like the ABC to the battlegrounds of a new form of industrial 
unionism. The CNM/CUT‟s international strategies would be formed both by the legal 
restrictions on its development as well as openings in its economic and social 
environment.  
 Brazilian labor unions were saddled by a system of corporatist labor laws 
rooted in the 1930s populism of Getulio Vargas. Vargas had based Brazilian labor law 
system  (the Consolidation of Labor Laws, CLT) on Mussolini‟s mix of corporatism 
                                                 
1
 ABC is an acronym for the towns of Santo André, São Bernardo and São Caetano.  
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and fascism.  “Creation of trade unions became dependent on the State‟s permit. The 
latter began to sponsor, support and control unions, and thereby the whole system of 
labour relations. Little ground was left for the parties‟ autonomy and direct 
relationships between employers and workers” (Rands Barros 1999: 17).  The impôsto 
sindical, or state-imposed union tax, meant labor unions were dependent upon State 
funds for their internal operations. Unions did not have the right to in-plant 
representation; negotiations were held at the industry level giving rank and file 
workers very little say in their union‟s day to day affairs. Under state corporatism, 
unions were forced to act more as social welfare organizations than democratic 
member-based organizations.  
Economic shifts were also shaping the way in which labor unions and social 
movements would emerge. The Brazilian state adopted a policy of Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) in order to stimulate growth in industrial sectors such as auto 
and capital goods. Fuel, steel and raw materials would be nationalized in order to 
ensure a stable supply of inputs for the growing industrial sectors in auto, chemicals 
and capital goods. In 1978, automobiles and auto parts made up more than half of 
Brazil‟s exports (Seidman 1994: 48). This meant that these industries were vulnerable 
to work stoppages, giving these workers more leverage to influence State policies.  
These industrial sectors such as auto and chemicals that were the heart of 
Brazil‟s growth strategies were also industries which were globally connected to both 
US and Western European markets as well as other emerging industrial nations, such 
as South Africa. Anner (2004) notes that “[N]ot all production regimes are alike. How 
production and distribution are structured in a sector affects labor and labor strategies” 
(2004:15). Unlike buyer-driver commodity chains (such as textiles and apparel), 
producer-driven commodity chains (such as auto, chemicals and steel) are more likely 
to produce transnational labor networks. Transnational labor networks with labor 
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movements in both the Global North (especially Germany, Canada and to a lesser 
extent the US) as well as the Global South (South Africa, Mexico and Korea) would 
play important roles in shaping Brazilian internationalist trade union strategies. 
ISI policies also meant the State would be in charge of planning, implementing 
and enforcing labor peace between industry and workers. Industrial growth needed 
labor peace and state corporatism was the tool used to keep both industrialists and 
workers in line for the greater good of national growth. From 1964 to 1989 Brazil was 
under the rule of a military dictatorship which restricted independent trade unionism 
and worker militancy, though the trade union movement would be at the forefront of 
challenging the dictatorship‟s rule. In the early years of the dictatorship, labor leaders 
were arrested, tortured and killed. Communist and independent trade union 
movements were repressed or co-opted by the State (Klein 2007). 
 
CUT Internationalisms 
 The Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) was founded in 1983 as the major 
opposition labor union to the state-sponsored Central Geral dos Trabalhadores (CGT). 
The CUT grew out of the need for an organizational vehicle to harness the growing 
militancy in the industrial workforce. The CUT “[E]mphasized mobilization and 
confrontation. It opposed the existing model of labour relations, stressed the autonomy 
of the working class, and, although participating in the general struggles of democratic 
forces against the regime, tended to underline the specific workers‟ claims within the 
democratic programme” (Rands Barros 1999: 32-33).  Many of the founders of the 
CUT had been active in the foundation of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), or 
Workers Party, in 1980. Current Brazilian President Lula da Silva was the leader of 
the Sao Bernardo Metalworkers Union and a founder of the PT as well.  
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Early Worker Exchanges 
Early international links were made through the World Company Councils in 
the late 1970s as well as through independent solidarity initiatives. At Volkswagen, 
Ford and Mercedes-Benz, relationships with the German metalworkers union IG 
Metall were especially important. The German system of works councils and in-plant 
representation were models for the incipient in-plant factory commissions the CUT 
had been organizing in the auto plants of the ABC (Anner 2004: 183). Exchanges gave 
Brazilian trade unionists an opportunity to exchange models of in-plant representation. 
Through the Volkswagen World Council, German unionists gathered funds to support 
South African and Brazilians. In the 1980s shop stewards at the VW Wolfsburg plant 
set up the “Working Group for International Solidarity” and organized seminars and 
exchanges for Brazilians to come to Germany (Rüb 2002:21). These same German 
unionists would assist Brazilians when they came to Wolfsburg to negotiate directly 
with VW management to protest layoffs (Anner 2004: 193).  
Attempts to engage in international strategies with the UAW were less fruitful. 
The UAW has participated in international level meetings at the IMF, though it is 
wont to engage in direct union-to-union strategies, preferring to pursue national 
collective bargaining strategies. This reluctance has been a persistent barrier to 
building stronger transnational networks in the auto industry. It is difficult to engage 
in comprehensive strategies without cooperation from unions in the home country of 
the largest auto manufacturers.  
Transnational work with the CAW has been more successful, owing to the 
CAW‟s origins rooted in opposition to the UAW‟s concessionary bargaining strategies 
in the 1980s. In 1997 the CAW and CNM/CUT began exchanges for women trade 
union activists to develop leadership skills and address issues of gender discrimination 
(MetalWorld 2008). While the CAW has devoted staff members to developing 
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international ties with other unionists through their CAW Social Justice Fund 
(MetalWorld 2008) it has been less eager to engage in cross-border campaign tactics. 
At the 2007 “Building Bridges” conference in Windsor, Ontario, the director of the 
CAW‟s International Department, Carol Phillips, struck a more protectionist tone 
noting “We need to be completely engaged in the home front, we need to be 
completely engaged domestically, before we can add an international component to 
our struggle” (Phillips 2007).   
 Early exchanges such as the ones with German trade unionists in the auto 
industry, while not being utilized as strategies for campaigns or during collective 
bargaining, were crucial to the later campaign work in the 1990s and 2000s. These 
face-to-face meetings built a sustained relationship of rank-and-file organization 
through trust building and added international solidarity into the pool of strategies that 
unions could use in future work. Because workers had met other workers and built 
personal relationships, international solidarity was now an option for future 
campaigns. 
Though these international exchanges were setting the ground for future 
collaboration, Brazilian union strategies focused on domestic solutions to collective 
bargaining problems. “Unionists received international support to form these factory 
commissions. But the core component of the Brazilian unionists‟ strategy in the 1980s 
was still national or sub-national. The strike was the action of choice, and the 1980s 
was one of the periods of the greatest strike activity in Brazilian history” (Anner 2004: 
181). CUT unions focused on member mobilization, and mass strikes to influence 
industrial policy and make economic and political gains for the labor movement as a 
whole.   
The political economy of Brazil shifted from ISI growth policies to a 
neoliberal approach under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the mid 1990s. 
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Cardoso (and to an extent his predecessor, Fernando Collor) privatized state 
enterprises, invited foreign investment and worked with the International Monetary 
Fund to stabilize the ailing Brazilian economy. A more hostile economic and political 
climate of free market reforms meant relying solely on the traditional strategies of 
mass strikes and direct mobilization would be less effective. 
 A new labor union central, Força Sindical dedicated to a “unionism of results” 
had been formed in 1991 (Rands Barros 1999: 38). Força Sindical was more willing to 
cooperate with the government, supported the privatization of state industries and 
promoted free market reforms as the way to modernize Brazil‟s economy. Força 
became the CUT‟s major rival for members and offered a very different model of 
unionism from the CUT‟s member-mobilization focus (Anner 2004).  
It wasn‟t until the 1990s that the CUT changed strategies and began exploring 
international campaigns as tactics. Industrial restructuring in the auto industry towards 
lean production and non-union sites shifted the industry from the heavily unionized 
South and Southeast to the less unionized and poorer Northeast. These shifts were 
used as strategies to whipsaw CUT unions in the South to accept layoffs and 
concessions. Força Sindical‟s model of cooperation was a growing force. It used 
agreements with local and regional politicians to gain representation rights to new 
industrial sites in the North. “The oppositional unionists found that contentious 
activities had to be combined with transnational information exchange, campaigns and 
international collective bargaining to be effective”  (Anner 2004:183). Faced with 
industrial restructuring, union competition from Força Sindical and neoliberal 
economic policies, the CUT would have to expand its repertoires of action. The 
relationships forged in the worker exchanges of the 1980s would have to be 
transformed from networks for information exchange into tangible campaign 
strategies.  
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Campaign Strategies 
 The CUT has used transnational labor strategies in dealing with multinational 
employers, especially in the auto industry where they have incorporated transnational 
strategies into their collective bargaining campaigns and protests against layoffs. 
Building off the foundation of worker and information exchanges with Canadian and 
German trade unionists (though not the UAW), the CUT has used direct negotiations 
with auto companies. In 1999 Ford announced 2,800 workers at their São Bernardo 
plant were to be laid off just before Christmas. Bargaining with the Brazilian state was 
unsuccessful and leaders decided to go to Detroit to meet Ford executives. CUT 
negotiators were able to secure a five year guarantee for future work. Likewise after 
layoffs were announced at VW in 2001, CUT leaders traveled directly to Wolfsburg to 
meet VW executives. Anner (2004) notes that transnational labor networks only 
developed at VW where the CUT and IG Metall had been in contact for almost twenty 
years. The UAW‟s reluctance to engage in transnational coalition building has 
impeded the ability to build stronger transnational networks.  
 At Daimler Chrysler CUT unionists were able to use historical ties with 
German and South African unionists to build a dynamic series of sympathy strikes and 
work stoppages. In 2000, Brazilian workers had gone on strike to protest layoffs of 
temporary workers. Management attempted to shift production to Germany by adding 
an extra Saturday shift. After finding out about the Brazilian strike and management‟s 
attempts to shift production through the international works council, Germans refused 
to take the shift in order to aid the Brazilians on strike. Likewise in 2001, workers in 
Germany and Brazil were able to coordinate strategies refusing to take extra work to 
compensate for a strike at South African plants (Anner 2004).   
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Information and Research Strategies 
 The CUT has used research as a tool for building transnational strategies. 
Because Brazil is host to dozens of multinational corporations, a large proportion of 
the CUT‟s membership is employed at these MNCs. Consequently the CUT has had to 
develop in-depth, sophisticated research and monitoring approaches to foreign MNCs.  
 The Social Observatory Institute was founded in 1997 by the CUT to research 
and monitor foreign MNCs operating in Brazil. The Social Observatory monitors 
MNCs to measure their compliance with ILO core labor standards using research 
resources as well as interviews with rank and file workers. The Social Observatory 
then issues reports on the behavior of these MNCs for both public pressure in 
conjunction with collective bargaining campaigns. The Social Observatory‟s research 
methodology incorporates a broad range of issues such as gender equity, 
discrimination, and child labor beyond the traditional issues of wages and benefits. 
Unions are then able to incorporate these issues into their bargaining campaigns to 
build stronger unions, better working conditions and a more progressive union culture 
(Barbosa et al. 2006). 
Out of the Social Observatory came the “Action Front for Multinationals,” or 
“CUTMulti.” Established in 2001 in cooperation with the Dutch union federation 
FNV, the CUTMulti goes beyond research and initiates relationships with foreign 
trade unions operating at the same MNC in order to build company-wide transnational 
labor networks. The CUTMulti has helped build regional and global networks at 
MNCs such as BASF, Carrefour, Arcelor Mittal, DuPont and Dow among others. The 
CUT has used these networks for global campaigns as well as for coordinated national 
bargaining strategies to combat regional disparities in wages and working conditions 
(CUTMulti 2008).  
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III. Company and Industry History 
Grupo Gerdau 
 Joao Gerdau, a German immigrant, and his son Hugo Gerdau, founded Gerdau 
Group Pontas de Paris Nail Factory in 1901 in Porto Alegre. The Gerdau family 
became local industrialists in the booming Southeastern region of Brazil. In 1948 the 
company entered the steelmaking business focusing on scrap steel and feeding the 
growing heavy industries of the Southeast. Through the 1950s and 1960s Grupo 
Gerdau expanded as a regional industrial force in the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro and began domestic expansion into the Northeast in 1969 with operations in 
the state of Pernambuco. Gerdau opened its first retail outlet for selling commercial 
steel in 1971 in Sao Paulo.  
 By the 1980s Gerdau had begun expanding international operations after 
acquisition of the Uruguayan Laisa Steel (1980). Gerdau made its first North 
American acquisitions, buying Canadian steel companies Courtice Steel (1989) in 
Cambridge, Ontario and MRM Steel (1989) in Selkirk, Manitoba. Grupo Gerdau 
continued its domestic expansion through aggressive acquisition of recently privatized 
steel mills. 
 Expansion continued through the 1990s with acquisitions of AZA Steel in 
Chile (1992) and Sipar Aceros Steel in Argentina (1998). In 1999 Gerdau became the 
majority stakeholder in US based Ameristeel. By 2002 it owned eleven mills in North 
America and changed its name to Gerdau Ameristeel for North American operations. 
Colombian companies Diaco and Sidelpa became part of Gerdau in 2004 followed by 
Siderperu in 2006. Gerdau continued its North American expansion with the 
acquisition of CoSteel in 2002, North Star Steel in 2004 and Sheffield Steel in 2006. 
Gerdau made its first move beyond the Americas when it bought the Spanish company 
Sidenor in 2006 (Gerdau 2006).  
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Gerdau Ameristeel 
 Ameristeel began as Florida Steel Products in Tampa, Florida in 1937. Florida 
Steel produced rebar and grew into producing rail products, nails and wire. In the 
1980s it expanded beyond Florida into Southern regional markets in South Carolina 
and Louisiana. In 1996 Florida Steel became Ameristeel and in 1999 was bought by 
Brazilian steel firm Gerdau. In 2002 Gerdau consolidated its North American steel 
operations to create Gerdau Ameristeel, headquartered in Tampa. 2004‟s acquisition 
of four minimill facilities from Cargill‟s North Star operation expanded Gerdau 
Ameristeel into Midwestern regional markets. By 2006 Gerdau was the second largest 
minimill operator in North America (behind Nucor). After the acquisition of Chaparral 
Steel in 2007 Gerdau became the fourth largest overall steel producer in North 
America (Gerdau Ameristeel 2007).  
 
The Minimill Industry 
Since the late 1970s the steel industry has undergone intensive restructuring. 
Declines in heavy industries such as automobiles, containers, railroads and machinery, 
the increase in direct foreign imports and technological advances have all put pressure 
on the integrated steel industry (Hogan 1987). Minimills, which are smaller, less 
expensive to run and more technologically integrated, began to compete with the 
larger, more capital-intensive integrated firms such as USX, LTV and Bethlehem Steel 
in the late 1970s, placing pressure on traditional USW strongholds (Hogan 1987).  
 The steel industry is divided into three sectors: integrated, specialty and 
minimill. Integrated steel is the largest sector, accounting for around 75 percent of US 
production. Iron ore, limestone, and coal are placed in large blast furnaces to produce 
steel. Companies such as Arcelor Mittal, US Steel and Severstal are leaders in 
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integrated steel. Specialty steel is a high skill process for making stainless and alloy 
products for specialized consumers. Minimills, however,  
 
…are fundamentally different than other parts of the steel industry in they use 
scrap steel as their primary input and melt it down in electric furnaces, 
eliminating the need to prepare iron ore and coke like traditional mills. This 
molten steel… is usually made into billets, which are later rolled into either 
reinforcing or hot rolled bars, wire rods, or structural shapes. Minimills 
typically concentrate on the low cost, low quality end of steel production due 
to their technological limitations. Whereas integrated mills have focused on 
national and international markets, minimills are regional in nature. Scrap steel 
is purchased from local sources and the primary customers are usually located 
a short distance from the plant. (Seroka 2005: 42-43) 
 
Arthur (1987) identifies four types of industrial relations strategies in the 
minimill industry. In union facilities Arthur identifies a “traditional union strategy” of 
adversarial union-management relations, though he claims these have been 
concentrated in older minimills, many of which have now been shut down or sold to 
larger firms such as Birmingham Steel (now part of Nucor) (Arthur 1987). The second 
type of industrial relations strategy in union minimills has calls “cooperative union 
strategy.” This strategy is marked steady pay and benefit increases and contracts in 
line with traditional integrated mills though with some work rule trade-offs (Arthur 
1987).   
 Arthur identifies two non-union labor relations strategies, “company 
identification” and “traditional nonunion.” The company identification model is based 
on the satisfying employee needs for job security and pay, merging company and 
employee goals through profit sharing and flat organizational structures. Industry 
leader Nucor is the most prominent proponent of this model (Arthur 1987: 119-120). 
According to Arthur, traditional nonunion strategies include an authoritarian, 
aggressive anti-union stance. Union drives are countered with legal and sometimes 
illegal opposition tactics such as firings, intimidation and confrontation. Companies 
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such as Bayou Steel and Birmingham Steel represented this model of industrial 
relations. Arthur‟s theory failed to take stock of the size and distribution of these 
practices on the overall minimill industry, underestimating the level of employer 
opposition endemic to the minimill industry. 
It is important to note that the industrial relations strategy at Gerdau 
Ameristeel most closely resembles that of the “traditional nonunion” strategy followed 
by Birmingham Steel and Florida Steel, the two precursors to the current Gerdau 
Ameristeel. Florida Steel was one of the most well-known of the anti-union minimill 
firms throughout the 1970s and 1980s. A 1980 Federal 5
th
 Circuit Court decision 
noted:  
 
By one count, Florida Steel had been found guilty of an unfair labor practice 
by the Board on seventeen separate occasions since 1974, with enforcement 
ordered by the court in ten of the twelve cases reviewed on appeal. The 
company has countered by emphasizing the disputatious character of the 
Steelworkers organizational and representational activities at various plants, 
leading to the filing of dozens of charges and to the characterization by this 
court of the controversy as one reminiscent of the feud between the Hatfields 
and McCoys. (Federal Circuits, 5
th
 Circuit. June 25, 1980)  
 
USW organizing attempts at Florida Steel in the 1970s and 1980s were vicious, highly 
adversarial affairs. During the USW‟s drive to organize Florida Steel‟s Indiantown, 
Florida minimill facility the company “withheld certain pay and benefit increases to 
union employees which the board found to be in violation of the National Labor 
Relations Act” (Arthur 1987: 122). Between 1973 and 1979, Florida Steel was ordered 
to pay $3.3 million in back pay to employees in the third largest settlement handled by 
the NLRB (Arthur 1987). This culture of highly adversarial anti-union labor relations 
by Florida Steel management would continue as Florida Steel became Ameristeel and 
then Gerdau Ameristeel.   
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The USW has noted the threat of minimills to the traditional union stronghold 
in integrated mills but has been largely unsuccessful in organizing the minimill 
industry overall (Kuster 1995). As of 1995 the USW represented just over half of all 
North American minimill employees, though it has been unable to gain a foothold 
industry at leaders such as Nucor (Kuster 1995). The USW noted “[N]ew minimill 
projects represent a total investment of about $4.5 billion, of which about $1 billion 
will come from tax breaks and subsidies by local and state governments” (Steelabor 
1995: 10). The USW outlined a two-pronged approach: first, to slow future minimill 
growth through political lobbying of local governments in order to end tax breaks for 
minimill companies and second to organize existing minimill sites (Steelabor 1995).  
There is little or no current research on the level of unionization within the minimill 
industry to track gains or losses in the minimill industry. The USW‟s lack of a 
coordinated strategy for new organizing in the minimill industry is likely to be a 
problem for unionized workers in the minimill industry. Without expanding levels of 
density in an already anti-union industry (Arthur 1987; D‟Costa 1999), bargaining 
power is more likely to erode for workers such as those at Gerdau.  
 
IV. Building a Global Union at Gerdau (1997-2007) 
Comissão dos Trabalhadores do Grupo Gerdau  
National coordination of Gerdau workers in Brazil began years before the 
cross-border network developed. The CUT undertook a program to build nationwide 
union networks at large national and multinational firms (Jakobsen 2003). Gerdau was 
an exception among other multinationals targeted for network building because it was 
a Brazilian multinational operating in other countries rather than a Western 
multinational operating in Brazil. CNM/CUT representative and Gerdau worker 
Fernando Lopes would direct the organization of the Gerdau network.  
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The first meeting of Brazilian Gerdau workers took place in 1989 in Rio de 
Janeiro. This meeting had two important goals. The first goal was to understand 
Gerdau‟s corporate structure, its growth plan and negotiating strategies. It was 
important to strategically map the company‟s operations and growth plan, especially 
since it had taken advantage of recent privatizations in order to expand beyond its base 
in the South and Southeast. They would also need to gather information about wages, 
benefits and the content of collective agreements from the union locals since there was 
no preexisting research database on Gerdau. Because unions had no access to 
company information, nor any right to internal financial records, the unions would 
have to gather the information themselves.  
The second goal would be to create a more sustained structure for all Gerdau 
unions to interact and communicate. Ultimately this organization, called the Comissão 
dos Trabalhadores do Grupo Gerdau, would attempt to build a unified national agenda 
for collective action and national bargaining directly with Gerdau (as opposed to the 
municipal-level bargaining mandated by law). The Comissão would be composed of 
Gerdau unions in both the CNM/CUT and Força Sindical, and would publish and 
circulate newsletters, organize regional and national meetings with all Gerdau unions 
and reach out to Gerdau management to begin the process of collective negotiations 
for all Gerdau workers. The Comissão pledged to research and contact unions in 
Uruguay, Chile and Canada to begin a dialogue and information exchange (Boletim 
Unificado, 1995).  
The organizational difficulties of bringing together workers from across Brazil 
and from rival union confederations were formidable and the resolutions of the first 
meeting were left largely unfinished. By 1995, when the second meeting of Brazilian 
Gerdau workers took place in Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul), Gerdau had 
expanded though the acquisition of recently privatized steel mills. Gerdau‟s corporate 
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expansion had extended the reach of the Brazil network, but brought new challenges 
to the network in the form of uneven levels of union representation and regional wage 
disparities. Previously State-run mills generally had stronger union presence and 
higher wages, while mills originally owned by Gerdau tended to have a weaker union 
presence and a more patriarchal role for Gerdau management. For example, employees 
at the São Leopoldo plant in Rio Grande do Sul averaged $220 reais/month, while 
those in the former state-run Rio de Janeiro facility averaged $450 reais/month 
(Boletim Unificado, 1995). Union representatives shared information on wages, 
working conditions and content of respective collective agreements as well as various 
organizing and negotiating strategies each local had used with Gerdau.  
The structure of Brazilian union representation also brought unique challenges 
for building a national network at Gerdau. Because unions are limited to 
representation at the regional and sectoral levels, Gerdau management was not bound 
to recognize any workers organization (such as the Brazilian Gerdau network or the 
national confederations) beyond the legally mandated regional bargaining. As João 
Lima, Gerdau employee relations representative stated: 
 
While trying to continue investing in the evolution of the democratization of 
relations (with Gerdau)…depends in large part on the attitude of workers 
organizations… in the case of a „strong‟ union action, the reaction from the 
company will be “strong” and the option, once again, will be to create channels 
directly with employees. (Boletim Unificado 1995) 
 
There were no legal structures, such as co-determination rights, to support a 
national network. This meant that unions at Gerdau would have to build sufficient 
strength at the national level, through plant-by plant organizing in order to induce 
Gerdau into recognizing their demands. The burden would be on the unions 
themselves to organize a national (and ultimately international) network, without the 
help of labor law or a tradition of social dialogue. The ultimate goal would be to build 
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a unified national platform from which to negotiate directly with Gerdau for all 
workers across Brazil, but this goal would be hampered by the constraints of Brazilian 
labor law, employer intransigence, and uneven union coverage.  
Though the goal of national collective bargaining would not be easily reached, 
the first meetings of Brazilian Gerdau workers ultimately would be crucial to the long-
term development of an international network. An infrastructure of information 
sharing, communication through newspapers and meetings, as well as an institutional 
commitment from the CNM/CUT and Força Sindical to long-term organization at 
Gerdau would be instrumental once network building took an international turn. The 
Brazilian network created a parallel structure for worker-to-worker communication on 
a national level, a structure the Brazilian industrial relations system did not provide 
for.    
“Bridgebuilders” were crucial to the long-term continuity of both the Brazil 
network and the cross-border network. Fernando Lopes, a Gerdau employee and later 
CNM/CUT representative, was one of the early (and most energetic) organizers of the 
Brazil network and would become a key bridgebuilder between the established 
Brazilian Comissão and the nascent cross-border network. At founding of the 
Comissão, Lopes was an engineer at the Gerdau Bahia USIBAS plant (recently 
privatized and bought by Gerdau in 1989) and had been active on the Brazilian Left 
during the military dictatorship.  Judith Marshall of the Steelworker Humanity Fund 
(SHF) had lived and worked in Mozambique teaching and researching popular 
education methods throughout the 1980s. Under Marshall, the SHF had become 
increasingly involved in issues such as development, regional free trade agreements 
and the effects of multinational corporate expansion. Carolyn Kazdin of the AFL-
CIO‟s Solidarity Center had lived and worked in Brazil during the 1970s as a Peace 
Corps volunteer. The Solidarity Center would provide an important link to the USW 
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once Gerdau expanded into the United States. Both Marshall and Kazdin spoke fluent 
Portuguese and had extensive contacts with Brazilian unions and social movements.  
 
1
st
 Inter-American Meeting of Workers of the Gerdau Group (1998) 
The origins of a cross-border Gerdau network arose from exchanges between 
the Steelworker Humanity Fund (SHF) and the CNM/CUT from January 16-31, 1997. 
A CNM/CUT delegation traveled to Canada, attending the Iron and Steel Conference 
in Hamilton, Ontario, touring a worker-owned cooperative in Sault Sainte Marie, and 
participating in a day-long workshop on NAFTA/MERCOSUR in Toronto with the 
Canadian Steelworkers, the SHF and Common Frontiers. “[T]he CNM was lobbying 
Canadian labour and social movements to work with them in crafting joint positions 
derived from…respective experiences in NAFTA and MERCOSUR for the new 
phase…crafting of the FTAA” (Brazil-Canada Metalworkers Exchange 1997:1).  
The issue of Gerdau, which had acquired Canadian facilities at Courtice Steel 
in 1989 and MRM Steel in 1995 and was rapidly expanding in Brazil after a wave of 
privatizations in the Brazilian steel sector, was raised during a two-hour meeting on 
January 29, 1997 (Brazil-Canada Metalworkers Exchange, 1997). Local union 
representatives at Courtice and MRM were curious to know more about Gerdau since 
it was a relative newcomer to the Canadian scene. CNM officials agreed to send 
copies of Brazilian collective bargaining agreements and newsletters from the 
Brazilian Gerdau network to the Canadians. The CNM also offered to send a 
representative to upcoming rounds of bargaining for the Canadian locals. The SHF, 
having already been involved in creating cross-border links with Chilean mineworkers 
unions and having an existing relationship with the CNM in Brazil, decided to take the 
initiative to expand the network at Gerdau through another meeting in Brazil the 
following year (Brazil-Canada Metalworkers Exchange 1997: 2).  
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The First Inter-American Meeting of Workers of the Gerdau Group took place 
April 20-23, 1998 when Brazilian, Chilean and Canadian workers met in Charqueadas 
(Rio Grande do Sul state), Brazil. Workers compared information about wages and 
relative purchasing power. Comparing workers‟ wages between developed and 
developing countries showed obvious discrepancies, but a comparison of the relative 
purchasing power of those wages in respective countries made the impact of these 
discrepancies clearer. The average wage of a Canadian Gerdau worker was $24,166 
while a Brazilian Gerdau worker‟s was $4,743 and a Chilean‟s $4,1602 (First Inter-
American Meeting of Workers in the Gerdau Group 1999). But the disparity in 
relative purchasing power of these wages was even starker when comparing the 
number of salaries needed to purchase a car. In Canada it took two salaries, in Chile 
over thirteen and in Brazil up to twenty-eight average salaries to buy a car. While this 
research highlighted disparities between countries, it also showed regional variation 
within Brazil. Workers in Divinopolis and Contagem plants in Minas Gerais averaged 
$416.66/month while workers in the Sao Jose dos Campos plant outside São Paulo 
averaged $566.66/month (First Inter-American Meeting of Workers in the Gerdau 
Group 1999). Comparisons such as this helped bring together workers in the already 
existing Brazilian Gerdau network as well as the nascent cross-border network.  
 Differences and similarities in working conditions and union structure were 
another topic of exchange between Gerdau workers. Union structure in Brazil is 
unique in that it only allows for representation at the municipal and sectoral level. 
Unions such as the CNM/CUT have created parallel structures for local representation 
(factory commissions and company networks) since neither in-plant nor national 
representation is legally required.  While the CUT has been resolute in its commitment 
to building both kinds of structures, both in-plant and national representation 
                                                 
2
 All figures in 1997 $USD.  
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structures have been met with legal and corporate resistance and consequently levels 
of union strength vary from region to region.  Because workers in Brazil lacked the 
right to in-plant representation and faced challenges such as variable and arbitrary 
work shifts where the company has unilateral decision-making power over the length 
of shifts and which days employees must work, the priorities of the Brazilian 
contingent were different than those of the Canadian and Chilean workers, tending to 
emphasize a minimum set of rights and standards for the company to adhere to. Other 
issues such as subcontracting and the implementation of Total Quality Management 
and work teams were common trends across all three countries (First Inter-American 
Meeting of Workers in the Gerdau Group 1999).  
In the wake of the passage of NAFTA in 1995 and ongoing negotiations over 
the hemisphere-wide FTAA, great efforts were taken go beyond basic worker to 
worker exchanges that focused solely on the bread and butter issues of wages and 
working conditions, and link the issues of free trade and corporate power. “The 
CNM/CUT is seeing Gerdau as having a hemispheric strategy, with its operations in 
the four countries, and placing the emphasis on Gerdau as part of understanding some 
of the new dynamics of corporate rule in the hemisphere.” (Marshall 1997:1). As 
companies like Gerdau were rapidly expanding beyond national boundaries, workers 
would need to know more than just the basics of respective working conditions, but 
would need to understand the broader shifts in the political and economic landscape. 
NAFTA and the proposed FTAA were making it easier for capital to move across 
national borders, facilitating restructuring within corporations and across whole 
industrial sectors such as auto and steel, and unions could rely less upon traditional 
allies such as the State to protect them from corporate whipsawing. Cross-border 
networks like that at Gerdau would need to integrate an educational component to 
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understand how macro processes, like free trade agreements and resulting corporate 
expansion, were affecting workers‟ ability to fight back.  
These exchanges and educational sessions were a necessary first step for 
building more permanent links between Gerdau workers, but the first meeting was not 
without its challenges. The SHF had anticipated difficulties in “coordinating joint 
strategies among four countries (sic)
3
 where bargaining is carried out in very different 
ways.” (SHF memo, undated: 2) and “continuity of initiatives from the base, rather 
than promoted by SHF or CNM International Relations” (SHF memo undated: 2). The 
financial costs of organizing a week-long international meeting were also an 
impediment to sustained contact. Travel arrangements, logistics and time off for the 
Canadian and Chilean workers were shouldered by the USW. Because each of the 
three industrial relations systems were substantially different than each other, workers 
in each country brought a different set of priorities to the network. These differences 
would not be worked out in one meeting, but would need to be negotiated through a 
long-term relationship of trust-building and collective action. 
Because this was the first international meeting of its kind for Gerdau workers 
it would need to be carried back to the shop floor in order to build truly cross-border 
linkages. Workers who participated also had to return to their shops and convince their 
local members that they had taken part in an important event that ultimately affected 
them on the shop floor, not just traveling on a union junket. Ultimately this would be 
the long-term test of the Gerdau network: the ability of participants in these 
international exchanges to communicate the importance of what happened far away 
(usually in a tropical-sounding location) to workers on the shop floor who had never 
been involved in cross-border activities. If workers on the shop floor did not feel as if 
these exchanges had any connection or relevance to their quotidian life at Gerdau or if 
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 Uruguayan workers were invited but chose not to participate 
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participants could not effectively bring the lessons of these exchanges back with them, 
then the network would falter.  
The SHF‟s focus on the pedagogical component of these exchanges included a 
broader understanding of the changing political and economic landscape in which 
unions and corporations were now operating would be central to building more 
sustained cross-border links. Regional integration, free trade agreements and broader 
shifts in political economy would need to be integrated into worker exchanges. This 
would provide a context for dialogue and trust building between workers over the long 
run. 
 
2nd Inter-American Meeting of Workers of the Gerdau Group (2003) 
By 2003 the need for a second international meeting of Gerdau workers became 
apparent. First, it had been nearly five years since the meeting in Charqueadas. Both 
Gerdau and union representation at Gerdau had changed. Gerdau had grown in Brazil 
from twelve to twenty three mills. It was now the fourteenth largest steel producer in 
the world, the largest producer (in terms of raw steel) and the second largest (in 
profits) in Brazil (Gerdau Final 2003). Internationally, Gerdau had also grown. It had 
expanded into Argentina through a joint venture with Sipar. In North America, it had 
made its largest acquisition when it bought seven mills from AmeriSteel in 1999. In 
2002 it acquired a third Canadian mill outside of Oshawa from Co-Steel. In October 
2002, Gerdau‟s North American operations were consolidated and renamed Gerdau 
Ameristeel.  
Gerdau‟s acquisition of Ameristeel proved to be a catalyst for further 
international coordination. Of the seven mills in the AmeriSteel acquisition, only one 
was unionized (the Perth Amboy facility). AmeriSteel and the USW had had a 
contentious relationship since the 1970s. Ameristeel management was virulently anti-
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union and had fought a series of legal challenges to the USW‟s organizing drives at its 
North Carolina and Florida facilities (see above). The Canadian former Co-Steel mill 
was already represented by the USW. 
The USW and CNM/CUT were also trying to build a common agenda more 
broadly in the global steel industry. In March 2002 President George W. Bush 
announced steel tariffs of up to 30 percent on all foreign steel. The USW had been 
lobbying for protection after years of heavy job losses. These protections angered steel 
producers in the Global South who saw entrance to US markets as a key area of 
growth. Unions such as the CNM/CUT also took offense at the USW‟s support for the 
tariffs, but instead of retreating to national chauvinisms, the two unions took the 
opportunity to develop a common agenda beneficial to both unions through worker to 
worker exchanges (Steelabor 2002a). Stronger international ties at emerging 
multinationals such as Gerdau were integral to this development of a labor-friendly 
development agenda.  
From July 28-August 1, 2003 delegates from Brazil, Canada, the United States, 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay met in Rio de Janeiro for the Second International 
Meeting of Workers of the Gerdau Group. Jorge Garcia of the USW Canadian 
Research Office and Ike Gittlin of the USW Organizing Department and 
representative from each of the Gerdau AmeriSteel Canadian facilities attended. 
Carolyn Kazdin represented the AFL-CIO‟s Solidarity Center. A representative of the 
Brazilian Labor Ministry addressed the group on the first day. The International 
Metalworkers Federation (IMF) sent two representatives, one European and one based 
in Chile (Gittlen 2003). Gerdau management had initially agreed to attend the meeting 
and offered a plant tour but pulled out at the last minute (Gittlen 2003).  
The Brazilian research organization DIEESE presented overviews of Gerdau‟s 
history, its growing market share and growth plans as well as plant-by-plant statistics 
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on respective unionization rates in each country (especially important in Brazil, where 
membership is voluntary), average wages, weekly work week length and the major 
contract demands of each plant (DIEESE 2003).  
The second meeting furthered the initial relationships built from the first 
Gerdau workers meeting in 1998. In the first meeting international strategies were still 
more a possibility than a reality. By 2003 it had become clear that Gerdau was 
prioritizing growth outside of Brazil, both in other regions of South America and in 
North America. Gerdau was quickly becoming a major player in the Hemisphere 
giving it more bargaining power over Gerdau workers. Unless workers could find 
some way of matching Gerdau‟s hemispheric reach, Gerdau workers everywhere 
would be at a serious disadvantage for future bargaining and organizing efforts. The 
acquisition of AmeriSteel was particularly problematic for South American unionists 
as it meant that there could now be an importation of the more aggressive, US-style 
anti-union measures.   
In a memo, USW representative Ike Gittlin noted “personal relationships seem 
to be very important seem to be very important and trust is critical” (Gittlin 2003: 5) 
and earlier in the memo commented “It appears to me that the group is moving from 
initial stages of meet and discuss, to a more detailed set of goals and objectives” 
(Gittlin 2003: 5). The participation of IMF delegates was the first step in creating a 
formal working group of Gerdau workers recognized and endorsed by the IMF. 
Furthermore, participants agreed to “to explore the implementation of an International 
Master Agreement with the Gerdau Group, coordinated by the IMF.” (Resolutions 
2003).  
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Conclusions 
A national network of Brazilian Gerdau workers had existed since 1989 as a 
way of bringing members of the CNM/CUT into dialogue and coordinated action 
during the era of neoliberal restructuring under President Fernando Enrique Cardoso. 
Exchanges between Brazil and North America continued until 2002, ranging from two 
or three days to full ten day exchanges facilitated by the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center 
(Carolyn Kazdin, then head of the Solidarity Center, would later become the key 
“bridge builder” during the Beaumont campaign and afterwards). These initial 
exchanges, mainly between the USW in Canada (there was only one US Gerdau 
facility at the time) and the CNM/CUT, were informal in nature and consisted mainly 
of social events, meetings with local union membership and embryonic education 
about each country‟s respective labor systems (this would be a key in securing the 
support of both leaderships and rank and file Gerdau workers in Brazil during the 
Beaumont lock out). But despite the seemingly casual structure of these international 
exchanges, they initiated a long process of building trust among workers who were not 
accustomed to internationalism as a tactic for building local union strength, much less 
used to soliciting international support during collective bargaining struggles.  
 
North Star Bargaining/Unity Council 
National coordination of North American Gerdau workers had its roots in the 
North Star Unity Council. The Unity Council was established in 1999 in order to 
maintain communication between the four USW-represented North Star/Cargill 
facilities in Wilton, Iowa; St. Paul, Minnesota; Beaumont, Texas; and Calvert City, 
Texas. Until 2003 the Unity Council had been used sparingly. The locals had not 
coordinated bargaining activity or used strategic communication, nor had the USW 
international pushed for more synchronized activity. In 1999, USW district director 
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Dave Foster (a former employee at the St. Paul North Star facility) called the USW‟s 
Strategic Campaigns department to see if the international could do something in the 
way of calling the North Star locals together to discuss a more coordinated strategy 
(Newhouse 2004: 2). Melinda Newhouse described the USW Strategic Campaigns 
Department‟s role: 
 
[D]oes work with Locals who are in serious fights where labor dispute is 
currently underway…and then we kind of carved out a section where we spent 
time preparing Locals  who thought they were going to have a difficult fight 
about putting together a campaign and doing this kind of stuff before your 
contract expires in the hope of avoiding it. And then we just kind of get called 
in from time to time by directors or someone else about some sort of special 
project that is going on that they want special attention on, which Northstar 
(sic) was one of those type events… (Newhouse  2004: 1) 
 
Cargill‟s size and disarticulated structure (Cargill focuses on farm machinery, 
meat processing, agricultural research and development, steel is a very small part of 
Cargill‟s operations) gave the four Locals limited bargaining power and most Locals 
had been used to less than great contracts. Cargill‟s financial resources and its private 
ownership status made the Locals think twice about striking. Melinda Newhouse 
explained that the Locals: 
 
[H]ad a regular pattern of getting together and then breaking apart and Cargill 
was just very divisive and did a very good job at keeping them so that they 
didn‟t expire within smaller chunks of time. So they were spread out over three 
years… they had a history of talking to each other…but not much more than 
that. And they were all very tentative about what they thought we could 
accomplish. It‟s Cargill and they knew it was Cargill and the company had 
instilled some fear into, you‟re obviously not going to go out on strike against 
Cargill, they have more money than you. (Newhouse 2004: 3) 
 
Despite hesitation (and/or lack of confidence) and the looming shadow of Cargill‟s 
institutional and financial power (Cargill is one of the largest privately held 
corporations in the world) the four Locals decided to try to bring the four contracts 
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into line, or at least more so than they currently were. This process would entail 
extending bargaining and working under the provisions of the expired contracts 
without a current contract in order to align the expiration dates of all four contracts. 
The first of the four to expire was Beaumont‟s (2/7/02), followed by Calvert City 
(3/14/02), Wilton (11/1/02) and finally, St. Paul (3/31/03) (Kleiman 2004: 27). The 
hope was to extend the Beaumont bargaining all the way to the St Paul expiration date 
over a year later, but a more realistic goal was to get it to Wilton‟s in November. The 
St Paul contract was also a benchmark because of its successorship language and more 
generous retiree benefits. 
Because of Cargill‟s financial might and ability to divide the locals, it would 
take more than just talking to each other through sporadic conference calls to 
withstand Cargill‟s pressure. Locals would need to educate their own members about 
why it was necessary to continue bargaining, which would be somewhat difficult 
without a tradition of coordination amongst the Locals, but could be made easier 
because some Locals (especially the Beaumont Local) had been getting subpar 
contracts and were ready to do something to improve their situation. Locals would 
need to coordinate mobilization activity amongst each other when it was their turn to 
bargain with Cargill. Cargill needed to know and feel that the Locals were working in 
coordination. 
To do this the Locals started small with sticker days, support letters, petitions 
and hand bills. ”Very minor things, but things that tied them together and made the 
others feel like they were a part of it” (Newhouse 2004: 26).  To escalate this pressure 
Beaumont Local 8586 president Pete Savoy traveled to the Wilton facility to attend a 
bargaining session with the company. “Pete was there, they (Cargill) didn‟t like it, 
Pete loved it, the Iowa Local loved it, Pete‟s Local loved it” (Newhouse 2004: 31). 
Savoy‟s presence at the table let Cargill know the tone had changed and that Cargill 
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needed to get serious about bargaining with all four locals fairly. Sending workers 
from one facility to another also helped facilitate communication amongst Locals and 
kept the rank and file involved in the campaign. 
The USW also confronted Cargill through the media. “[W]e ran some radio ads 
around retiree health care…The Locals loved that. We did that, we had a whole media, 
we did a billboard in Beaumont, we did radio in Wilton, we did a full page newspaper 
ad in Monroe
4
 and St Paul…we may have had a small billboard” (Newhouse 2004: 
31-32). The USW International became more involved in strategic research, reaching 
out to other unions who had bargained with Cargill and exchanging contracts and 
bargaining strategies (Newhouse 2004: 34) and identifying vulnerabilities in Cargill‟s 
corporate structure. One of the reasons the media actions were so effective was 
Cargill‟s desire to protect its image. “We did radio stuff and billboards and they hate 
media attention, that‟s one thing they really don‟t like” (Newhouse 2004: 34).  
In 2003, after a little over a year of coordinated actions between the locals, 
Cargill and the USW reached agreements on expiration dates for three of the four 
minimill contracts
5
, all within six months of each other. The contracts also presciently 
included successorship clauses because the USW had gotten word of Cargill‟s 
intention to sell the four facilities. Worried that Cargill would sell them off one-by-
one, successorship was included in all contracts in order to guarantee continuity of 
union representation.  
The 2002-2003 campaign to line up the North Star contracts was important for 
two reasons. First, it introduced a repertoire of mobilization amongst the locals.  
 
So this was fascinating…you had these four different units plus some waiting 
for a first agreement that didn‟t connect that had bad blood that in fact played 
against each other. You had an employer that was trying to get major 
                                                 
4
 A UAW-represented North Star facility in Monroe, Michigan was also participating in some of the 
Unity Council activities, though it bargained on its own.  
5
 The Calvert City Local only participated in the coordinated campaign.  
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concessions in different ways, in different plants and ultimately owned by an 
employer that was planning to get rid of them and was very powerful so you 
can see if you had not brought people together…and not succeeded in getting 
the things she‟s won, close to common expiration dates, the successorship 
language right now they‟d be selling it off piece by piece, probably a non-
union in the end (Kleiman 2004: 43) 
The locals mobilized their membership local by local though more regular 
communication, rank and file actions such as flyers, petitions and sticker days and 
used media outlets to educate the public and shame the company with billboards, radio 
slots and newspaper ads. The USW Strategic Campaigns department helped the locals 
to coordinate amongst each other by allocating full-time staff attention and using 
strategic research to identify in Cargill‟s complex corporate structure.  
It is important to remember that all of these actions were done by activating the 
nascent Unity Council structure. While the Unity Council was created specifically for 
activities such as this, prior to 2002 it had only been used for sporadic phone calls, not 
for coordinated activities. A functioning network of locals at a powerful MNC would 
become very important during the Gerdau campaign by providing another level of 
coordinated activity to integrate into a broader, more global, campaign. Much like the 
Brazilian Gerdau network, the Unity Council provided a national level structure from 
which to coordinate activities, one that did not have the same difficulties that a global 
network would face, such as language and communication barriers. 
Second, the campaign ultimately won the locals successorship clauses in the 
face of an impending sale (at the time to an unknown buyer). It is quite possible that 
without this contract language, the locals could have been sold off individually, 
breaking the power of the Unity Council. Though the USW did not know the buyer at 
the time of the 2002-2003 campaign, it was prescient in its insistence on including 
successorship language, especially since the buyer was an anti-union firm like Gerdau 
Ameristeel. Ameristeel was to test the USW quickly and swiftly in the 2005 Beaumont 
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lockout, seeking to break the union as soon as it could. It is possible that without the 
successorship language, Ameristeel could have broken the union.  
What seemed like an important step forward for the four minimills through 
their domestic coordination would become magnified during the global campaign of 
2005-2007.  The 2002-2003 contract coordination maneuvers built a bond of both 
militancy (towards a common employer) and trust between the locals. These two 
postures would both be put to the test during the ensuing two years of struggle and 
establish the foundation for the more global agenda to come.  
 
Gerdau Acquisition 
  An acrimonious round of negotiations with Cargill/North Star led up to the 
sale to Gerdau. Cargill had made it known to the union that they were shopping the 
North Star subsidiary around to potential buyers, significantly impacting the nature of 
negotiations. “It was clear what they were trying to do is make it more attractive to 
buyers by getting rid of retiree insurance” (Kleiman 2004: 19). Cargill wanted an 
attractive product to show off to suitors. Consequently, a successorship clause and 
card check neutrality became major issues to the union bargaining in 2003 (Kleiman 
2004: 25). While the company eventually gave in on successorship, the union didn‟t 
get the card check language they had hoped for. While the Steelworkers‟ relationship 
with Cargill/North Star was usually a contentious one, Cargill never actively 
attempted to break the union. Cargill used its power at the table to fight the union, but 
never crossed the line between tough bargaining and actively breaking the union. The 
difficulties in the 2002-2003 Cargill bargaining were a harbinger for the even more 
difficult fight to come with Gerdau, testing the locals‟ ability to hold together and use 
strategic coordination to hold their ground at the table. 
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The Cargill/North Star locals were about to go from the unique difficulties of 
bargaining with a large, privately held “dis-integrated corporation” (Brecher and 
Costello 1998) where the company has diverse holdings in multiple industries and 
makes significant profit from the buying and selling of these subsidiary groups in a 
short term strategy, to bargaining with a publicly held multinational corporation 
seeking vertical and horizontal integration in the global steel industry. The differences 
would be great, but it would seem that, structurally, Gerdau would offer a new chance 
to establish a stable bargaining relationship, and because it was a publicly held 
company, more leverage in bargaining. Either way, though, the Beaumont plant was 
still behind the other three minimills in terms of wages, industry position and potential 
leverage capability. 
 In October 2004, the sale of Cargill‟s North Star Steel facilities to Gerdau 
Ameristeel was finalized. The four main mini mills in Beaumont, Wilton, Calvert 
City, and St Paul, along with three (non-union) wire rod facilities (two in Texas and 
one in Memphis) and a grinding ball plant in Duluth, Minnesota (also non-union) were 
sold for $266 million to Grupo Gerdau‟s North American subsidiary, Gerdau 
Ameristeel (Metal Center News 2004: 47-48). This move turned Gerdau Ameristeel 
into the second largest mini mill operator in North America, behind only Nucor. As a 
subsidiary of Brazilian based Grupo Gerdau, Gerdau Ameristeel was formed in 2002 
with the merger of Co-Steel Inc. and Ameristeel Inc., its North American headquarters 
remaining in Tampa, Florida (Metal Magazine 2004: 6).  
 
Negotiations and Lockout 
Bernie Kleiman put it bluntly, “Cargill didn‟t really see a future in steel and 
course the steel was very bad in 2002 and 2003…Texas‟s been a horrible loser.” 
(Kleiman 2004: 30). The new beginning with Gerdau was seen as an opportunity for 
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the USW to forge a new relationship on a “blank slate” of bargaining. Reviews of the 
new company were mixed. On one hand, the company publicly promised to work with 
the union. Tampa CEO Phillip Casey‟s comments to the media described the merger 
as “a dynamic step in the continuing revitalization of the North American steel 
industry” (Metal Magazine 2004: 6) and from Brazil, Jorge Gerdau‟s stress was on 
“strong market position” and “growth through consolidation” (Robertson 2004: 10). 
On the ground, the attitude was similarly upbeat. On the eve of Christmas, just weeks 
before bargaining was set to begin, Steve Roane, environmental manager at the 
Beaumont plant stated “Our employees have a lot of pride…Since the acquisition, 
there is a new sense of life in the mill” (AMM 12/20/04: 19).  
On the other hand, the USW was familiar with the Ameristeel half of Gerdau 
Ameristeel. Ameristeel management (the Tampa-based North American subsidiary of 
the Brazilian Grupo Gerdau) was made up of executives of the former Florida Steel, a 
viciously anti-union firm who had a long history of illegal union-busting tactics dating 
back to the 1970s and 1980s. These same executives who had tangled with the USW 
twenty years before were now intent on flexing their muscle at the bargaining table in 
Beaumont (the first of the four contracts to expire under Gerdau management).  
The former North Star locals were at a structural disadvantage as well, as the 
USW only represented three Gerdau mills, two in Canada and one in New Jersey, 
leaving the union with little density and contract talks looming soon after the merger. 
While the Canadian locals had participated in the global network, meeting with 
Brazilian and Chilean unionists, bargaining at both Canadian and the New Jersey shop 
had been done individually. There had been no attempts at coordinating bargaining or 
organizing a communication network like the North Star Unity Council.  
The company‟s optimistic attitudes and lofty promises of familial relations 
were quickly doused by the tenor at the bargaining table. Beaumont (Local 8586), with 
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their contract expiration on March 31, 2005, was the first local to bargain with Gerdau. 
As the first to bargain, the relations in Beaumont would set the tone for the rest of the 
locals in the following year. The local, with a history of getting inferior contracts, 
finally had a chance to set the pattern for the rest of the locals. Gerdau saw it the same 
way and took to the offensive. 
 In the first sessions, the two sides were far apart on almost every issue: wages, 
benefits, working conditions and health insurance, but the union was not expecting the 
demands the company came to the table with. Echoing the industry trend, the company 
proposed a consolidation of 24 job categories down to 10 and called for unrestricted 
right to contract out any work it wanted or relocate bargaining unit work to any other 
Gerdau Ameristeel facility. Union workers had previously received overtime after any 
time worked over 8 hours in a day, but the company pushed for overtime based on 
hours worked over 40 hours in a week. Directly related to this was the request for an 
increase in the amount of mandatory overtime one could work in a day from 12 hours 
to 16 hours (Local 8586 Negotiation News 3/22/05). This was not only an affront to 
the current union contract, but an obvious health and safety risk waiting to happen.  
This meant an employee could be forced to work a 16-hour day and not receive any 
overtime pay. Vacation was cut from 2 weeks after 3 years to 3 weeks after 7 years. 
Management wanted probation extended from 150 days to 1,040 hours (around 6 
months). Finally, one of the major sticking points became the length of the contract 
itself, the company pushing for a full 4 year contract and the union calling for a 2 year 
contract to try and line up the contract with the Kentucky plant, set to expire in 2007 
(Local 8586 Negotiation News 3/22/05).  
For the union‟s part they continued to look to the historically strong contracts 
they‟d been able to bargain with the larger integrated steel companies as the pattern 
for Gerdau bargaining. “We are interested in a contract that looks a lot more like what 
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International Steel Group negotiated with the former Bethlehem Steel, and U.S. Steel 
Corp. did with the former national Steel in terms of various corporate governance 
provisions, plant and job security provisions” (Leonard 3/31/05). “The USW 
spokesman said he believes the reason little progress has been made is Gerdau 
Ameristeel‟s lack of experience in dealing with organized labor” (Leonard 3/31/05). 
Either way, Local 8586 continued bargaining until the contract expiration, despite the 
sense that management was dug in and wouldn‟t be moving any time soon. 
 To emphasize the gravity of their concessions package and set the new tone of 
labor relations at Gerdau, the company brought lawyers from union busting firm 
Ogletree-Deakins to negotiate. Previous negotiations with North Star/Cargill had been 
conducted with plant managers and Cargill management, never corporate lawyers.  
Negotiations continued to be polarized, with each side far apart on the major 
issues and little in the way of compromise or common interest. By the time contract 
expiration arrived in late March little had changed. The Steelworkers described 
management‟s proposals as “preposterous” and “ridiculous,” and said that “nothing 
had been resolved and very little progress has been made,” telling management that 
“They need to get in the same ballpark” (Leonard 3/31/05). Both sides agreed to 
continue bargaining, the Steelworkers not prepared to strike and management still with 
a few forcing tactics in their arsenal. Local 8586 workers went back to work under the 
terms of the old contract (minus the arbitration option for grievances and dues check 
off) and agreed to a four hour notice if ready to strike (Robertson, 4/4/05), Through 
April and mid-May, progress at the table varied from “far from mature” (Leonard 
4/8/05) to “some progress” (4/25/05) back to “stagnant” (5/6/05). 
 By early May each side began to show signs of alternative strategies for 
resolving the near impasse at the table. A federal mediator, Steve Fischer, was called 
in to help facilitate the bargaining. The union continued its insistence on resolving the 
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problem at the table, a USW representative claiming, “We‟re not giving up without a 
fight” and “the workers would do whatever the union asked of them” (Leonard 
5/6/05). Management began to hint that since their strategy of getting the union to 
immediately accept concessions through traditional means wasn‟t working, they were 
making preparations for work stoppages. A Gerdau spokeswoman claimed, “Our 
strategic customers have been covered for the next 60 days” (Leonard 5/6/05). On 
May 9th, just days after public comments about the company‟s readiness for work 
disruption, management raised the stakes and placed its “last, best and final offer” on 
the table. 
Two pieces of news give texture to the ensuing lockout and union strategic 
campaign. First, Gerdau Ameristeel president Phillip Casey gave the Steelworkers 
(and investors) a hint to the ensuing tone for labor relations at Gerdau the night before 
the lockout. At a dinner speech to the Pittsburgh chapter of the Association of Women 
in the Metal Industries, Casey questioned the loyalty of American workers, accusing 
them of being “less loyal to the company than workers in developing nations,” and 
claiming workers in Korea, Japan and Brazil have “a greater respect for work ethics.” 
Casey continued to define the position of the company, describing “medical benefits, 
workers compensation, retirement, environmental” benefits as a “burden” (Undated 
USW leaflet). Second, Gerdau announced its North and South American sales 
revenues were up from $5.5 billion in 2003 to $8.8 billion in 2005, a growth of 48%. 
With record profits and arrogance towards its American union workers, Gerdau 
Ameristeel locked out its workers (Steel Times International February/March 2005: 8). 
USW International didn‟t see it coming. Pete Savoy didn‟t see it coming, and 
neither did the 265 members of Steelworkers Local 8586. The company notice to the 
USW stated: 
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We regret that, despite our good faith efforts, the union committee has left us 
no bargaining room on aspects of the agreement that are key to the long-term, 
successful operation of the mill. For that reason, the company has elected to 
exercise its right as provided by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to 
cease operations at the Beaumont mill until such a time as a satisfactory 
agreement can be reached. (Gerdau Leaflet, 5/26/05) 
 
No one actually thought the company would go so far as to shut down a profitable mill 
and lock out its workers. Relations with Cargill/North Star had been difficult, but 
contracts were eventually resolved without a work stoppage. The next day, after first 
shift workers got off at 3PM, Gerdau shut the Beaumont plant down and told all union 
employees to leave by 7PM. USW International was notified and Pete Savoy quickly 
called a meeting for the next morning to set up picket lines and discuss strategy.    
The lockout of the Beaumont local, while a surprise, was not completely 
unexpected by the USW international. Before exchanging initial contract proposals 
Gerdau had already hired the notorious union-busting law firm Ogletree Deakins to 
conduct negotiations with the USW. The Beaumont local was the first plant to 
negotiate with Gerdau management. The company saw this as an opportunity to take 
the offensive and set the pattern for the ensuing Steelworker locals. Beaumont was 
historically the weakest and had the least amount of leverage to effectively fight back 
against a company attack. Gerdau wanted to put the union on the defensive and beak 
the solidarity of the former North Star locals. Seeing an opportunity to set the pattern 
for the ensuing negotiations, Gerdau Ameristeel management took an aggressive 
stance and offered a concessionary contract. Much of the American management was 
made up of old executives from Florida Steel who were used to union busting tactics. 
These same executives had been used to running a more or less non-union company in 
North America, save the two USW plants in Canada, and were not willing to let the 
USW come in and set the tone of the relationship. Previous comments by union 
officials had referred to Gerdau‟s “lack of experience in dealing with organized labor” 
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(see Leonard 3/31/05) and company officials had not been shy about emphasizing 
differences in culture (see Kusic 2/20/06).  
 
USW Comprehensive Campaign (2005-2007) 
On June 1, 2005 members of United Steelworkers (USW) Local 8586 held a 
funeral. This funeral was not held for a fallen union brother injured on the job, nor for 
a retired member who had passed away. Rather, this funeral was held to mourn the 
death of trust between Gerdau Ameristeel management and USW Local 8586. 270  
USW members had been unexpectedly locked out by their employer, Gerdau 
Ameristeel. With a coffin labeled “Trust” and a headstone reading “Here Lies the 
Trust Between the Company and Its Workers: 11-1-04/5-26-05” Local 8586 president 
Pete Savoy read a eulogy chastising an Ameristeel management that had “gone back 
on its word, violated our trust and broken the law.” Union members led a seventy car 
procession and motorcycle escort to bury this trust in its “final resting place” outside 
the union hall (Steelabor 2005: 23). TV cameras rolled and the story led on local news 
channels.  
Local actions and community support such as the funeral would be just one of 
many important components of a broad comprehensive campaign to end the Beaumont 
lockout and attain contracts for all North American Gerdau locals between 2005-2007. 
Immediately after the May 2005 lockout there remained hope that a settlement would 
be reached without further escalation. But as weeks turned into months, workers in 
Beaumont and USW staff in Pittsburgh became more pessimistic about the hopes for a 
quick settlement. Negotiations continued off and on but little progress was being made 
at the table. Ameristeel management was not just using the lockout as a scare tactic to 
get some concessions but as a full-blown effort to break the union and set the tone for 
upcoming negotiations with the other three former North Star locals.  
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 The USW‟s leverage at the bargaining table was limited. Under the Bush 
administration, the NLRB had been sapped of its will to intervene on the behalf of 
unions. The Beaumont facility was the least profitable of the four recently acquired 
North Star plants, meaning the economic pressure from a work stoppage would not be 
sufficient to deter management from a long dispute. Beyond this, Ameristeel 
management had picked a fight with the USW and was ready to dig in and absorb 
some losses in order to set the precedent for the rest of the former North Star locals.  
Beaumont is located ninety miles east of Houston and three hours west of New 
Orleans, just on the Louisiana border, not a traditional stronghold for USW. 
Ameristeel management was located in Tampa, also not a site of community pressure. 
Texas and Florida were both “right-to-work” states with a long record of anti-union 
administrations. The USW would need to include Beaumont and Tampa in its strategy, 
but ultimately look elsewhere for more effective sites of leverage. Understanding 
Gerdau‟s global reach meant there would be many sites of leverage, rather than just 
one. The USW and union allies would travel to Beaumont, Tampa, Wilton, Iowa and 
St Paul, Minnesota, as well as far-flung places such as Toronto, São Paulo, Buenos 
Aires, Montevideo, and Maranhão, Brazil, to build a global campaign. 
Ameristeel managers were responsible for the labor relations in all of North 
America including bargaining with unions. North American management had 
autonomy in setting the tone and designing the tactics for local bargaining. There was 
no reason to believe that the decision to pursue a lockout strategy came from 
anywhere except Tampa. But, just because Ameristeel management had autonomy in 
setting the tone of labor relations in North America didn‟t mean that it was 
independent in all decisions. Ameristeel was still Gerdau Ameristeel and ultimately 
accountable to its Brazilian owners.  
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Understanding this key circuit of power between North America, Tampa and 
Brazil was crucial to designing a campaign strategy for the USW. Power ultimately 
resided in Brazil. In order to convince Ameristeel management to negotiate and sign a 
fair contract with Beaumont, and eventually the other North American USW locals, 
the USW would need to convince Brazilian management to intervene in Tampa‟s 
affairs and settle the lockout and contract disputes. Brazil would need to send the 
message to Tampa that its labor relations policies were interfering with Gerdau‟s 
overall ability to make profit. This campaign dynamic created a sort of “boomerang 
effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) for the USW. The local blockage would only be 
resolved by taking the campaign international, mobilizing a global network of allies 
and building sufficient pressure to bring national management back into line. 
The second and more practical reason behind the USW‟s campaign strategy 
was that Gerdau was not a household corporate name in North America, nor was there 
a public brand to Gerdau. Its steel went primarily into rebar and construction projects. 
These factors precluded a public campaign concentrated in the US.  But the USW 
knew that the situation was the reverse in Brazil. Gerdau is a well known corporate 
entity throughout Brazil, being one of the few (albeit of a growing number) Brazilian 
multinationals acting on the world stage, its president Jorge Gerdau is a well known 
corporate citizen, philanthropist and public figure in Brazil, and the company had a 
public presence through advertising and retail stores. 
Even with a network of allies willing to support the campaign, the USW 
needed to be careful not to interfere with the livelihood of Brazilian workers. A 
campaign focused on Brazil had the potential to affect Gerdau‟s overall profits, 
perhaps causing Brazilians to lose their jobs, face retaliation for the actions of a North 
American conflict, or create tensions in the hard earned trust between the CNM/CUT 
and USW. The campaign message would focus on US workers, the lockout (and later 
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the open contracts), and the disparity between the North American management‟s 
aggressive anti-union stance versus the Brazilian management‟s more “family-
oriented” management style. The campaign would need to end the lockout in 
Beaumont, but not at the expense of the jobs and relationships of the workers in 
Brazil.  
In order to carry this out, the campaign would focus on three main tactics: 
participatory internationalism, the use of Jorge Gerdau‟s image, and a broad, 
comprehensive campaign. First, rank and file workers from North America would 
need to play an active role in the campaign. They would be the messengers telling 
their personal stories of the lockout, Gerdau‟s broken promises and the need for a 
good contract. Brazilian trade unionists were used to stories of Northern 
multinationals mistreating their employees. Poor working conditions, flouting labor 
standards and disregard for unions had been the common trade of multinationals in 
Brazil for years. But the image of a Brazilian multinational acting in this manner was 
difficult to comprehend for many Brazilian unionists. Companies don‟t have recourse 
to a “lockout” in the Brazilian labor system, nor is there a word for “lockout” in 
Portuguese.
6
  US workers would need to travel to union halls and community centers, 
speak face to face to union brothers and sisters, to the media and to politicians to 
explain the lock out and, ultimately, what Brazilians could do to help. 
 Second, Jorge Gerdau would remain the central image of the campaign. 
Although Ameristeel management would be the ultimate movers in ending the 
lockout, the USW realized that Ameristeel management would never end the lockout 
and sign a contract of its own volition. Ameristeel managers would need to feel some 
form of pressure from their corporate owners in Brazil in order to address the USW. 
                                                 
6
 Lockout is either transliterated directly into Portuguese as “locaute” or referred to as a “greve de 
impresa” or “company strike” 
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Jorge Gerdau himself would need to send the message to Ameristeel management. 
Therefore the campaign in Brazil would need to highlight Jorge‟s inaction vis a vis the 
Beaumont lockout. Ultimately Ameristeel management was beholden to Brazilian 
higher ups, which meant that Brazilian management had to take some responsibility 
for the actions of Ameristeel management. Because Jorge Gerdau was both the 
symbolic and actual head of the company he would be at the center of the USW‟s 
campaign. Campaign messages would focus on the North American lockout by 
highlighting Jorge‟s inaction in the situation. This message would manifest itself in 
stickers, leaflets, and ads with Jorge Gerdau‟s blank profile with a heading of 
“Where‟s Jorge?”  
The campaign also could not make a blanket condemnation of Gerdau 
management, or portray Gerdau on the whole as bad company. Doing this would 
backfire on the USW in the long run and potentially alienate Brazilian allies. Rather 
than painting a portrait of Gerdau as a “corporate outlaw” with a broad stroke, as is 
sometimes done in campaigns, the USW‟s message was subtler. The message would 
focus on the “Two Faces of Gerdau.” Why did Gerdau respect its employees and 
bargain with unions in Brazil and other countries while practicing union busting in 
North America? Why was there a double standard for the two groups of employees? 
This message would highlight the anti-union practices of Ameristeel management 
while reinforcing the good image of Brazilian management. Fairness and a common 
set of standards for all Gerdau employees would be the thread that held workers on 
both sides of the equator together. 
Third, the USW‟s campaign would need to focus on Brazil, especially on 
Jorge‟s image, but it couldn‟t do this at the expense of a broad campaign integrating 
allies beyond the Brazil-Tampa axis. The Brazil-Tampa axis was the most important, 
but not the only, site of leverage. Gerdau is a multinational firm with operations, joint 
109 
 
ventures and subsidiaries in more than a dozen countries. A broad and active network 
of union allies already existed in most countries where Gerdau had production 
facilities. If the USW could mobilize a broad and escalating global campaign it would 
make it much harder for Gerdau to endure a comprehensive campaign otherwise 
focused on one or two tactics. 
To do this the USW would expand its campaign to utilize the network of allies 
through coordinated and sustained solidarity actions.  North American workers would 
make their case in newspaper interviews, radio ads and on TV shows. Gerdau 
shareholders would hear directly from USW members at shareholder meetings. 
Politicians in the US would fly to Brazil to meet with Jorge Gerdau. The GWWC and 
PT allies would contact Brazilian President Lula da Silva to block Jorge Gerdau‟s 
appointment to a cabinet position. Customers of Gerdau‟s steel in the commercial 
construction trade would be warned of potential product defects of scab-made steel. 
Gerdau workers would take part in coordinated sticker days inside dozens of Gerdau 
plants across the globe. The billboards and rallies outside corporate headquarters in 
Tampa and Porto Alegre would be important, but not sufficient. The campaign would 
need to follow Gerdau‟s networks of power and interfere with its profit centers in 
multiple locations.   
 
On the Ground (June-August 2005)  
On the ground in Beaumont workers set up pickets and enlisted community 
support. Bargaining continued in fits and starts, making progress some sessions, then 
regressing the next session. Despite the severity of the lockout the USW hoped to 
resolve the lockout through continued negotiations. Throughout June and July of 2005 
the USW and Ameristeel management exchanged proposals, but these proposals were 
matched by increasing animosity in the media and a sense of resignation that the 
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impasse would take longer than expected (Leonard 7/14/05). The USW and Gerdau 
management each ran full page ads in the local Beaumont paper accusing the other of 
holding up negotiations (Beaumont Bargaining Update 2005).  
By July, USW representatives in St Paul were preparing for a tough round with 
Gerdau with the pall of the Beaumont lockout hanging over upcoming contract 
negotiations (Leonard 6/7/05). The St Paul local eventually decided not to strike but to 
remain on the job working under the terms of the old contract but with a 72-hour 
notice of extension (Leonard 8/2/05). The Wilton, Iowa contract would expire 
September 30. The 270 members of Local 8586 in Beaumont continued to be locked 
out with their negotiations stalled as well. The question for the USW was how soon to 
muster its resources and initiate a broader campaign. 
 
Global Campaign 
By August the lockout was in its third month with little in the way of progress 
at the bargaining table. The two sides continued to meet, at least in theory, but the 
Beaumont workers remained locked out with no end in sight (Gerdau was now 
ironically calling its bargaining strategy “reality-based bargaining” (Beal 2/13/06)). 
The Unity Council continued to meet and Beaumont workers had traveled to the other 
locations to tell their stories of Ameristeel‟s behavior. Leaflets, newspaper ads, radio 
spots and local rallies had come and gone in the U.S. but the situation remained at 
more or less the same location it was the day after the lockout. Ameristeel wasn‟t 
budging.  These tactics hadn‟t worked, and more USW contracts were about to open 
up, meaning more steelworkers working without contracts. The USW decided that it 
was time to escalate the fight and take it to Brazil.  
The week of August 12, 2005, Gerdau Ameristeel executives in Tampa, 
Florida were surprised by a group of unwelcome guests. Two Brazilian labor leaders, 
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Fernando Lopes of the CNM/CUT and Nair Goulart of Força Sindical, traveled to the 
Tampa headquarters of Gerdau Ameristeel to deliver a petition to Ameristeel chairman 
Phillip Casey. The petition was signed by their Brazilian coworkers called for 
Ameristeel management to end the lockout and negotiate a fair contract. The 
delegation entered the building and even got into the elevators before being 
intercepted by Ameristeel managers on the sixth floor. The group was eventually 
escorted out by security and police called to make sure they didn‟t return (Unity 
Council 9/8/05). Outside, a group of fifty supporters held a rally passing out leaflets 
and calling media attention, in both the U.S. and Brazil, to Gerdau‟s union busting 
(Robertson 8/12/05).  
Lopes, Goulart and the Beaumont leaders went on to the other former North 
Star locals to rally support and discuss future actions. In an interview Lopes explained 
the lockout from the Brazilian perspective “I think the company is trying to take 
advantage of what they see as a weakness among the workers. They thought the 
workers would just take whatever offer they made, and they are acting based on the 
weak enforcement of labor laws here in the US. They are not in compliance, in my 
opinion, with international labor laws, and that is wrong” (Robertson 8/12/05). 
Gerdau‟s reaction to the visit in a press release referred to the Lopes and Goulart as 
“Representatives…from South American special interest groups” (Robertson 8/22/05).  
This delegation was followed by a similar attempt to meet with Jorge Gerdau 
in Porto Alegre in September 2005. The delegation of Brazilian and US union 
members delivered a letter from locked out workers in the US and met with Brazilian 
Gerdau workers about the situation of the American workers (Unity Council 9/8/05). 
Beaumont workers Pete Savoy and Phil Everett, along with USW Strategic Campaigns 
representative Melinda Newhouse, traveled to Brazil for the first of numerous worker 
delegations. The three spent eleven days in Brazil meeting with Brazilian Gerdau 
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workers, participating in leafleting and rallies outside Gerdau plants in Osasco, 
Cumbica, São Paulo and Gerdau‟s flagship facility in São Leopoldo, meeting with 
CUT and Força leaders, local Workers Party (PT) representatives and the federal 
Minister of Labor and former CNM/CUT leader, Luiz Marinho (Unity Council 
9/8/05).  
Worker visits such as this first one had multiple effects on the campaign to end 
the lockout, as well as broader effects on the larger union network as a whole. First 
and foremost the delegations were an opportunity for Beaumont workers to tell their 
story directly to other Gerdau workers. Speaking directly to other Gerdau workers put 
a human face on the Beaumont lockout and gave the Brazilians a new, less flattering, 
perspective of Gerdau. Fernando Lopes explained, during his August trip to the US, 
“Usually, we travel abroad to look for help against the multinationals. This is the first 
time that we are traveling to give solidarity” (Unity Council 9/8/05). Second, US 
workers were able to take the stories of flyering, rallies, meetings with politicians and 
the outpouring of support in Brazil back to Texas with them. This bolstered morale 
back home giving workers incentive to stay united and not give in to Gerdau‟s 
pressure. Third, these exchanges sent a message to Gerdau management. It is not an 
everyday occurrence when locked out US steelworkers show up at the Gerdau factory 
gates in São Leopoldo, Brazil. Brazilian management got the message and would 
quickly pass it on to US managers that something was happening. If the USW was 
willing to spend thousands of dollars to send three of its representatives to Brazil, it 
was a sign the union was digging in for a protracted fight. Finally, these delegations 
were opportunities to strengthen the existing domestic networks in both Brazil and the 
US (the Unity Council). As Fernando Lopes said, “Besides this, the effect is relative, 
in reality what this experience shows is that the capacity to lend solidarity depends on 
our capacity for mobilization and organization here in Brazil. We need to improve our 
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organization and power of mobilization, in order for Brazilian multinational 
companies see us as true interlocutors for problems which happen in the exterior” 
(Leão 2005). 
These, and ensuing delegations continued to build support on the local level 
and show Gerdau management in Tampa and Brazil that Gerdau workers were 
working together globally and wouldn‟t be pitted against each other. Local 8586 
president Pete Savoy continued to be the public face of the locked out workers 
throughout 2005 as he traveled to Buenos Aires, Argentina for an IMF Steel 
Conference. The IMF delegates strategized in workshops and passed resolutions 
supporting the locked out American steelworkers (Metalworld 2005: 24). 
 
Recall 
On December 12, 2005 the first members of Local 8586 began to go back to 
work. Gerdau management announced that the Beaumont facility would reopen and 
workers would be recalled according to “prevailing market conditions” (Robertson 
12/14/05). The USW immediately filed Unfair Labor Practices (ULP‟s) for Gerdau‟s 
refusal to call union members back by seniority and their implementation of its 
previous “last, best and final offer” terms for the returning workers. Despite these 
grievances, Local 8586 had won a big victory. All along Gerdau management claimed 
union members wouldn‟t be recalled until a contract had been signed, but after six 
months management caved and began to call workers back. Management‟s gamble to 
break the local had failed, costing the company nearly $14 million dollars due to its 
idled plant (Kusic 2/20/06).  
After six months of being locked out the Beaumont workers began the slow 
process of recall and returning to work without a contract. Rather than simply 
claiming victory and returning to the bargaining table to hammer out a deal with 
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Gerdau, the USW knew the campaign had shifted in rhetoric, but not in tactics. Three 
Gerdau locals were already working without contracts with more expiring soon. The 
international fight would continue to escalate until all Gerdau locals had contracts.  
 
From Lockout to Contract Campaign 
As the Beaumont workers were slowly recalled, the new focus of the campaign 
spread from the lock out to the growing number of US locals without contracts. 
Beaumont was working without a contract, as were two other former North Star locals, 
St Paul, MN and Wilton, IA. While the lockout was over, the ultimate goal of 
contracts for all North American Gerdau facilities stayed the same, as did the global 
reach of the campaign. The campaign would escalate from unannounced visits to 
management to international days of action, speeches at the shareholders‟ meeting, 
coordinated billboards in two continents and meetings with political allies in the US 
and Brazil.  
Gerdau itself was also expanding. Over the course of 2006 it would grow from 
the fourth largest minimill company in the US to the second largest. In March, 2006 
Gerdau acquired Sheffield Steel‟s three minimill facilities in Sand Springs, OK, Joliet 
IL and Kansas City, MO. All three of these facilities were represented by the USW 
and, like the Ameristeel facilities it was joining, all three had open collective 
bargaining agreements. These three USW shops would quickly join the former North 
Star shops in their global fight for contracts. Gerdau had also expanded its reach in the 
Americas by acquiring recently privatized Sindiperu, Peru‟s largest steelmaker. 
Gerdau also made its first acquisition outside the hemisphere buying three Sidenor 
facilities in Spain. By 2007 Gerdau would become the fourth largest overall 
steelmaker in North America after its acquisition of Chapparal Steel and MacSteel. 
Globally, Gerdau expanded into Mexico and the Dominican Republic, created a joint 
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venture in India, and consolidated downstream iron ore production in Brazil (Gerdau 
Annual Report 2007).  
Gerdau‟s strategy of acquiring existing production facilities meant the network 
of Gerdau unions was expanding as well. In 2006 and 2007 the North American 
campaign would continue through worker exchanges, delegations, coordinated actions 
and pressure on Gerdau stakeholders. But, as the campaign expanded to new sites of 
leverage, more complex lines of communication and coordination would be needed as 
well. When the axis of the campaign remained between the US and Brazil, 
coordination could be effectively handled by USW campaigners located in Pittsburgh 
and Solidarity Center representatives in Uruguay and Brazil. These campaigners could 
travel to Brazil with North American workers as needed for delegations and rallies or 
rely on the Solidarity center representatives to help with logistics. But, as the Gerdau 
campaign escalated to include more coordination broadly, it would also need to 
expand deeper into Gerdau‟s channels of power, especially in Brazil.  
In order to do this, two important steps would be taken. First, the USW would 
hire a staff person to work in Brazil full time. Carolyn Kazdin, former representative 
of the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center‟s office in Brazil, became the full time organizer to 
coordinate joint actions between North America and Brazil. Her work would be 
important not just in ending the Beaumont campaign, but as a full time bridge builder 
who could maintain continuity of organization after the campaign had finished. 
Kazdin had connections and relationships with key Brazilian trade unionists, 
politicians and community leaders stemming from her time at the Solidarity Center. 
By having full time staff on the ground, the campaign would have a direct line of 
communication between Pittsburgh and Brazil. This would aid both the speed of 
communication and the depth of activity between unions.  
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Second, both the level of campaign activity and the continued corporate 
expansion of Gerdau would engender a similar expansion of the Gerdau union 
network. In November 2006 Gerdau unions from nine countries would meet for the III 
International Meeting of Gerdau Workers in Porto Alegre and take the important step 
of establish the GWWC. Beyond semantics, the foundation of the GWWC was 
important because it petitioned Gerdau management for recognition as the negotiating 
body for all Gerdau workers globally and, likewise, launched a formal campaign for 
negotiation of an International Framework Agreement (IFA). While Gerdau 
management rejected both of these proposals, their introduction was an important sign 
of organizational maturity. As Gerdau expanded to new countries with unionized 
workforces, these workers and their union representatives needed to be included in a 
more formal, transnational union body. Furthermore Gerdau management was 
showing a more anti-union posture in countries such as Peru and Colombia, not just in 
the US. Similar Human Resources and Quality of Work Life (QWL) programs were 
being implemented by Gerdau management in all countries. The GWWC created a 
platform for unions to compare health and safety standards across the firm and push 
for more uniform standards for all Gerdau workers. And, the escalating campaign was 
mobilizing workers not just in North America and Brazil, but in Spain, Argentina and 
Mexico, too. A more formal, yet flexible structure for communication and strategy 
would be needed to cement the gains of North American workers as well as to ensure 
continuity of activity once the campaign wrapped up.  
 
Global Contract Campaign (2006-2007) 
The 2006 new year started off with a Unity Council meeting in St Paul, MN. 
The 350 USW members from Local 7263 had been working without a new contract 
since August 1, 2005. Brazilians Fernando Lopes and Nair Goulart joined the North 
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Americans for the meetings. The campaign continued to bridge the global and local by 
reaching out to the St Paul community with a traveling billboard (“street blimp”). The 
billboard included a photo of a crocodile with an open mouth, showing its teeth with 
the message: “Gerdau devoured North Star Steel; now it‟s after our standard of living. 
What a crock…” The union parked the billboard outside the St Paul plant and drove it 
around downtown Minneapolis/St Paul (Kucera 2006).  
In February 2006 a delegation of Gerdau workers, USW representatives and 
Brazilian trade unionists attended the Cornell University Global Unions Conference in 
New York City, the largest gathering of trade unionists, academics and researchers of 
its kind. Meetings such as the Global Unions Conference helped spread the message 
beyond USW and Gerdau circles to a more extensive network of international trade 
union activists and academic researchers. 
Coordinated solidarity activity continued through the first half of 2006. Local 
8586 president Pete Savoy returned to Brazil in March for more rallies, interviews and 
meetings. Savoy‟s trip intersected with a global day of action involving union workers 
in all eight countries with Gerdau facilities. Workers wore stickers on their hardhats 
featuring a hand holding a large hammer (USW leaflet 2006). The “union hammer” 
was a spoof of one of Gerdau‟s ubiquitous advertising campaigns endorsing Gerdau‟s 
quality products and urging consumers to “Give it the hammer test.” 
Gerdau‟s 2006 annual shareholder meeting was held in Toronto, giving the 
Canadian locals to get involved directly in the campaign. Thirty-five USW workers 
and representatives as well as Fernando Lopes of the CNM/CUT attended the 
shareholder meeting in May.  Local 8586 president Pete Savoy addressed the room, 
speaking directly to CEO Mario Longhi, former CEO Phillip Casey, who authorized 
the 2005 Beaumont lockout, and the complete Ameristeel board of directors. Local 
8581 (Wilton, IA) president Bill Clevinger presented a petition to Jorge Gerdau who 
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was sitting in the front of the room. The petition was signed by USW members from 
plants where contracts had expired. The shareholder meeting was also an important 
opportunity to highlight the different attitude taken by US management versus 
Brazilian management. “We‟re sure that if he comes and visits our plants and searches 
for the truth, heads will roll at Tampa headquarters, where all the lies have originated 
and where the union busting scheme was hatched and financed,” claimed St. Paul local 
president Mike Wodaszewski (Unity Council May 2006). Jorge Gerdau himself was 
again the center of the union campaign, stressing the central role he would have to 
take in order to circumvent US management and end the growing impasse. 
 Local leaders Jim Whitmore from Wilton, IA and Ben Hallas from St. Paul, 
MN crisscrossed Brazil participating in rallies outside Gerdau World Headquarters in 
Porto Alegre, meeting with Gerdau workers in the northern state of Maranhão, giving 
interviews on radio programs and addressing a state level NGO Forum (Marreta Neles 
2006). The North Americans addressed union delegates at both the Ninth National 
Congress of the CUT as well as the First Congress of the National Confederation of 
Metalworkers of Força Sindical (CNTM/FS) (Unity Council 2006). These appearances 
spread the message to a national audience, not just to Brazilian Gerdau workers. 
The second half of 2006 progressed with a similar pattern of worker 
delegations, coordinated actions and a focus on Jorge Gerdau‟s image. Billboards with 
the “Where‟s Jorge?” message went up on roads leading to the Sao Paulo, Porto 
Alegre and Brasilia airports, all airports frequented by domestic and international 
businessmen. Word of Gerdau‟s anti-union practices needed to get to the boardrooms 
as well as the shop floor.  
The USW upped the ante in August by releasing a report sent to media and 
Gerdau shareholders entitled “Saving North American Steel.” In it the USW 
highlighted its role of working cooperatively through mergers and restructuring with 
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firms such as Goodyear Tire, LTV, and USX, which respected the USW‟s seat the 
bargaining table. The report also contrasted these productive relationships with the 
case of Oregon Steel which endured a six year strike of 1,100 USW members. Oregon 
Steel eventually lost hundreds of millions of dollars in idle plant time, back pay 
awards, and loss of share valuations. The USW outlined the consequences of a 
potential strike at Gerdau: financial losses by plant, loss of market share and reduction 
in share value. The USW estimated Ameristeel would lose $2.5-$3 million per day and 
more than $50 million in sales and fixed costs per trimester (USW 2006; Nakamura et 
al. 2006). Gerdau had the option of having a cooperative relationship with the USW or 
facing the consequences of a potential strike. A coordinated sticker and petition day in 
January 2007 followed this shareholder report under the theme “Deal or No Steel.” 
 
Domestic Actions 
Actions focused on winning support in Brazil, but the campaign maintained a 
broad based, multi-scale, escalating campaign in North America as well. The Unity 
Council structure remained at the center of organizing these coordinated North 
American actions. Throughout 2006 locals participated in a series of coordinated 
sticker days, informational picketing sessions, signs on cars, and visits to and from the 
Canadian locals. The Unity Council met regularly and published a newsletter keeping 
local informed on international solidarity, national coordinated actions and the 
progress of local bargaining sessions.   
On a local level, unions rallied their communities through frequent leaflets and 
community outreach. Support from political leaders was extensive as well. State and 
US representatives such as Minnesota Senator Mark Dayton and House representative 
Betty McCollum, Texas representative Sheila Jackson-Lee and Iowa governor Tom 
Vilsack sent letters of support to Jorge Gerdau on behalf of workers (Unity Council, 
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February 2006). Senator Dayton and former Michigan congressman David Bonior 
traveled to Brazil to meet directly with Jorge Gerdau urging him to visit the US 
personally and facilitate a resolution to the growing number of open contracts in the 
US (Unity Council, May 2006).  
In Beaumont, local communities were especially hard hit after Hurricane Rita 
struck the Gulf Coast in September 2005, giving the struggle of the Beaumont workers 
added urgency. County commissions and mayors passed resolutions of support for the 
workers and pushed for Gerdau management to negotiate a fair contract in all 
locations. Local religious leaders wrote letters of support and added the workers to 
prayer lists. Local 8586 in Beaumont organized gumbo feeds and other locals 
organized potlucks and fish frys to keep families, religious leaders and members of the 
community involved in the daily realities Gerdau workers were facing (USW internal 
memo, undated).  
Beginning in Tampa in December 2005 a retired Steelworker named “Big 
Nick” Mikatich undertook a road trip of Gerdau facilities and Tampa HQ driving a 
large truck with a billboard mounted on the flatbed, known as the “Truck of Truth,” to 
show solidarity. With a set of rotating billboard messages aimed at Gerdau 
management such as “Gerdau Devoured North Star Steel. Now It‟s After Our Standard 
of Living. What a Crock!,” “Two Faces of Gerdau, Millions for Brazilians. Nothing 
For Loyal Sand Springs Workers” and “Nolan and Top Execs get nearly $2 Million. 
Sheffield Workers and Retirees Get the Shaft” (USW internal memo 12/20/05; Unity 
Council 1/18/06; 7/06), Mikatich would drive the billboards around each facility, park 
outside the factory gates, and distribute leaflets during shift changes, inevitably 
provoking a local HR manager to come out and ask for a flyer or ask Mikatich to 
leave. One way or another, the USW was determined to make sure Gerdau 
management was receiving the message of solidarity from multiple sources.  
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The USW‟s critique of Gerdau was not confined to labor rights violations. In 
June the USW filed a suit with the Tennessee Environmental Board asking the state of 
Tennessee to set up a hearing investigating air emissions levels coming from Gerdau‟s 
Jackson, TN facility. The USW sought to review Gerdau‟s industrial lead emissions 
permit after research uncovered that Gerdau was responsible for ninety six percent of 
the lead emissions in the county (USW Press Release 6/22/06).  
The campaign reached beyond worker-to-worker exchanges and local labor 
management relations seeking to influence a wide set of corporate stakeholders 
Gerdau Ameristeel. Despite being relatively unknown to the average consumer in 
North America, Gerdau was known within construction and industrial trade circles. In 
October 2006 workers traveled to Washington, D.C. to a bridge construction trade 
show to handbill and educate Gerdau customers of the costs of a potential strike by 
Gerdau workers (USW Internal Memo 10/2/06). Consumer actions such as this added 
one more piece of leverage into the overall comprehensive campaign, increasing the 
heat on Gerdau management to negotiate fair contracts.  
By the end of 2006 the broad-based escalating tactics began to reap dividends. 
In July 2006 workers at Gerdau‟s Calvert City, KY facility won a $2 million 
arbitration decision on nineteen months unpaid profit-sharing (Kusic 7/25/06). The 
Calvert City collective bargaining agreement, signed when the facility was still owned 
by North Star, included a provision for a profit sharing program. After Gerdau 
acquired the facility in 2004, it had claimed the program was “discretionary” and 
refused to pay. The grievance was won under the past practice clause after going to 
arbitration (Internal Email 7/20/06). Workers from the other former North Star locals 
won over $2.3 million in similar back pay settlements later in 2006 (Unity Council 
10/6/06).  The campaign was not solely global at the expense of the local communities 
involved. These actions reinforced a central tenet of comprehensive campaigns: for a 
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campaign to work, it must build support at multiple levels and maintain escalating 
pressure on multiple sites of the corporation‟s operations.  
 
Settlement 
By New Year 2007, the strategy to divide the two managements and move 
Ameristeel management by going to Brazil began to show its effectiveness. Workers 
on the ground in the US began to notice shake-ups in local managements and Brazilian 
union leaders began hearing complaints about the global campaign. CEO Phillip 
Casey, one of the former Florida Steel executives and CEO during the Beaumont 
lockout, had been replaced with a Brazilian, Mario Longhi. Negotiations with 
management had continued off and on, but were now overseen by company 
negotiators rather than outside lawyers.  
The ground campaign in Brazil began to wrap up in early 2007 when Gerdau 
Ameristeel management contacted the USW about wrapping up the open contracts in 
the former North Star facilities at St Paul, Wilton, and Beaumont. As with any 
settlement after a long protracted fight, the end contract was not a total victory. A 
large part of the ultimate settlement is the very continued existence of the union after 
an onslaught of corporate power. The final contract at Beaumont was no exception.  
The new contract included settlement of outstanding ULP charges concerning 
lost overtime, vacation day accrual and recall of USW members after the lockout was 
ended all in favor of the USW. Other provisions were not so cut and dry (Proposed 
Agreement 2007). Workers were able to maintain the provisions of the old pre-2004 
Cargill-era pension plan. A major source of contention had been the company‟s intent 
to overhaul overtime language. Ameristeel had wanted to increase, from twelve to 
sixteen, the amount of hours it could force employees to work. It also sought to 
eliminate overtime pay after eight hours and use the state minimum of overtime after 
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forty hours per week. The USW was able to preserve both of these provisions 
(Proposed Agreement 2007). 
But these hard fought victories were tempered by concessions on sensitive 
issues such as higher premiums on medical coverage and wage cuts for new hires in 
the lowest job classifications. The most painful change for the Beaumont workers 
involved the rewriting of the job classification system. Where there had been an 
established manual of job descriptions, management now became responsible for 
writing job descriptions and justifying their pay rate (Proposed Agreement 2007). 
While these descriptions would have to pass a labor management committee and could 
be grieved, it was a tough pill to swallow for the local which had taken specific 
umbrage to this provision. 
Tentative agreements for the former North Star locals were finalized in March 
2007. Bargaining at the three former Sheffield facilities and one Canadian facility 
continued through the spring and summer. The North American Unity council 
continued to meet to discuss and update the locals on the progress of bargaining. In the 
April meeting of the Unity Council it drafted a letter presented to the May 2007 
Gerdau shareholders meeting encouraging management to continue to take 
negotiations for the remaining open contracts seriously, to emphasize health and safety 
as common priority for all Gerdau workers globally, and to push for Gerdau 
management to begin working with the GWWC on issues such as health and safety 
(Unity Council May 2007). Though negotiations continued to occur at the local level, 
global strategies continued to be a priority for the Unity Council, and vice versa. The 
GWWC coordinated another global sticker day with the message of health and safety, 
a sign of its developing focus on the issue a means for cooperation across-borders 
(Unity Council August 2007). Former Sheffield locals settled in August and 
September 2007.  
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Gerdau Workers’ World Council (GWWC) 
The Gerdau Workers‟ World Council (GWWC) was established in November 
2006 in Porto Alegre, Brazil. After nearly 10 years of informal strategic partnership 
Gerdau workers wanted a more formal transnational structure to share information, 
coordinate bargaining and organizing strategies, and ensure continuity of organization. 
Seventy workers, union representatives and researchers from Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay, Colombia, Peru, United States and Canada and the IMF attended the Porto 
Alegre meeting. The goals of the GWWC meeting were threefold: to continue the 
ongoing information exchanges on bargaining and local conditions at each Gerdau 
location; to formally petition Gerdau management for recognition of the GWWC as 
the bargaining agent for all Gerdau workers; and third, to begin discussions on how to 
launch a campaign for an International Framework Agreement (Report 2006). 
Notably, the GWWC sent a letter to Brazilian President Lula asking him to not appoint 
Jorge Gerdau as Minister of the Interior.  
It is important to see the Porto Alegre meeting and the GWWC as not just a 
sign of global solidarity with the ongoing North American campaign, but as the next 
step in the decade-long attempt to create a lasting infrastructure for all Gerdau workers 
to build global bargaining power. Global solidarity meant solidarity not just for North 
American workers, but for all Gerdau workers. Numerous workers in Colombia had 
been harassed for their activity in the local union, three workers had died in 
preventable plant accidents in Bahia, Brazil, and Gerdau was rapidly acquiring new 
facilities in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and the US. The GWWC and the 
international alliances engendered by it needed to expand both in the number of 
participants and also in the breadth of campaigns to ensure that all Gerdau workers 
were treated fairly. The formal recognition of the GWWC from the IMF (in the 2004 
meetings) helped ease issues of funding for unions in countries such as Peru, Uruguay 
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and Colombia with fewer resources to send delegates and workers to meetings in other 
countries.  
The establishment of the GWWC in November, 2006 was a key moment for 
Gerdau workers for three reasons. First, it was the largest (in number of participants) 
and broadest (in number of countries represented) gathering of Gerdau workers to that 
date. The coalitions, campaigns, and capacity building work of the past ten years were 
durable enough to continue. Gerdau was expanding and so were the efforts of unions 
at Gerdau to maintain a network of communication and organization. Second, the 
meeting took place at a crucial time in the North American campaign. A little over a 
year after the global campaign had begun in earnest, the GWWC symbolized the 
continued solidarity of Gerdau workers globally. Gerdau management continued to 
hold out and most North American workers remained without contracts. The GWWC 
meeting was a powerful response to Gerdau‟s continued intransigence. Third, the 2006 
GWWC meeting formally petitioned for recognition as the bargaining agent for all 
unionized Gerdau workers globally. While Gerdau management swiftly rejected this 
request, it was just as much a sign to management of the extent of organization and the 
intent to build continuity. Much as the message of the North American campaign was 
“we won‟t go away,” the same message applied to the formation of the GWWC. 
Gerdau workers would not go back to their respective countries and bargain alone. 
Instead, the GWWC would establish a forum for communication, decision-making and 
cross-border strategy.  
The GWWC met in Montevideo, Uruguay in June 2007 and again in October 
2007 in São Paulo to discuss a unified health and safety platform, finalize a global 
database of strategic research on Gerdau accessible to all workers and researchers and 
plan for next steps in petitioning international recognition from Gerdau (in the form of 
an International Framework Agreement) as the bargaining agent for all Gerdau 
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workers. The most recent meeting took place in December 2008 in Houston, TX, the 
first meeting held in North America. Union delegates from ten countries (and the IMF) 
addressed the global financial crisis urging Gerdau to work with the GWWC to 
generate joint health and safety programs for employees as well as invest in large 
public infrastructure projects to aid broader national recovery efforts.  
 
V. Analysis 
Cross-Border Union Networks 
Networks do not appear suddenly, nor do they last without the involvement 
and engagement of their members. Most networks have been cultivated over many 
years (and in many languages) through the difficult work of coordinating local 
activists with internationalist leanings, mid-level union bridgebuilders as well as 
higher-level union-to-union officials. The Gerdau example is no exception to this. 
Informal contact began in 1997 and continued irregularly through Steelworker 
Humanity Fund exchanges, industry and sectoral union meetings (steel industry 
conferences, GUF meetings), and federation-to-federation contacts. The behind the 
scenes work of cultivating and expanding networks often goes unnoticed until a crisis 
erupts, in this case, the 2005-2007 North American campaign. The e-mails, phone 
calls, newsletters, requests for information, and personal bonds of trust established 
between local activists and union staff are the glue which hold these networks 
together. One of the difficulties of writing about these cross-border networks is the 
often informal formation and evolution of them. Until more formal agreements about 
structure and organization are established, networks take an unwieldy and 
“rhizomatic” form (Deleuze and Guattari 1987).  
Initially, cross-border networks may not have anything to “show” for their 
existence; they exist in the personal contacts and exchanges between activists, staff, 
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and bridgebuilders. But as these networks expand and become formalized, they 
demonstrate their utility by expanding the scope of possible collective bargaining 
strategies. Where previously bargaining strategies may have been limited to the local 
or national levels, cross-border networks create “opportunity structures” for including 
new points of leverage (Tarrow 2005).  
Many other cross-border campaigns have used international solidarity as a 
tactic to end strikes, lock-outs or to aid organizing drives. International solidarity is 
hardly a new or innovative tactic. But what is innovative is that unions are making 
concerted efforts to research multinational firms, understand their structure, and build 
lasting cross-border firm-centered structures in order to build power across national 
borders as a long-term strategy. Unions such as the Brazilian CUT, North American 
USW, German IG Metall, South African COSATU and South Korean KCFTU have 
all been at the vanguard of cross-border strategies, especially member-centered, cross-
border network building at multinational firms.  
These cross-border networks differ from broader Global Union Federations or 
federation-to-federation alliances
7
 in that they use common employers as the nexus of 
organization. While networks are almost always affiliated with GUFs and rely on 
GUFs for resources and coordination help, networks are autonomous from GUFs in 
their firm-centered organizational structure. Yet, beyond the characteristic of sharing 
common employers union networks are a heterogeneous bunch. Further research is 
needed to identify shared characteristics.  
 
                                                 
7
 This is in no way saying that GUFs and federation-to-federation alliances have no role, or are 
too far removed from local campaigns (see Snyder 2008 for more on the various roles of GUFs in cross-
border organizing campaigns). These types of “global unions” are important for their geographic reach 
(helpful especially for unions seeking to expand networks as firms expand to new countries look for 
new union contacts), the amount of funding and resources they bring to national and local union 
disputes as well as their continuity of organization.  
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Coalitions at Gerdau 
The tradition of rank and file coalition building at Gerdau has been the most 
important component for building a long-term, sustained and comprehensive example 
of cross-border unionism. More than ten years of trust building, face-to-face 
interaction, and both North-South and South-North decisionmaking have built a solid 
foundation for other network activities.  
The legacy of the CNM/CUT has been absolutely central in establishing a rich 
rank and file, member-to-member foundation at Gerdau. It is important to remember 
that the cross-border network at Gerdau is an outgrowth of the work done by Brazilian 
unionist activists such as Fernando Lopes during the late 1980s and 1990s. During 
these years, Brazilian unions in the auto, steel, chemicals and food sectors 
simultaneously built deep, rank and file-based, in-plant factory commissions as well as 
coordinated nationwide networks of unions at multinational firms. This is all the more 
impressive because the Brazilian industrial relations system of corporatism was 
designed to prevent precisely this kind of autonomous local and national worker 
organization. Taking the international step, linking with German, Canadian, Dutch, 
South African and US workers, was the next logical step for building worker 
organization at multinational firms.  Brazilians took this rank and file unionism with 
them when building cross-border networks at companies such as Volkswagen, BASF, 
Ford and Unilever. At Gerdau this foundation of rank and file activity has been more 
acutely felt because Gerdau is a Brazilian firm and Brazilian unions maintain a central, 
home company-based role in the network. The influence of the Brazilian tradition of 
rank and file organization cannot be overstated in the Gerdau case.  
The Canadian Steelworker Humanity Fund was also critical in the initiation 
and formation of early Gerdau coalition building. The Humanity Fund‟s emphasis on 
critical pedagogy, worker education, and linking hemispheric corporate globalization 
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with worker “globalization” dovetailed with the CNM/CUT‟s rank and file-based 
unionism. The first international Gerdau meeting in 1998 was primarily the work of 
the Humanity Fund‟s Judith Marshall and the CNM/CUT‟s Fernando Lopes. And 
while this first meeting was an embryonic form of cross-border organization, it set the 
tone and tenor of future cross-border activity at Gerdau; internationalism would need 
to be rank and file based or it would never develop the capacity to exert real power at 
other levels.  
Years of meetings primarily between the USW and CNM/CUT at both the mid 
and rank and file levels as well as strategic partnerships at the international, union to 
union level, had built strong bonds of trust between leaderships. Mid-level union 
officials such as USW‟s Doug Niehouse and Melinda Newhouse were familiar with 
their counterparts on the other side of the equator, often having worked together on 
shared projects through the IMF, Solidarity Center and Humanity Fund (as well as 
working through disagreements such as the 2002 US steel tariffs) and remaining in 
frequent contact with each other. Even before Local 8586 was locked out, USW 
researchers in Pittsburgh contacted colleagues in Brazil to gather more information as 
it became clear Gerdau would be buying the four North Star facilities.  
During the campaign, local leaders from Beaumont, Wilton and St Paul, 
among others, visited Brazil on a rotating basis. These US union activists met with 
colleagues in the CNM/CUT and Força Sindical, distributed flyers outside Gerdau 
facilities in industrial parks from São Paulo to Salvador, spread the word of the 
campaign to the Brazilian press and recounted their stories to political allies from the 
PT. These activists were then able to bring news of global solidarity, show photos of 
meetings with colleagues, and recount local actions US workers never would have 
been able to do. Brazilian activists who met with US workers ran front page stories in 
their local union newspapers and spread the word via radio programs.   
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 Integrating worker delegations into the North American campaign partly 
stemmed out of this history of frequent worker exchanges before the campaign. A 
foundation of rank and file militancy and participation has been the sine qua non of 
USW and CNM/CUT cross-border campaigns (See Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 
1995, 2003; Anner 2004; Hickey 2004). Worker delegations were central to the North 
American campaign partly out of the USW and the CNM/CUT‟s commitment to rank 
and file participation in campaigns in general (see Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 1999; 
Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 2003) as well as the repertoire of worker exchanges set 
during the late 1990s and 2000s. Both the union-to-union contacts as well as the rank 
and file exchanges were crucial. Coalition building has been the organizational 
principle from which all other network activities have been launched.  
It is essential that the Gerdau network not lose this tradition of rank and file-
based exchange. As informal networks develop into more formal structures there may 
be pressure to shift the levels of decisonmaking upward to higher levels of union 
officials at the expense of rank and file voices. While institutionalization (i.e. capacity 
building) is one of the keys to building long-term organization, it is crucial to maintain 
a balance between institutionalization and rank and file involvement. One does not 
preclude the development of the other, rather, one should enhance the development of 
the other. Worker exchanges beyond the regular GWWC meetings may act as a check 
on the tendency towards institutionalization without democratization.  
At Gerdau this may also mean creating a more comprehensive pedagogy for 
union delegates who participate in GWWC meetings. As Johns (1998) pointed out, it 
is not enough just to have rank and file workers interact with their counterparts, these 
interactions must qualitatively transform workers relationships with each other in 
order to overcome national, gendered, and racial boundaries and create shared 
interests. Worker education on a local level should integrate themes of globalization 
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from below, building bargaining power through cross-border activity and direct 
worker-to-worker communication. The 2006 Gerdau Study Tour leading to the 
GWWC meeting is an excellent example of integrating education and action to create 
a praxis workers can bring back to their locals. Brazilian unionists especially have 
developed rich tradition of critical pedagogy. US and other Northern unions could 
learn from and adapt these kinds of education modules to fit their own circumstances. 
However an educational program may be implemented, the key is for rank and file 
workers to interact, both psychically and physically, with other workers to create the 
foundation for future collective activity.  
 
Campaigns at Gerdau 
Coordinated cross-border campaign activity between Gerdau unions had not 
been attempted until the 2005-2007 USW campaign. This is explained most 
prominently by both the Gerdau network‟s early stages of development, and the more 
obvious fact that there was little reason for Brazilian unions to use cross-border 
strategies. Labor relations between Gerdau and Brazilian unions were relatively stable 
and there was little bargaining power resting outside of Brazil. Gerdau‟s profit centers, 
as evidenced by the Brazilian focus of the USW campaign, remained in Brazil. Until 
2002 Gerdau only operated in Chile, Canada, Uruguay and Brazil. By 2008 Gerdau 
had expanded into the US, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, Dominican Republic, 
and Spain. It was not until the rapid evolution of Gerdau from a major national player 
in the Brazilian market into an upstart steelmaker in both hemispheres around 2004 
that the threat of reduced bargaining power, the need for better coordination amongst 
unions and crises such as the Beaumont lockout created the need for more extensive 
cross-border organization.  
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Even though the USW‟s campaign to end the Beaumont lockout was a 
defensive campaign, it played an important role in expanding the network overall. The 
campaign succeeded in crystallizing existing relationships between unions into a more 
tangible form of solidarity. The meetings in 1998 and 2003 were important steps in 
building a more formal framework for shared decision-making and trust building, i.e. 
“capacity building,” but the campaign changed the tenor and focus of unions in the 
Gerdau network. Gerdau‟s blatant anti-union activity in the US was an affront to the 
notion, emphasized by Gerdau management, that Gerdau was a family business with a 
paternal relationship with its workers. Brazilian workers were especially taken aback 
by the stories of US workers coming to Brazil describing unsafe working conditions, 
concession bargaining and corporate law breaking. Brazilians were much more 
accustomed to being the ones who had to tell their stories to US or European workers 
about Northern companies operating in Brazil with anti-union tactics and disregard for 
labor law. This role reversal may have caused an overall shift in the way Gerdau was 
viewed by other unions in the network. The campaign, as well as the rank and file 
workers who traveled telling their stories, helped reframe Gerdau‟s image and created 
a shared threat for all Gerdau unions. Campaigns are an important process in creating 
a more tangible form of solidarity among workers.  
 Campaigns need not be vast global undertakings such as the USW campaign, 
but may be utilized to the extent that local circumstances dictate. The GWWC‟s 
support during Peruvian and Colombian workers‟ contract negotiations in 2007 was 
limited to letter writing and communication amongst Gerdau unions, but it sent a 
message to Gerdau management that Peruvian and Colombian workers were not alone 
(Unity Council 1/25/07). The Gerdau network will need to ensure that it works for all 
its members, not just for the largest unions in the US and Brazil. Through more 
comprehensive participation and trust building, smaller unions with less practice at 
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cross-border campaigns, such as the Dominican, Peruvian, and Mexican unions, may 
be more likely to appeal for help from other members of the network. In this case, the 
unions with more resources and bargaining power, such as the USW, will need to 
demonstrate the same levels of solidarity other unions practiced for them.  
More developed forms of cross-border campaigns may also be possible as the 
Gerdau network develops over time. Thus far cross-border campaigns at Gerdau have 
been primarily defensive. In the US, Gerdau Ameristeel‟s operations remain nearly 
half non-union. The USW could make a concerted effort to organize these plants using 
the network as a central part of its organizing strategy. Cross-border organizing efforts 
at other companies have been scattershot at best, but with the levels of trust and 
infrastructure of communication between Gerdau unions, a well-planned, strategic 
cross-border organizing campaign may be more feasible.  
 
Capacity Building at Gerdau 
Establishing the GWWC in November 2006 was the most important step 
towards formalizing existing relationships and building continuity for future 
collaboration. The GWWC is the forum for sharing decisionmaking responsibilities, 
airing grievances, and speaking with a unified voice to those outside the network, 
especially Gerdau management.  
In the Gerdau case, the GWWC is the culmination of years of more informal 
relationships. This lengthy history of collaboration is somewhat unusual compared 
with other networks. In other cases, at other companies, a rich history of collaboration 
and activity between unions may not exist as it had at Gerdau. This should not be a 
barrier to establishing more formal spaces for decisionmaking, as long as this 
establishment of a more formal space is combined with activities such as coalition 
building and campaign solidarity. Establishing world councils such as the GWWC at 
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other companies will only provide real spaces for voice and continuity if they work in 
concert with other activities. World councils such as the GWWC are only as dynamic 
and strong as the relationships between their members.  
Research has played an important role in the institutionalization of the Gerdau 
network. One of the original goals of the GWWC was the creation of a shared research 
database accessible to all unions in the network. This database collects information on 
the location and size of each Gerdau facility, wages, working conditions, health and 
safety issues, and levels of union representation by plant and country. Organizing and 
codifying this information creates a more comprehensive understanding of Gerdau‟s 
global operations and, potentially, provides a blueprint for more sophisticated 
bargaining, organizing, and representation campaigns. The USW, CNM/CUT, 
DIEESE, and the IMF all have well developed research capabilities. These unions will 
need to maintain their commitment to communication and information sharing.   
Involvement by GUFs is important in this step of formalization and continuity. 
The IMF‟s participation in the 2003 Gerdau workers‟ meetings in Rio de Janeiro was 
an important step for the global committee‟s overall development. Though the IMF‟s 
official recognition of the GWWC as a global representative body for Gerdau workers 
wouldn‟t happen until 2006, the IMF‟s 2003 participation signified that there was 
sufficient interest in solidifying the existing network and that these unions were 
willing to commit resources and manpower for future expansion of the network. The 
IMF is an important source of funding, resources, and coordination because it 
maintains a stable global presence in most regions of the world. If Gerdau expands to 
new countries where the USW or CNM/CUT don‟t have relationships with unions, the 
IMF is able to initiate contacts and link the network to these new unions.  
Future GWWC work may involve building more regional networks: North 
American, Andean, Southern Cone, and Brazilian. The North American Unity council 
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and the Brazilian Gerdau Network already provide models for these kinds of regional 
networks, but more work will need to be done to include others, especially unions in 
countries with fewer workers such as Peru and Mexico, into networks which represent 
their interests more directly. Other global networks such as the BASF network have 
adopted this regional sub-structure to coordinate communication and action as these 
networks have grown to include more members.  
Other possibilities for more decentralized governance might come from the 
formation of issue related committees: education, organizing, health and safety, etc. 
Because of its more universal, cross-national application, the GWWC has already 
identified health and safety as a future area for collaboration. The May 2007 GWWC 
meetings in Montevideo focused specifically on building a platform for research and 
collaboration on health and safety issues. Similar GWWC meetings could focus on 
creating a global education curriculum, or a study on possible joint organizing and 
bargaining campaigns.  
In whatever form the GWWC develops, it will need to maintain an open and 
inclusive structure where all members, not just the larger members, have a voice. Thus 
far this balance between North and South, large and small, has been a pillar of the 
GWWC‟s success, but as Gerdau continues to grow, this will need to remain central. 
Likewise, the GWWC must remain a space for rank and file voice, not just an echo 
chamber for the prerogatives of official union representatives. Again, thus far the 
GWWC has been an excellent example of this, but it will need to remain a central 
organizing tenet of the GWWC‟s work.  
  
Contracts at Gerdau 
 The issue of an IFA at Gerdau may be the most long-term and difficult goal for 
the network to achieve. Most of the IFAs signed have been at European-based MNCs 
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where stronger institutional supports such as national works councils or EU-wide 
EWCs promoting firm-level bargaining exist. As of 2007, forty-eight of the fifty-five 
IFAs signed have been with European MNCs; only two, Turner and Chiquita, have 
been with US companies (Stevis and Boswell 2008). No IFAs have been signed by 
companies based in the Global South.  
Nonetheless, an IFA remains an important goal for the Gerdau network. First, 
it provides a concrete goal to organize cross-border activity. Long-term network 
collaboration requires some degree of shared future goals in order to maintain a 
cohesive agenda for cross-border activity. Second, an IFA would provide some form 
of institutional opening for dialogue with Gerdau management on a global level. This 
transnational space for dialogue with Gerdau management in Porto Alegre could 
obviate the kind of costly and enervating campaign the USW was forced to use during 
its 2005-2007 campaign. Third, an IFA at Gerdau would be even more meaningful to 
other union networks beyond Gerdau because it would be the product of a more 
organic, grass roots model of global unionism rather than one emerging from strong 
institutional supports. An IFA would be a symbol that unions would not have to rely 
on the institutional supports of an EWC or strong national industrial relations system 
as the foundation for developing cross-border unions. 
 IFAs are important achievements, but most lack enforcement and monitoring 
mechanisms. Enforcement of IFA provisions must come primarily from the bargaining 
power of the unions themselves. An IFA provides one more tool to build bargaining 
power, but it is not the pinnacle of cross-border unionism. Unions must have 
bargaining power on the local, national and international levels in order to hold 
companies to their side of the agreement rather than rely on an IFA to automatically 
provide bargaining power to unions. Enforcing an IFA will be easier in places where 
unions have greater bargaining power, or stronger labor law provisions. In countries or 
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regions where there is less bargaining power and/or little institutional support for labor 
law enforcement, an IFA will have less impact. But, as an IFA is designed to provide 
basic rights for all employees of the company (and those of subcontracted workers), 
networks must take a comprehensive approach to building bargaining power for all 
network actors. This is why it is important to build the bargaining power of the 
network as a whole, not just focus on signing an IFA in itself. An IFA without 
bargaining power to support and enforce it will be of little value, but an IFA with 
strong network actors is potentially a powerful tool for enforcing the rights of all 
workers at the company.  
 Successful examples do exist for the Gerdau network to emulate. The 
Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Sindicatos Banananeros (COLSIBA) have built a 
grass roots organization of primarily women banana workers from Central and South 
America. COLSIBA succeeded in signing an IFA with Chiquita in 2001 (Frank 2005), 
the first of its kind in the agriculture sector. Since 1985 this network has developed 
through cross-border campaigns, education, and organization, with an emphasis on 
women‟s issues (an issue that has not come up at Gerdau). COLSIBA has used its 
broad network leverage to push for stronger regulatory and monitoring programs 
beyond the IFA itself (Frundt 2007). At COLSIBA an IFA, coupled with broad grass 
roots support and an aggressive approach to defending workers rights, has become an 
important tool for more comprehensive cross-border activity, not simply an end in 
itself. Collaboration and exchanges between Gerdau workers and the COLSIBA 
unions could be a powerful tool for coming up with new Gerdau network strategies, 
especially strategies to push for an IFA. 
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Global Unions/ Cross-Border Networks 
The focus of this thesis has been on the global network as a subject, not simply 
as a supporting actor in other union activities, particularly cross-border campaigns. I 
argue that networks do not construct themselves, nor can unions take them for granted. 
Rather networks must be developed and utilized by unions in order to keep them sharp 
and effective. A comprehensive program of coalitions, campaigns, capacity building, 
and contracts should be central to both building networks and analyzing their 
effectiveness. Individual networks vary considerably in their respective organizational 
forms and levels of development, but more work needs to be done by scholars and 
practitioners to assess the effectiveness of various tactics and strategies.  
The notable exceptions to this are research devoted to the dockworkers global 
network (Anner et al 2006; Turnbull 2007), US-Mexico cross-border organizing 
efforts in the maquila sector (Alexander and Gilmore 1999; Hathaway 2000‟ Frundt 
2002), and the networks formed by the banana workers in Central and South America 
(Frank 2005; Frundt 2007). This paucity may be representative of the difficulties in 
developing and maintaining cross-border union networks. The paucity becomes 
clearer when looking at the disparity between the large amount of research on 
individual campaigns versus the lack of research on successful, sustained forms of 
cross-border representation. More work is needed to compare similarities and 
differences in these findings and possibilities for future research.  
This thesis is an important addition to the case studies documenting the USW‟s 
international strategies. It is also the only one that this author knows about to examine 
the possibilities of long-term, cross-border organization in this context. Further 
research might take the compiled case studies of USW cross-border campaigns and 
apply my framework of coalitions, campaigns, capacity and contracts to them. 
Bridgestone/Firestone would be notable considering the development of the 
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Bridgestone/Firestone global network and regional networks after the campaign 
wrapped up. The Latin American United Tire and Rubber Industry Workers 
(FUTINAL) has become an important forum for regional coordination of unions in the 
tire and rubber industry. FUTINAL involves over twenty-five unions as well as the 
ICEM meeting regularly to exchange information and strategy (Steelabor 2001). 
BASF would also be an interesting example because a dense network of unions has 
developed in Latin America, Asia and Europe, but has not included North American 
BASF workers. This is especially interesting given the 1984-1990 BASF campaign in 
Louisiana which used international solidarity as a central tactic in ending the lockout 
(Minchin 2003). More research is needed to see how this network has been utilized in 
other cross-border solidarity campaigns such as Continental Tire, Titan Tire and 
Goodyear Tire.  
 
Other Network Actors 
National Networks 
This study also examines the initial formation of the global network as well as 
its ancillary national-level networks. These national networks are important for 
multiple reasons. First, in large countries such as the US and Brazil where there are 
multiple unionized facilities (thirteen in the US and more than a dozen in Brazil) with 
individual contracts  (especially when these facilities are geographically dispersed) 
there is a need to establish some formal network of communication and regular 
meeting to share information and coordinate common bargaining strategies. Second, 
these national networks dovetail with the cross-border work of the GWWC. 
International meetings are prohibitively expensive and lack of funds limit the number 
of local unionists who may participate in international meetings. National networks 
ensure that subjects covered, resolutions passed, and information shared at the global 
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level are disseminated back to the national and local level. Conversely they also serve 
to disseminate information and to communicate issues relevant to local unions upward 
to the global level.  
The cross-border network at Gerdau was an outgrowth of the strategies of 
building a national network of Gerdau unions in Brazil. Because the Brazilian 
industrial relations system confines official trade union structures to the municipal 
level and segments unions by industry and sector, unions have had to create 
autonomous and parallel structures in order to coordinate activity across firms and 
geographically across the nation. The CNM/CUT undertook a policy of building firm-
centered networks at multinational firms operating in Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Unions have been most successful in organizing in the auto, chemicals and heavy 
industry sectors. This program has evolved into a more methodical program of 
building networks at multinationals (see CUTMulti 2008) and has expanded its reach 
to building cross-border networks. The Gerdau example is somewhat unique in this 
respect (especially in the 1980s when there were few Brazilian multinationals) as it is 
a Brazilian and not a North American or Western European firm.  
National networks are important in their own right, not just as building blocks 
in cross-border networks. This is evidenced by the formative work of the North 
American Unity Council (formerly the North Star Unity Council) during their 
campaign to align contract expiration dates. The work of meetings, establishing trust, 
sharing common issues and overcoming grievances during this domestic campaign 
translated into a shared repertoire of activism and built lines of communication which 
would be utilized during the global campaign. As Gerdau expands and purchases new 
facilities, some of which are unionized, these union members may quickly be involved 
in the work of the network. The Unity Council continues to meet regularly, publish a 
newsletter and coordinate North American strategies.  
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Global Union Federations (GUFs) 
While Global Union Federations (and their predecessors, International Trade 
Secretariats before them) have been criticized in some quarters for ineffectiveness 
(Jakobsen 2001) GUFs have become more proactive in their involvement in cross-
border campaigns (see Snyder 2008). GUFs provide important resources to both the 
maintenance of global networks as well as to their expansion. First, GUFs provide 
financial, logistical and institutional support. Research tools, planning and executing 
international meetings, and translation (sometimes across three or more languages) 
cost large sums of money. Maintenance of websites, conference calls and 
(multilingual) newsletters are all time consuming and require devoted staff as well as 
developed networks of communication between parties.  
Second, globalization demands that unions develop more flexible means of 
coordination and GUFs play a crucial role in initiating contact between unions in new 
countries and regions. As corporations expand production networks beyond their 
established bases in Western Europe and North America or expand along commodity 
chains, unions need to expand their network of allies. Many unions are unfamiliar with 
cross-border work. GUFs have established offices and project staff in most regions 
across the globe. Few unions have the global infrastructure or capacity that GUFs 
have. Whatever the criticisms of GUFs for their ineffectiveness or structural defects 
they remain the only truly viable global labor organizations with the capacity to aid 
complex cross-border campaigns as well as ensure some form of continuity.  
Third, the rise of International Framework Agreements as both a tool for aiding 
cross-border campaigns and a long-term organizational goal have thrust GUFs into a 
more prominent role vis a vis cross-border networks and campaigns. While only fifty-
five IFAs have been signed and the reality of a signed and working IFA remains out of 
reach for most workers represented at multinationals, IFAs remain an important 
142 
 
benchmark of global union organization. GUFs have been signatories of all IFAs and 
remain at the center of negotiations with corporations once IFAs have been signed. It 
follows that GUFs would play a central role in facilitating cross-border networks 
throughout their gestation and not just once an IFA has already been signed. 
 The Gerdau network was formed “informally” in the sense that the 1998 
meeting in Charqueadas was an initiative of the USW Humanity Fund through its 
work with the CNM/CUT. Exchanges, meetings and cooperation around hemispheric 
trade deals such as the FTAA kept USW/CNM/CUT relationships active and 
communication open, but the network did not qualitatively expand until after the IMF 
became involved in 2003.  As Gerdau expanded into Argentina, Colombia, and across 
the US, coordination became more complex and required more resources. The 
Steelworker Humanity Fund was integral in the initial meetings with the Brazilians 
and Chileans, but a more global network needed a more centralized organizer to 
coordinate the growing number of unions scattered across Latin America. In order to 
handle the complications and logistics of expanding the Gerdau network it was natural 
that the IMF would take a more central role in coordinating the various unions.  
GUFs are not a panacea to the questions of global unionism. They are not 
designed to run campaigns on a local level or set the agenda for local unions, but 
rather to coordinate local and national struggles by maintaining global channels of 
communication and coordination. While GUFs are understaffed and underfunded, they 
do provide an important role in building and facilitating cross-border networks and 
campaigns. They have the reach and capability to initiate new contacts between unions 
in unfamiliar regions. GUFs also have the know-how to build cross-border networks 
and conduct campaigns. Most GUF staff are former union activists themselves and 
have run global comprehensive campaigns in their home unions. These staff 
campaigners bring with them a broad network of allies in unions and NGOs as well as 
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a proven repertoire of tactics and strategies tested in various circumstances. In the 
future GUFs will need to be important players in building cross-border networks and 
conducting global campaigns.  
 
Bridgebuilders 
Special note needs to be made of the role of “bridgebuilders,” both in building 
the Gerdau network as well as in conducting the North American campaign. 
Bridgebuilders are often overlooked in institutional analyses because they tend to be 
individuals, not institutions, and their utility cannot be summed up simply by their 
membership in one organization. By their nature they occupy a role that goes beyond 
the organization they represent. Tattersall and Rose discuss bridgebuilders in the 
social movement context as “people with experience in community organizations and 
unions who translate cultural differences between organizations” (Tattersall 2007: 
157; Rose 2000). Robertson and Plaiyoowong (2004) give a more germane definition 
with their analogy of “mid-fielders.” “The presence of a bi-lingual and knowledgeable 
„mid-fielder‟ who plays the key linking role with both the defensive and offensive side 
of the football team. In the case of an international labour solidarity effort the mid-
fielder is involved in both the national and international sides of the effort” (Robertson 
and Plaiyoowong 2004: 5).  
 It is difficult to build a model that presupposes or guarantees the presence of a 
bridgebuilder. “Bridgebuilder” is not a job title and one can‟t hire a bridgebuilder the 
way one can a researcher. Bridgebuilders tend to emerge organically from the specific 
context of a campaign. Researchers may have in-depth knowledge of how a 
corporation is structured and where it is vulnerable to pressure, but may not know who 
to contact or work with to implement an action plan. Organizers may be skilled at 
organizing actions and may know a group of workers inside and out, but without 
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knowing the cultural and political contexts of another country or union, an organizer 
will not be able to effectively run a global campaign.  
In the Gerdau case there was continuity in these bridgebuilders. Lopes‟ legacy 
as a former Gerdau worker,
8
 and a local and then national union activist who helped 
form the Gerdau network from the outset gave the Gerdau campaign an auspicious 
boost. For Lopes, the campaign was a logical extension of the effort he had put into 
building the network from the beginning. But Lopes‟ importance goes beyond the 
emotional or personal stake he brought to the campaign. Carolyn Kazdin, while 
officially hired by the USW after the North American campaign began, had been 
familiar with both the USW and CNM/CUT for years. Kazdin had participated in the 
Second International Gerdau meeting as the AFL-CIO Solidarity Center„s Brazil 
representative, and had remained in contact with activists in the Brazilian labor 
movement. When she was hired by the USW in a full time capacity in 2005 she was 
able to transition directly into aiding the Gerdau campaign without having to rebuild 
or reestablish trust.  
 Other important bridgebuilders on both sides of the equator contributed 
significant pieces to both the campaign and the network. Judith Marshall, director of 
the Steelworker Humanity Fund, was the central figure in the establishment of the 
Gerdau network on the northern side. Jorge Garcia-Orgales continues to be involved in 
research and organizing of the Gerdau network as well as others that involve Canadian 
USW members.  
 Despite criticism for its Cold War-era work in other parts of Latin America and 
the Global South, the AFL-CIO‟s Solidarity Center has maintained a steady presence 
in Brazil. Carolyn Kazdin‟s tenure at the Solidarity Center translated directly into her 
                                                 
8
 As per the Brazilian labor system Lopes is still officially employed by Gerdau though he receives no 
pay and has not worked in a Gerdau facility for over 20 years.  
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ability to slide into her new role with the USW during the Gerdau campaign. Terri 
Lapinsky facilitated early exchanges of Gerdau workers in Brazil and aided USW with 
worker tours and logistics until her departure in 2007. Current Brazil field 
representative Brian Finnegan, formerly the Solidarity Center representative for the 
Southern Cone, has taken a lead role in organizing and facilitating regional and 
international meetings of the GWWC. Each of these has acted as bridgebuilders 
mediating between Northern and Southern unionists. Their full time presence in Brazil 
and Latin America sends the message that one campaign is not isolated, and that 
solidarity is reciprocal. This continuity is important in maintaining lasting channels of 
trust and communication that work both, North to South and South to North. 
Bridgebuilders have been the focus of multiple articles in social movement literature, 
but have remained an under-researched phenomenon, especially in cross-border union 
literature. 
 
Challenges to the Model 
 The Gerdau campaign and cross-border network present many lessons for both 
practitioners and researchers, but it is not a complete model. The Gerdau case has 
room for improvement and expansion. Education and global pedagogy is an area for 
development of the Gerdau network. This question of pedagogy, education and 
creation of the space for cross-border exchange may be the most important issue for 
the long-term vitality, not just the continuity, of the Gerdau network. The Gerdau 
network was initiated by an initiative from the Steelworker Humanity Fund, an 
organization which has consistently placed worker education and exchanges at the 
center of its mission. As the Gerdau network shifted from a Humanity Fund project to 
a more concentrated USW project, the focus on education and pedagogy has 
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diminished. This may be partly due to lack of resources and focus at the USW 
international as well as the urgency created by the North American campaign.  
First, the USW will need to devote more resources to creating a pedagogy 
around globalization for local union members. The process of “making members 
internationalists” does not happen automatically and unions cannot rely upon crises, 
such as the North American campaign, to radicalize or globalize its members. In order 
for bargaining power to be truly expanded, Gerdau management must be constantly 
reminded, on a plant-by-plant basis, that local members are connected to global 
networks of power and that these networks are available to be used. Through button 
and t-shirt days, worker exchanges, study sessions, and global solidarity funds, local 
unions must make transform these global networks into local bargaining power.  
  This pedagogy would ensure that members see cross-border strategies as an 
option when looking for creative solutions to collective bargaining issues. A 
commitment to worker education about globalization would also combat the tendency 
in some media to portray foreign workers as competition rather than as sources of 
solidarity. An analysis of the broader Gerdau project must take into account the shift 
from the early focus on worker education by the Steelworker Humanity Fund to a 
more organizational approach to developing the GWWC. Pedagogy and education 
cannot be sacrificed for the larger goals of building more stable cross-border 
organization from the top down. 
  Second, because Gerdau is a multinational steel producer it is embedded in a 
global production chain that includes miners and transport workers downstream and 
construction workers upstream. Miners and workers in extractive industries have been 
involved in global production chain organizing at Rio Tinto, Vale Rio Doce and 
others. These networks have grown to include environmental activists in the producing 
country and the consuming countries. Dockers and transport workers have also been 
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involved in global organizing efforts. Expanding the Gerdau network to include these 
sectors could increase the bargaining power of Gerdau workers globally by producing 
more sites of potential leverage in the case of a strike, lock out or global organizing 
campaign.  
The third potential site for expansion of the network would be to use the 
network in a global organizing campaign. While most production facilities outside of 
the United States are already organized, Gerdau remains nearly fifty percent 
unorganized in the US. The USW has shown itself to be adroit at using global 
strategies during bargaining campaigns, yet it has shown a reluctance to use this 
potential leverage in organizing campaigns. Most union have been hesitant to integrate 
global solidarity into their organizing campaigns, despite UNITE‟s 2001-2003 
campaign at Brylane (Hannah 2006) and 2004-2005 campaign at H&M which 
demonstrated  that global solidarity could be an important component. The Gerdau 
case is ultimately a defensive case. A concerted and well-planned effort to organize 
workers in the US with the aid of the cross-border network could be an example for 
other USW networks and a riposte to critics who claim that industrial workers cannot 
be organized in the current economic context. Without a comprehensive strategy to 
organize non-union Gerdau facilities in North America, gains made through cross-
border campaigns and collective bargaining are likely to be threatened by whipsawing 
and non-union competition.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
This thesis has examined the development of a cross-border union network at 
the multinational steel firm, Gerdau. The Gerdau case study provides a rich source of 
information for examining the dynamics of cross-border union activity and 
organization. The Gerdau network has lasted more than ten years and continues to 
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meet and coordinate activity. Unlike other cases of cross-border coordination, the 
Gerdau network has withstood many tests to its very existence and yet, in spite of 
these challenges, the network has thrived. It is this perseverance and continuity of 
organization that is at the heart of this case study. What factors, both internal and 
external, have led the Gerdau story to be one of success while so many other attempts 
at cross-border union coordination have failed to sustain themselves beyond initial 
cooperation? Does the Gerdau network provide a model for other unions to build long-
term, cross-border organization? If so, what are the keys to replicating such a model? I 
believe the Gerdau network does hold important lessons for other unions, though 
applying these lessons in other contexts may be more of an art than a science.   
First, the Gerdau network has been built on a foundation of rank and file 
involvement. From the first meetings between Brazilian, Chilean and Canadian trade 
unionists in 1998 to more formal iterations of the Gerdau network, such as the 
GWWC, rank and file members have been central to cross-border strategy. What is 
key, and overlooked by most studies, is not just what happened during the cross-
border exchanges and delegations themselves, but what happened when these workers 
returned to their workplaces and union locals. Internationalism became more than just 
something that occurred overseas; rather, internationalism was brought back with 
workers and able to slowly take root in the locals in Brazil, Canada, and the US. This 
ensured that the seeds of shared interests and common goals were planted among the 
rank and file base at Gerdau. Workers delegations gave solidarity a face, not just 
during the meetings of 1998, 2003 and during the 2006 Gerdau Study Tour, but 
especially during the 2005-2007 global campaign when US workers told their stories 
of poor working conditions and management intimidation directly to Brazilian 
unionists unfamiliar with that side of Gerdau. Unions at Gerdau will need to ensure 
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that this legacy of rank and file involvement remains the foundation of future cross-
border collaboration.  
Rank and file involvement in cross-border activities built deep bonds of trust, 
and in doing so laid the foundation for more complex cross-border activity such as the 
2005-2007 global campaign. That campaign occupies a central role in this case study 
not just because of the strength and endurance of the workers involved, but for the 
level of coordination the three-year campaign took to complete. The campaign was a 
tangible expression of solidarity and coordinated activity on an unprecedented level at 
Gerdau. North and South American unions had met and exchanged information prior 
to the campaign, but the campaign demonstrated that unions at Gerdau had a sufficient 
level of comfort and familiarity with each others‟ tactics and an ample reserve of trust 
that unions could coordinate a cross-border campaign with actions taking place in 
multiple countries simultaneously. Granted, the campaign was spearheaded by the 
USW, who had run similar types of campaigns before, but not at Gerdau. The USW 
could not have maintained the level of pressure on Gerdau management in its most 
vulnerable area, Brazil, without a history of trust and a network of unions ready to do 
actions on the ground on behalf of the USW. Unions at Gerdau will need to make sure 
that calls for global solidarity are reciprocated, especially when those calls come from 
smaller unions with fewer resources. It will also be important for unions at Gerdau to 
find ways of building cross-border campaigns to expand, rather than just defend, 
levels of bargaining power.   
Third, the establishment of the GWWC in 2006 may be the single most 
important event, in the more than ten-year case of the Gerdau network. The GWWC is 
key because it demonstrated a level of structural and organizational maturity that most 
cross-border union networks lack. The GWWC is a formal body for regular meetings, 
shared decision-making, and the resolution of differences between unions. It implies a 
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commitment to future activity, rather than organization for a single event. There have 
been numerous cases of individual cross-border campaigns and cycles of worker 
exchanges between unions at other multinational firms, but only a scant handful of 
unions have been able to maintain organizational continuity and vitality, especially 
without the structural scaffolding of a transnational regulatory framework such as the 
European Works Councils system. With the benefits of more developed levels of 
coordination comes a responsibility to involve all Gerdau unions, not just the largest 
unions, in the decision-making process. Unions will need to make sure that the voices 
of all unions at Gerdau are heard, and likewise that the GWWC represents the interests 
of all its members.  
Finally, the issue of an IFA may be the most difficult challenge facing the 
Gerdau network as a whole. An IFA undoubtedly remains an important long-term goal 
for the network and, if achieved, would give the network an established level of 
recognition from Gerdau management and ensure a broad framework of rights for all 
unions at Gerdau. But an IFA is not a panacea for Gerdau unions; IFAs are only as 
strong as the unions who use them. Nonetheless, an IFA remains a central, long-term 
organizing frame for cross-border activity, even if the realization of that goal 
continues to be seemingly far off.  If it were to be achieved by unions at Gerdau, it 
would be one of the first IFAs to come from a bottom-up campaign at a non-Western 
MNC, a historic feat.  
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